Presidential Power, Legislative Organization, and Party Behavior in Brazil

2000 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo ◽  
Fernando Limongi
Author(s):  
Matthew E. Bergman ◽  
Cory L. Struthers ◽  
Matthew S. Shugart ◽  
Robert J. Pekkanen ◽  
Ellis S. Krauss

Author(s):  
Douglas L. Kriner ◽  
Eric Schickler

Although congressional investigations have provided some of the most dramatic moments in American political history, they have often been dismissed as mere political theater. But these investigations are far more than grandstanding. This book shows that congressional investigations are a powerful tool for members of Congress to counter presidential aggrandizement. By shining a light on alleged executive wrongdoing, investigations can exert significant pressure on the president and materially affect policy outcomes. This book constructs the most comprehensive overview of congressional investigative oversight to date, analyzing nearly 13,000 days of hearings, spanning more than a century, from 1898 through 2014. The book examines the forces driving investigative power over time and across chambers, and identifies how hearings might influence the president’s strategic calculations through the erosion of the president’s public approval rating, and uncover the pathways through which investigations have shaped public policy. Put simply, by bringing significant political pressure to bear on the president, investigations often afford Congress a blunt, but effective check on presidential power—without the need to worry about veto threats or other hurdles such as Senate filibusters. In an era of intense partisan polarization and institutional dysfunction, the book delves into the dynamics of congressional investigations and how Congress leverages this tool to counterbalance presidential power.


Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 6
Author(s):  
Anna Bassi

Although parties’ preferences for office and policy goals have been featured by many rational choice models of party behavior and a majority of coalition theories, the literature still lacks a measure and a comprehensive analysis of how parties’ preferences vary among parties and across countries. This study aims to fill this gap by presenting the results of an original expert survey protocol, which finds that parties pursue both goals simultaneously as office is sought both as and an end and as a means to affect policy, and that the degree to which they prefer policy versus office objectives varies across parties and countries. I provide an application of the preference ratings for policy versus office in the context of government formation, by using the ratings to solve for and predict the equilibrium coalition that should have formed in Spain after the 2015 elections. The government predicted by the model matches the government that formed, providing evidence of the ability of the preference ratings to generate reliable predictions of the composition of government coalitions.


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