The Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules with Mutually Coherent Voter Preferences: A Borda Compromise

2011 ◽  
pp. 107 ◽  
Author(s):  
William V. Gehrlein ◽  
Dominique Lepelley ◽  
Hatem Smaoui
Keyword(s):  
Voting Rules ◽  
Voter Preferences ◽  
Condorcet Efficiency

scholarly journals Well-Structured Committees

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sushmita Gupta ◽  
Pallavi Jain ◽  
Saket Saurabh
Keyword(s):  
Standard Model ◽  
Parameterized Complexity ◽  
Independent Set ◽  
Combinatorial Problems ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Voter Preferences ◽  
Candidate Network ◽  
Graph Properties ◽  
The Standard Model ◽  
The Given

In the standard model of committee selection, we are given a set of ordinal votes over a set of candidates and a desired committee size, and the task is to select a committee that relates to the given votes. Motivated by possible interactions and dependencies between candidates, we study a generalization of committee selection in which the candidates are connected via a network and the task is to select a committee that relates to the given votes while also satisfy certain properties with respect to this candidate network. To accommodate certain correspondences to the voter preferences, we consider three standard voting rules (in particular, $k$-Borda, Chamberlin-Courant, and Gehrlein stability); to model different aspects of interactions and dependencies between candidates, we consider two graph properties (in particular, Independent Set and Connectivity). We study the parameterized complexity of the corresponding combinatorial problems and discuss certain implications of our algorithmic results.

Choosing How to Choose

2021 ◽  
pp. 42-70
Author(s):  
Charles E. Phelps ◽  
Guru Madhavan
Keyword(s):  
Majority Rule ◽  
Rating Scales ◽  
Group Decision ◽  
Rank Order ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Letter Grades ◽  
Voter Preferences ◽  
Collective Group ◽  
Voting Methods ◽  
Voting Method

“Majority rule” seems like the fairest and best voting process imaginable, yet it simply doesn’t work in many cases. Dozens of different voting rules have been proposed to assemble the preferences of individuals into a collective group decision. Some use rank-order ballots. Some use rating scales (like “stars” for Uber drivers or amazon.com purchases). Some use letter grades like those assigned by teachers to students. This chapter reviews over a dozen different voting methods, showing how and why they can lead to different choices even with the same set of voter preferences using a simple example where 19 people (e.g., at a conference together somewhere) vote to decide where to have dinner—an American, a Brazilian, a Chinese, or an Indian restaurant. The powerful conclusion emerges that it is the voting method, not the voters’ preferences, that determines the choice.

scholarly journals Even More Effort Towards Improved Bounds and Fixed-Parameter Tractability for Multiwinner Rules

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sushmita Gupta ◽  
Pallavi Jain ◽  
Saket Saurabh ◽  
Nimrod Talmon
Keyword(s):  
Weighted Average ◽  
Scoring Rules ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Voter Preferences ◽  
Voting Rule ◽  
The Family ◽  
Fixed Parameter ◽  
Real World Applications ◽  
Ordered Weighted Average ◽  
Fruitful Research

Multiwinner elections have proven to be a fruitful research topic with many real world applications. We contribute to this line of research by improving the state of the art regarding the computational complexity of computing good committees. More formally, given a set of candidates C, a set of voters V, each ranking the candidates according to their preferences, and an integer k; a multiwinner voting rule identifies a committee of size k, based on these given voter preferences. In this paper we consider several utilitarian and egailitarian OWA (ordered weighted average) scoring rules, which are an extensively researched family of rules (and a subfamily of the family of committee scoring rules). First, we improve the result of Betzler et al. [JAIR, 2013], which gave a O(n^n) algorithm for computing winner under the Chamberlin Courant rule (CC), where n is the number of voters; to a running time of O(2^n), which is optimal. Furthermore, we study the parameterized complexity of the Pessimist voting rule and describe a few tractable and intractable cases. Apart from such utilitarian voting rules, we extend our study and consider egalitarian median and egalitarian mean (both committee scoring rules), showing some tractable and intractable results, based on nontrivial structural observations.

On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences

2020 ◽  
Vol 289 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-241
Author(s):  
Abdelhalim El Ouafdi ◽  
Dominique Lepelley ◽  
Hatem Smaoui
Keyword(s):  
Voting Rules ◽  
Condorcet Efficiency

European voting rules flawed

Nature ◽  
2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Ball
Keyword(s):  
Voting Rules

A Political Economy Model of a Research University

2009 ◽  
pp. 132-143
Author(s):  
K. Sonin ◽  
I. Khovanskaya
Keyword(s):  
Organizational Structure ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Research University ◽  
Hiring Decisions ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Economy Model ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Political Economic ◽  
Optimal Incentives

Hiring decisions are typically made by committees members of which have different capacity to estimate the quality of candidates. Organizational structure and voting rules in the committees determine the incentives and strategies of applicants; thus, construction of a modern university requires a political structure that provides committee members and applicants with optimal incentives. The existing political-economic model of informative voting typically lacks any degree of variance in the organizational structure, while political-economic models of organization typically assume a parsimonious information structure. In this paper, we propose a simple framework to analyze trade-offs in optimal subdivision of universities into departments and subdepartments, and allocation of political power.

Optimal Two Stage Committee Voting Rules

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Ayres ◽  
Colin Rowat ◽  
Nasser Zakariya
Keyword(s):  
Voting Rules ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Committee Voting
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