Hollywood on Trials: Courts and Films, 1930–1960

1994 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 341-367 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman Rosenberg

As long as legal scholarship focused on traditional sources that were considered“distinctively legal,” a great variety of “legal texts” were consigned to scholars in other disciplines. Thus, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1841–1932) and his classic workThe Common Law(1881) appeared safely inside the categorical “box” identified as distinctively legal, while Louis Calhern's portrayal of Holmes and the filmThe Magnificent Yankee(MGM, 1950) fell outside.In recent years, however, both the inside/outside distinction and the legal box metaphor have become increasingly suspect. Drawing upon post-structuralist theories, which highlight the discursive and representational dimensions of law, a variety of different projects seek to locate the diverse places at which legal rhetoric and imagery are constituted.

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 135
Author(s):  
Seyed Mohammad Mousavi ◽  
Arash Babaei ◽  
Shamsollah Khatami ◽  
Yousef Jafarzadi

<p>One characteristic of the force of law in the country, the integrity of the rules in all areas of all aspects of creation into account the distinction between crime and the crime and failed or incomplete in acts of crime and crime as the withdrawal. In this respect the rules on penalties culpability in the crime has been proposed that the content of the crime with absolute responsibility of these categories has manifested. Under the Articles 144 and 145 of the Latest version Islamic criminal law (2013), Create unintentional offenses, subject to verification of the fault committed. In crimes ranging from quasi-intentional unintentional deviation as retaliation book rules apply. Legislator to commit a fault, the reason for the error is considered criminal, which has always been considered an objective measure and a ruler (in Article 145), while the common law under subsection (1) "criminal law to crimes" adopted 1981 crime start as the offense is punishable total. This study showed that certain similarities between the laws. In this context, the two internal laws and the common law can be found, in which the underlying offense of absolute liability is not fixed in the courts. Always treat judges and lawyers in the face of legal texts are not consistent because of the lack of transparency and clarity of the rules. In particular, in the common law, when a crime for the first time in cour t, and a warrant has been issued about it in terms of predicting the law and with regard to the interpretation of judges, procedural difference is more tangible.</p>


2019 ◽  
pp. 63-92
Author(s):  
Gamonal C. Sergio ◽  
César F. Rosado Marzán

Chapter 3 describes the principle of primacy of reality in Latin America, namely, in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. The principle is also contained in the International Labor Organization’s Recommendation 198. The principle posits that facts must be given preference over what parties, particularly employers, state in legal texts, documents, and agreements. It is particularly important when determining threshold questions in labor law, such as employee and employer status. While employers might deny an employment relationship given a formal agreement to hire workers as independent contractors, the facts might show otherwise. However, the chapter also argues that primacy of reality depends on the principle of protection and in dubio pro operario to resolve questions when the facts are not dispositive given vague or missing rules. The chapter then searches primacy of reality in the United States and finds it in various employment tests, such as the common law control test. It is also finds it in employer tests of joint employer status. However, many of those tests remain vague, requiring supplementation with the U.S. versions of in dubio pro operario, i.e., liberal construction of the statutes that derogate the common law, and with legislative purpose. Primacy of reality makes it even more important for legal operators to be cognizant of labor law principles and, principally, the protective principle.


Obiter ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eltjo Schrage

Within both the civil law and the common law (as well as in mixed legal systems), there are means of acquiring and losing rights, or of freeing ourselves from obligations with the passage of time. The reason for this is at least twofold: on the one hand, for a claimant, a dispossessed owner or a creditor, limitation and prescription provide stimuli for bringing the action; on the other, this sanction upon the negligence of the claimant implies in many cases a windfall for the defendant. If a creditor is negligent in protecting his assets, the law at a certain stage no longer protects him or her. As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. said aptly some 100 years ago: “Sometimes it is said that, if a man neglects to enforce his rights, he cannot complain if, after a while, the law follows his example”.


2016 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 155-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Papp Kamali

During the period at issue in this paper–the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when trial juries were first employed in English felony cases–felonious homicide was a catch-all category, with no formal distinction drawn between murder and manslaughter. Nevertheless, juries did distinguish among different types of homicide as they sorted the guilty from the innocent, and the irremediably guilty from those worthy of pardon. Anger was one of the factors that informed this sorting process. This paper builds upon an earlier analysis of the meaning of felony, which posited that the medieval paradigm of felony was an act that involved deliberation and forethought, an exercise of a person's reasoning capacity and volition in the absence of necessity, and moral blameworthiness. Anger complicates this scenario. On the one hand, anger was seen to be a product of an ill-formed conscience. This potentially placed anger within the felonious area of moral blameworthiness. On the other hand, anger in its more extreme manifestations was seen to inhibit a person's ability to reason and to inspire behavior resembling insanity, thereby possibly pointing toward a partial excuse. This paper takes a fresh methodological approach for the study of emotion in the common law, placing legal texts within a broader cultural context in order to illuminate the concerns and priorities of jurors.


2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Carla Spivack

AbstractCivil law regimes in Europe have been cautiously open to the common law trust for commercial purposes, and to some forms of the private trust as well. This openness indicates that the time may be right to issue a warning to civil lawyers about the recent proliferation of highly problematic forms of the trust in the U. S., and to offer an explanation of the dysfunction which allowed these trusts to win legislative approval. Civil law may be less amenable to these forms of trust for reasons of social policy and legal philosophy as expressed in foundational legal texts. Recent changes to EU trust law and to French and Dutch tax law indicate that this may be the case. This article discusses these new trust forms and discusses some elements of civil law which, at least from a common lawyer’s perspective, offer some resistance to them.


2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 534-546
Author(s):  
Allen Mendenhall

Seth Vannatta identifies the common law as a central feature of the jurisprudence of former United States Supreme Court justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Holmes treated the common law as if it were an epistemology or a reliable mode for knowledge transmission over successive generations. Against the grand notion that the common law reflected a priori principles consistent with the natural law, Holmes detected that the common law was historical, aggregated, and evolutionary, the sum of the concrete facts and operative principles of innumerable cases with reasonable solutions to complex problems. This view of the common law is both conservative and pragmatic. Vannatta’s analysis of Holmes opens new directions for the study of conservatism and pragmatism—and pragmatic conservatism—demonstrating that common-law processes and practices have much in common with the form of communal inquiry championed by C.S. Peirce.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document