The Antecedents of Institutional Investor Activism

2002 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 554 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lori Verstegen Ryan ◽  
Marguerite Schneider
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Investor ◽  
Investor Activism

Institutional Investor Activism and Employee Safety: The Role of Activist and Board Political Ideology

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Shi ◽  
Chongwu Xia ◽  
Philipp Meyer-Doyle
Keyword(s):  
Political Ideology ◽  
Health And Safety ◽  
Shareholder Activism ◽  
Institutional Investor ◽  
Workplace Safety ◽  
Employee Health ◽  
The Political ◽  
Workplace Injury ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Investor Activism

Although prior research on shareholder activism has highlighted how such activism can economically benefit the shareholders of targeted firms, recent studies also suggest that shareholder activism can economically disadvantage nonshareholder stakeholders, notably employees. Our study extends this research by exploring whether shareholder activism by institutional investors (i.e., institutional investor activism) can adversely affect employee health and safety through increased workplace injury and illness. Furthermore, deviating from the assumption that financially motivated institutional investor activists are homogeneous in their goals and preferences, we investigate whether the influence of institutional investor activism on employee health and safety hinges on the political ideology of the shareholder activist and of the board of the targeted firm. Using establishment-level data, we find that institutional investor activism adversely influences workplace injury and illness at targeted firms and that this influence is stronger for nonliberal shareholder activists and for firms with a nonliberal board. Our study contributes to shareholder activism research by highlighting how the political ideology of shareholder activists and boards affects the impact of shareholder activism on stakeholders and how shareholder activism can adversely affect the health and safety of employees. Furthermore, our paper also contributes to research on workplace safety and the management of employee relations and human capital resources by highlighting the detrimental effect of a firm’s ownership by investor activists on its employees and how the board’s political ideology may enable a firm to reduce this risk.

The Antecedents of Institutional Investor Activism

2002 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 554-573 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lori Verstegen Ryan ◽  
Marguerite Schneider
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Investor ◽  
Investor Activism

scholarly journals Corporate governance in Italy after the 1998 reform: What role for institutional investors?

2005 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 11-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcello Bianchi ◽  
Luca Enriques
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Mutual Fund ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Institutional Investor ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Legal Environment ◽  
Investor Activism

his paper tries to answer two questions: first, whether the changes in the law resulting from the 1998 reform are able to positively affect the attitude to activism of institutional investors in Italy; and second, whether, legal rules aside, it is reasonable to expect significant institutional investor activism in Italy. We provide both an empirical analysis of the factors affecting institutional investor activism in Italy and a legal analysis of the most relevant changes in the Italian mutual funds and corporate laws, following the 1998 reform. The empirical analysis shows that institutional shareholdings and investment strategies are compatible with the hypothesis that institutional investors can play a significant role in the corporate governance of Italian listed companies. However, a curb to their playing such an active role may derive from the predominance of mutual fund management companies belonging to banking groups (giving rise to conflicts of interest) and from the prevailing ownership structure of listed companies, which are still dominated by controlling shareholders holding stakes higher than, or close to, the majority of the capital (implying a weaker bargaining power of institutions vis-à-vis controllers). The analysis of the legal changes prompted by the 1998 financial markets and corporate law reform indicates that the legal environment is now definitely more favorable to institutional investor activism than before. However, the Italian legal environment proves still to be little favorable to institutional investor activism, when compared to that of the U.S. or the U.K.

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