scholarly journals The Supreme Court, The Death Penalty, and The Harris Case

1992 ◽  
Vol 102 (1) ◽  
pp. 205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judge Stephen Reinhardt
2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 567-576
Author(s):  
Henri Brun

The Miller case, decided by the Supreme Court of Canada on October 5, 1976, puts the death penalty under the light of the Canadian Bill of Rights which formulates the right to life and the right to protection against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. The following comment on the case relates to the interpretation given specific clauses of the Bill of Rights by the Court on that occasion. But it stresses especially the law that flows from the case about the compelling weight of the Bill of Rights over acts of Parliament enacted after the Bill came into force. In Miller, the Supreme Court expressed itself on the subject for the first time.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John H. Blume ◽  
Lyndsey S. Vann

11 Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy 183 (2016)Forty years ago, the Supreme Court of the United States deemed constitutional new death penalty laws intended to minimize the arbitrariness which led the Court to invalidate all capital sentencing statutes four years earlier in Furman v. Georgia. Over the last four decades the Court has — time and again — attempted to regulate the “machinery of death.” Looking back over the Court’s work, many observers, including two current Supreme Court justices, have questioned whether the modern death penalty has lived up to expectations set by the Court in the 1970s or if, despite 40 years of labor, the American death penalty continues to be administered in an unconstitutionally arbitrary manner. This Article presents data from South Carolina’s forty-year experiment with capital punishment and concludes that the administration of the death penalty in that state is still riddled with error and infected with racial and gender bias. It is — in short — still arbitrary after all these years. The authors maintain that the only true cure it to abolish South Carolina’s death penalty, although they do argue that lesser steps including additional safeguards and procedure may limit, but will not eliminate, some of the arbitrariness and bias which are present in the current imposition of South Carolina’s most extreme punishment.


Lethal State ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 153-179
Author(s):  
Seth Kotch

As the death penalty was falling out of use in North Carolina, the civil rights movement was underway. In 1972, the Supreme Court ruled in Furman v. Georgia that the death penalty as practiced was unconstitutional. Politically conservative North Carolinians who viewed the Supreme Court as a weapon of liberal overreach reacted by reinstating the mandatory death penalty and ultimately adopting the bifurcated sentencing protocol now in use around the country. The renewed interest in the death penalty emerged from the tough-on-crime rhetoric adopted by conservatives and the Republican Party during and after the civil rights movement. North Carolina resumed executions in 1984.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (4) ◽  
pp. 707-713
Author(s):  
Jacquelene Mwangi

The decision of the Supreme Court of Kenya (Court) in Francis Karioko Muruatetu and Another v. Republic (Muruatetu), finding the mandatory nature of the death penalty unconstitutional, represents not only a victory for human rights in Africa but also the transformative capacity of contemporary constitutions in Africa and the growing assertiveness of African judiciaries. In the judgment, the Court held that the mandatory death penalty is “out of sync with the progressive Bill of Rights” in Kenya's 2010 Constitution (para. 64) and an affront to the rule of law. The Court also relied on global death penalty jurisprudence to find the mandatory death sentence “harsh, unjust and unfair” (para. 48). Consequently, the Court mandated that all trial courts conduct a pre-sentencing hearing to determine whether the death penalty is deserved. The Court's judgment could spell the end of the mandatory death penalty in Kenya after almost 120 years on the statute books.


2006 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence C. Marshall

In 1976, the Supreme Court of the United States, allowing optimism to trump experience, accepted various states’ assurances that new death penalty procedures the states had then recently adopted would avoid the vices that had led the Court to strike down the death penalty in 1972. Now, some thirty years later, a body of evidence has developed demonstrating that this experiment has failed—that the problems of arbitrariness, racism and propensity to error are endemic to the criminal justice system (particularly with regard to capital punishment) and cannot be cured by what Justice Blackmun called “tinker[ing] with the machinery of death.” Despite the Court’s best intentions, the death penalty procedures of the 1980s and 1990s and the first half of this decade reflect little if any significant improvement over the condemned pre-1972 systems.


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