Campaign Spending on California Ballot Propositions, 1924-1984: Trends and Voting Effects

1986 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 675 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Owens ◽  
Larry L. Wade
Keyword(s):  
Campaign Spending

The Effect of Campaign Spending on Election Outcomes in Korea

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-58
Author(s):  
Yongjoo Jeon ◽  
Seungoh Nam
Keyword(s):  
Campaign Spending

Does Campaign Spending Affect Electoral Outcomes?

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avi Ben-Bassat ◽  
Momi Dahan ◽  
Esteban F. Klor
Keyword(s):  
Campaign Spending ◽  
Electoral Outcomes

Is the equalization/normalization lens dead? Social media campaigning in US congressional elections

2018 ◽  
Vol 42 (5) ◽  
pp. 718-731 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Gainous ◽  
Andrew Segal ◽  
Kevin Wagner
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Congressional Elections ◽  
Campaign Spending ◽  
Interactive Effects ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Electoral Success ◽  
The Masses ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose Early information technology scholarship centered on the internet’s potential to be a democratizing force was often framed using an equalization/normalization lens arguing that either the internet was going to be an equalizing force bringing power to the masses, or it was going to be normalized into the existing power structure. The purpose of this paper is to argue that considered over time the equalization/normalization lens still sheds light on our understanding of how social media (SM) strategy can shape electoral success asking if SM are an equalizing force balancing the resource gap between candidates or are being normalized into the modern campaign. Design/methodology/approach SM metrics and electoral data were collected for US congressional candidates in 2012 and 2016. A series of additive and interactive models are employed to test whether the effects of SM reach on electoral success are conditional on levels of campaign spending. Findings The results suggest that those candidates who spend more actually get more utility for their SM campaign than those who spend less in 2012. However, by 2016, spending inversely correlates with SM campaign utility. Research limitations/implications The findings indicate that SM appeared to be normalizing into the modern congressional campaign in 2012. However, with higher rates of penetration and greater levels of usage in 2016, the SM campaign utility was not a result of higher spending. SM may be a greater equalizing force now. Practical implications Campaigns that initially integrate digital and traditional strategies increase the effectiveness of the SM campaign because the non-digital strategy both complements and draws attention to the SM campaign. However, by 2016 the SM campaign was not driven by its relation to traditional campaign spending. Originality/value This is the first large N study to examine the interactive effects of SM reach and campaign spending on electoral success.

scholarly journals Policy platforms, campaign spending and voter participation

2008 ◽  
Vol 92 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 501-513 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helios Herrera ◽  
David K. Levine ◽  
César Martinelli
Keyword(s):  
Campaign Spending ◽  
Voter Participation

How Do Campaign Spending Limits Affect Elections? Evidence from the United Kingdom 1885–2019

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
ALEXANDER FOUIRNAIES
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
Campaign Spending ◽  
House Of Commons ◽  
Electoral Campaigns ◽  
Limit Formula ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The World ◽  
Legal Constraints ◽  
The Cost

In more than half of the democratic countries in the world, candidates face legal constraints on how much money they can spend on their electoral campaigns, yet we know little about the consequences of these restrictions. I study how spending limits affect UK House of Commons elections. I contribute new data on the more than 70,000 candidates who ran for a parliamentary seat from 1885 to 2019, and I document how much money each candidate spent, how they allocated their resources across different spending categories, and the spending limit they faced. To identify the effect on elections, I exploit variation in spending caps induced by reforms of the spending-limit formula that affected some but not all constituencies. The results indicate that when the level of permitted spending is increased, the cost of electoral campaigns increases, which is primarily driven by expenses related to advertisement and mainly to the disadvantage of Labour candidates; the pool of candidates shrinks and elections become less competitive; and the financial and electoral advantages enjoyed by incumbents are amplified.

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