An Inverted Logroll: The Charlottetown Accord and the Referendum

1993 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Johnston
Keyword(s):  
Charlottetown Accord

scholarly journals BEYOND THE FLIGHT FROM CONSTITUTIONAL LEGALISM: RETHINKING THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY POST-CHARLOTTETOWN

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (1, 2 & 3) ◽  
pp. 2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sujit Choudhry
Keyword(s):  
Social Policy ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
Constitutional Amendments ◽  
Normative Framework ◽  
Levels Of Detail ◽  
The Social ◽  
Economic Union ◽  
Institutional Architecture ◽  
Charlottetown Accord ◽  
Internal Trade

A decade after the demise of the Charlottetown Accord in 1992,1 one of the most visible features of federal-provincial relations is the replacement of constitutional with non-constitutional policy instruments to secure many of the same ends — what I term the “flight from constitutional legalism.” Instead of constitutional amendments, the instrument of choice is the non-legal, intergovernmental accord. The leading examples are the Social Union Framework Agreement2 and the Agreement on Internal Trade,3 which in differing levels of detail set out both a normative framework and an institutional architecture to manage the Social Union and the Economic Union, respectively.

scholarly journals CONSTITUTION-MAKING AS INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS.A Case Study of the 1980 Canadian Constitutional Negotiations

1969 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam D. McDonald
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional History ◽  
Canadian History ◽  
Pierre Trudeau ◽  
Political Landscape ◽  
History Of ◽  
Charlottetown Accord ◽  
Constitution Making

The Constitution Act, 1982 is a document that profoundly changed the Canadian political landscape. It brought home the highest law of the land; it provided Canadians a mechanism to change their Constitution; it created a Charter of Rights and Freedoms, entrenched within the Constitution, out of the reach of one government. Perhaps its most important legacies, however, are the seemingly permanent isolation of Quebec and the primacy of place in Canadian history it gave Pierre Trudeau. This paper will examine the constitutional history of Canada with a view to determining what made the 1980 negotiating sessions successful when the sessions that led to both the Meech Lake Accord and the Charlottetown Accord were not. It is important, however, to note that the word “successful” is used in the sense that an agreement was reached. Unlike Meech and Charlottetown, the repatriated constitution did not have unanimity among the participants. The question that comes to mind is this: if the governments did not really agree in 1981, why was a Constitution ratified? More importantly, are there lessons that can be drawn from this agreement that can be applied to the failed accords of the Mulroney era?

Canadian Election Study, 1993: Incorporating the 1992 Referendum Survey on the Charlottetown Accord

1995 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Johnston ◽  
Andre Blais ◽  
Henry Brady ◽  
Elisabeth Gidengil ◽  
Neil Nevitte
Keyword(s):  
Election Study ◽  
Charlottetown Accord

Canadian Election Study, 1993: Incorporating the 1992 Referendum Survey on the Charlottetown Accord

1995 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Johnston ◽  
Andre Blais ◽  
Henry Brady ◽  
Elisabeth Gidengil ◽  
Neil Nevitte
Keyword(s):  
Election Study ◽  
Charlottetown Accord

Constitutional Paralysis: Why Canadian Constitutional Initiatives Are Doomed to Fail

1994 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 747-771 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Lusztig
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Support ◽  
Constitutional Reform ◽  
Theoretical Argument ◽  
Divided Societies ◽  
Canadian Context ◽  
Elite Level ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Charlottetown Accord ◽  
Constitution Making

Abstract. The primary lesson to be learned from the failed Charlottetown Accord is that substantive constitutional reform in Canada is not possible, and will not be for some time. This claim is structurally grounded—a reflection of inherent limitations to successful constitutional negotiations. Specifically, it contends that the requirement of mass input/legitimization of constitutional bargaining in deeply divided societies is incompatible with successful constitution making. There are two reasons for this conclusion. First, mass legitimization serves to undermine effective elite accommodation. The degree of compromise necessary to forge a constitutional agreement at the elite level among different societal groups alienates too many mass supporters of each group. As a result, elites cannot deliver the support of their constitutional constituents. Second, constitution making, by virtue of providing certain groups with almost perpetual special privileges, provides an incentive for groups to seek constitutional status. Mass input into the constitutional process lowers the costs associated with seeking constitutional status, thereby facilitating the creation of new constitutional orientations. In this article, a theoretical argument about the incompatibility of consociational constitutionalism and mass input/legitimization is developed. This argument applies to the Canadian context, detailing the prevailing “mega-constitutional” orientations (MCOs) in Canada, emphasizing their inherent irreconcilability. Based on evidence from the Charlottetown referendum campaign, empirical support is provided for the argument developed. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the findings and forecasts failure for constitutional initiatives, in Canada and elsewhere, where consociational constitutionalism occurs in tandem with the requirement of mass input/legitimization.Résumé. La première leçon à tirer de l'échec de l'Accord de Charlottetown, c'est qu'une réforme constitutionnelle en profondeur n'est pas possible, et ce pour un avenir prévisible. Cette prémisse s'appuie sur des éléments structured, reflétant des limites inhérentes aux négotiations constitutionnelles. Plus précisément, cela présume que l'exigence de légitimation par les masses du marchandage constitutionnel dans des sociétés profondément divisées représente un obstacle majeur pour le succès des négotiations. On invoquera deux motifs pour justifier cette conclusion. D'abord, la légitimation populaire contribue à empêcher les accommodements entre les élites. L'ampleur des compromis nécessaires à l'émergence d'un accord au niveau des élites entre différents groupes sociaux aliène trop de citoyens dans chacun des groupes. Conséquemment, les élites ne peuvent garantir l'appui de leurs mandants. En deuxième lieu, le bricolage constitutionnel, qui procure à certains groupes des privilèges sociaux perpétuels, encourage les groupes à rechercher un statut constitutionnel. La participation des masses au processus diminue les coûts associés à la quête de statut constitutionnel, facilitant ainsi la création de nouvelles orientations constitutionnelles. Cet article propose une argumentation théorique à propos de l'incompatibilité entre le constitutionnalisme consociationnel et la légitimation par la participation populaire. La thèse est appliquée au cas canadien, approfondissant les orientations macro-constitutionnelles dominantes ou pas, et en en faisant ressortir l'irréconciliabilité. En s'appuyant sur l'expérience référendaire d'octobre 1992, l'article étoffe ensuite concrètement l'argumentation. Par-delà le résumé des principaux résultats, la conclusion prédit l'àchec des initiatives constitutionnelles, au Canada et ailleurs, partout où le constitutionnalisme consociationnel sera accompagné par l'exigence d'une légitimation par la participation populaire.

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