Nuclear Power Plants and Emergency Planning: An Intergovernmental Nightmare

1984 ◽  
Vol 44 (5) ◽  
pp. 393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard T. Sylves
2006 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 448-454 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jay Wu ◽  
Yung-Muh Yang ◽  
Ing-Jane Chen ◽  
Huan-Tong Chen ◽  
Keh-Shih Chuang

Author(s):  
Amesh A. Adalja ◽  
Tara Kirk Sell ◽  
Sanjana J. Ravi ◽  
Katie Minton ◽  
Ryan Morhard

AbstractEach of the nuclear power plants in the US is encircled by an Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). Within each EPZ, government officials, utility professionals, emergency managers, and public health practitioners collectively conduct extensive planning, exercises, and outreach to better protect their communities in the event of a nuclear accident. Our objective was to conduct a cross-sectional study of off-site public health preparedness within EPZs to better understand the dynamics of nuclear preparedness and uncover lessons for all-hazards preparedness.Using a qualitative, interview-based method, we consulted 120 county emergency managers, state health preparedness officers, state radiation health officials, and industry officials from 17 EPZs in ten different states.Interviewees reflected that EPZ emergency preparedness is generally robust, results from strong public-private partnership between nuclear plants and emergency management agencies, and enhances all-hazard preparedness. However, there exist a few areas which merit further study and improvement. These areas include cross-state coordination, digital public communication, and optimizing the level of public education within EPZs.This first-of-its-kind study provides a cross-sectional snapshot of emergency preparedness in the 10-mile EPZ surrounding nuclear power plants.


2007 ◽  
Vol 92 (Suppl 1) ◽  
pp. S18-S26 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Blando ◽  
Corwin Robertson ◽  
Katina Pearl ◽  
Carline Dixon ◽  
Martin Valcin ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Wang Xuan ◽  
Du Fenglei ◽  
Sun Dawei ◽  
Tang Te

Determination of the SMR emergency planning zone (EPZ) is one of the important external constraint factor of its marketing and application, which means that it is very important to formulate appropriate classification criteria and establish proper size range. In China, due to the requirement of “Criteria for emergency planning and preparedness for nuclear power plants: Part 1, The dividing of emergency planning zone.” (GB/T 17680.1-2008), for PWR nuclear power plant, its external plume EPZ should be within 7km–10km, and its internal plume EPZ should be within 3km∼5km. However, the scope of the standard for the emergency planning area is currently limited to conventional nuclear power plants, and for the current SMR, its emergency planning size is not included. In this paper, we will analyze the classification method of SMR EPZ based on the traditional Nuclear Power Plants feedback experience, including selection of source term, accident cutoff probability, determination method of the plume EPZ and the ingestion EPZ. Three typical nuclear power plant sites in China are chosen as CAP200 case study sites, including two inland nuclear power plant sites and one coastal site. The three sites can represent most of the meteorological and terrain characters of China nuclear power plants. According to the CAP200 source term and meteorological data of the sites, MACCS2 computer program is used to calculate the severe accidents consequence. Conclusions show that for the CAP200 SMR, the accident cutoff probability can be 1.0E−08 to 1.0E−07 per reactor per year, and its project dose exceeding probability in the three sites boundary is far below 30%, which directs that for CAP200 SMR, its plume and ingestion emergence planning zone is limited to the on-site area, and its off-site emergency response can be simplified.


Sadhana ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 38 (5) ◽  
pp. 925-943 ◽  
Author(s):  
P K VIJAYAN ◽  
M T KAMBLE ◽  
A K NAYAK ◽  
K K VAZE ◽  
R K SINHA

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sümer Şahin ◽  
Muhammad Ali

Emergency planning zones (PAZ and UPZ) around the Karachi-2 and Karachi-3 nuclear power plants (K-2/K-3 NPPs) have been realistically determined by employing Gaussian puff model and Gaussian plume model together for atmospheric transport, diffusion, and deposition of radioactive material using onsite and regional data related to meteorology, topography, and land-use along with latest IAEA Post-Fukushima Guidelines. The analysis work has been carried out using U.S.NRC computer code RASCAL 4.2. The assumed environmental radioactive releases provide the sound theoretical and practical bases for the estimation of emergency planning zones covering most expected scenario of severe accident and most recent multiunit Fukushima Accident. Sheltering could be used as protective action for longer period of about 04 days. The area about 3 km of K-2/K-3 NPPs site should be evacuated and an iodine thyroid blocking agent should be taken before release up to about 14 km to prevent severe deterministic effects. Stochastic effects may be avoided or minimized by evacuating the area within about 8 km of the K-2/K-3 NPPs site. Protective actions may become more effective and cost beneficial by using current methodology as Gaussian puff model realistically represents atmospheric transport, dispersion, and disposition processes in contrast to straight-line Gaussian plume model explicitly in study area. The estimated PAZ and UPZ were found 3 km and 8 km, respectively, around K-2/K-3 NPPs which are in well agreement with IAEA Post-Fukushima Study. Therefore, current study results could be used in the establishment of emergency planning zones around K-2/K-3 NPPs.


Nature ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 303 (5913) ◽  
pp. 101-101
Author(s):  
Peter David

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