The Struggle for the Middle East: The Soviet Union in the Mediterranean 1958-1968

1972 ◽  
Vol 92 (2) ◽  
pp. 383
Author(s):  
Charles D. Smith ◽  
Walter Laqueur
1972 ◽  
Vol 87 (2) ◽  
pp. 275
Author(s):  
Oles M. Smolansky ◽  
Walter Laqueur ◽  
Aaron S. Klieman

2019 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Marcinkiewicz-Kaczmarczyk

This article explores the establishment of the Polish Women’s Auxiliary Service (was) as part of the complex story of the formation of a Polish army in exile. In 1941, after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the Polish Army in the Soviet Union was established. The Women’s Auxiliary Service was formed at the same time as a means to enable Polish women to serve their country and also as a way for Polish women to escape the Soviet Union. The women of the was followed the Polish Army combat trail from Buzuluk to London, accompanying their male peers first to the Middle East and then Italy. The women of the was served as nurses, clerks, cooks and drivers. This article examines the recruitment, organization and daily life of the women who served their country as exiles on the battlefront of the Second World War.


Author(s):  
Dina Rezk

In July 1958, an unknown nationalist, General Abdul Karim Qasim, came to the helm of power in Iraq. Chapter 3 reveals how analysts reacted to the brutal murder of his predecessor Nuri al Said, as Britain’s most important ally in the Middle East seemed to contract the Nasser ‘virus’ spreading through the region. Qasim quickly demonstrated that he was no Nasserist stooge however. Whilst British policymakers hoped in vain that the new Iraqi leader could be cultivated as a counterweight to Nasser, the intelligence community rapidly realised that Qasim had neither the charisma nor the popularity to compete with his Egyptian counterpart in the Arab Cold War. Qasim reliance on Iraqi Communists to counteract the influence of local Nasserites led to widespread fears that Iraq was on the brink of acquiring Soviet satellite status. This chapter brings to light for the first time the JIC’s nuanced analysis of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), suggesting to policy-makers that in fact the Soviet Union was acting as a restraining influence on the Iraqi communists. Qasim came to be increasingly depicted as ‘paranoid’ and ‘irrational’, whilst assessments of Nasser took on a new and more complimentary light as a ‘moderate’ potential ally in the quest to prevent Communist penetration of the Middle East.


Author(s):  
David Abulafia

The Allied victory over Germany in the Second World War, like that in the First, left the Mediterranean unsettled. After Greece emerged from its civil war with a pro-western government, there were ever louder rumbles in Cyprus, where the movement calling for enôsis, union with Greece, was gathering pace again. Precisely because the Greeks sided with the West, and because Turkey had kept out of the war, during the late 1940s the United States began to see the Mediterranean as an advance position in the new struggle against the expanding power of the Soviet Union. The explicit theme was the defence of democracy against Communist tyranny. Stalin’s realism had prevented him from supporting Communist insurgency in Greece, but he was keen to find ways of gaining free access to the Mediterranean through the Dardanelles. In London and Washington, the fear that Soviet allies would establish themselves on the shores of the Mediterranean remained real, since the partisan leader in Yugoslavia, Tito, had played the right cards during the last stages of the war, even winning support from the British. Moreover, the Italians had lost Zadar along with the naval base at Kotor and chunks of Dalmatia they had greedily acquired during the war, while Albania, after an agonizing period of first Italian and then German occupation, had recovered its independence under the Paris-educated Communist leader Enver Hoxha, whose uncompromising stance was to bring his country into ever-greater isolation. When he took power, Hoxha imagined that his country would form part of a brotherly band of socialist nations, alongside Tito’s renascent Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Close ties with the Yugoslavs were sealed by economic pacts which reveal Tito’s hope of drawing Albania into the Yugoslav federation. Hoxha had other aspirations, and in his view Albania’s right to defend every square inch of the national territory extended into the waters off the Albanian coast: the Corfu Channel, long used as a waterway linking Greece to the Adriatic, was mined to prevent foreign incursions. Britain decided to send warships through the channel, asserting its right to police the Mediterranean on behalf of the nations of the world.


Author(s):  
Maria Koinova

This chapter and the following Chapter 9 are interconnected as they both discuss Armenian diaspora mobilizations. This chapter focuses on the transnational social field and the four types of diaspora entrepreneurs. Armenians have lived in the Caucasus and the Middle East prior to the 1915 Armenian genocide, a defining moment historically and especially for the diaspora. Self-determination claims of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh have been interconnected historically, considered part of ‘Eastern Armenia’. They both seceded from the Soviet Union in 1991. An independent Armenia was internationally recognized as a state, unlike the de facto state of Karabakh, unrecognized at present. A devastating 1988 earthquake and a war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Karabakh (1992–4) created opportune moments for the diaspora in Western countries to connect to Armenia and Karabakh. The diaspora in Europe was primarily formed by survivors and descendants of the Armenian genocide, with roots in ‘Western Armenia’ in Turkey and the larger Middle East, and organized by diaspora parties. Fragility of statehood in Armenia and Karabakh, and recurrent violence and authoritarianism in the Middle East continued to create push factors for Armenians to emigrate across the globe and for the diaspora to mobilize. The highest priority in the diaspora, especially in Europe, remained the recognition of the Armenian genocide, while Karabakh’s recognition and supporting Armenia took a back seat. The chapter presents data on migration in the Armenian field, in the Caucasus, the Middle East and globally, and specifies the individual profiles of Armenian diaspora entrepreneurs.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document