Decision-Making in the Supreme Court

1986 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bertha Wilson
Author(s):  
Jill Cottrell

Examining the Constitution of Kenya 2010, the chapter picks up its concept of public participation in decision-making and a more active form of democracy than simply voting once in five years. In Kenya, Parliament and other legislatures, as well as executive bodies and the judiciary’s administration regularly invite public input into their decision-making processes. The courts have held some legislation, though not at the national level, invalid for want of adequate participation, while the Supreme Court, rather the chief justice, has set out principles of participation in a major judgment. The chapter traces the rationale and the history of this development, and attempts a preliminary assessment of its impact on Kenyan democracy. Suggestions are also made for making public participation more effective.


Author(s):  
G. Edward White

Volume 2 of this series devoted several chapters to the emergence of what it called “guardian review” on the Supreme Court, a posture in which justices acted as guardians of individual rights against restrictions by the state. This volume contains several chapters exploring the replacement of that posture with “bifurcated review,” featuring a deferential attitude toward some restriction of individual rights and aggressive scrutiny of others. This chapter describes the evolution from guardian to bifurcated review on the Court and matches it to changes in the Court’s internal decision-making protocols from the 1940s through to the 1970s.


2012 ◽  
Vol 102 (1) ◽  
pp. 202-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matias Iaryczower ◽  
Matthew Shum

We estimate an equilibrium model of decision making in the US Supreme Court that takes into account both private information and ideological differences between justices. We measure the value of information in the court by the probability that a justice votes differently from how she would have voted without case-specific information. Our results suggest a sizable value of information: in 44 percent of cases, justices' initial leanings are changed by their personal assessments of the case. Our results also confirm the increased politicization of the Supreme Court in the last quarter century. Counterfactual simulations provide implications for institutional design. (JEL D72, D82, D83, K10)


1993 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 511-529 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph A. Ignagni

The U.S. Supreme Court, at various times, has changed the constitutional tests it claimed to use in order to settle free exercise of religion disputes. These changes in official doctrine and the manner in which many cases have been decided have left the Supreme Court open to much criticism from legal scholars. This study differs substantially from previous work in this area. It uses a fact-attitudinal model to analyze the cases from the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts. Its findings indicate that these decisions are, generally, explainable and predictable.


2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-233
Author(s):  
Benjamin Michael Superfine ◽  
Regina R. Umpstead ◽  
David Mayrowetz ◽  
Sarah Winchell Lenhoff ◽  
Ben Pogodzinski

In March 2017, the Supreme Court decided Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association and upheld the constitutionality of agency fees for nonunion teachers. We examine how Friedrichs reflects a host of issues grouped around a patchwork of ideological commitments regarding teachers unions and public-sector unions more generally, partisan politics, and empirically oriented claims about the impact of teachers unions on students’ educational opportunities. We particularly argue that the case reflects a tension between judicial, scientific, and democratic decision-making, and that courts and reformers should be sensitive to this tension as they consider similar cases moving forward.


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