Little Tin Gods: The District Officer in British East Africa

1975 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Thomason

They were unlikely choices for revolutionaries and hardly the haughty autocrats the phrase “Little Tin Gods” conjures up. Yet many East African district officers felt it their duty to change the lives of the Africans they ruled, and against great odds they did. Sent out by their superiors in London and Nairobi as policemen and tax collectors, they saw themselves as secular missionaries for a superior culture. Working in the decade before the catastrophic first world war, they were the last generation of Europeans who easily believed their own superiority. Under pressure to produce revenue many district commissioners fostered economic development as a first step in reforming African society. They wished to develop an exchange economy based upon the fruits of a settled and productive peasantry working on its own land. They believed the Africans would adopt the basic values of hard work and even self-reliance, making an Edwardian revolution. If their assumptions about social change, economics, or even civilization itself seem unsophisticated, it is because they were amateurs. They had few resources beyond their own confidence and sense of mission. They began a revolution, but it was not the one they intended for they failed to retrieve colonial Kenya from the clutches of a handful of white settlers. Their vision of peaceful prosperity for the Africans was ultimately denied, and the hopes they raised became murderous frustrations. They offered Kenya an alternative course which imperialism could not accept.Kenya's first district officers came from diverse backgrounds, but most shared the middle class values they proposed for the Africans.

2007 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-63
Author(s):  
Luc Vandeweyer

In deze bronnenpublicatie ontleedt Luc Vandeweyer de parlementaire loopbaan van de geneesheer-politicus Alfons Van de Perre: hoe hij in 1912 feitelijk  tegen wil en dank  volksvertegenwoordiger werd, zich anderzijds blijkbaar naar behoren kweet van zijn taak en tijdens de eerste verkiezingen na de Eerste Wereldoorlog (1919) zijn mandaat hernieuwd zag maar meteen daarop ontslag nam. Volgens de bekende historiografische lezing was de abdicatie van de progressieve politicus een daad van zelfverloochening die enerzijds werd ingegeven door gezondheidsmotieven en  anderzijds was geïnspireerd door de wil om de eenheid binnen de katholieke partij te herstellen. De auteur komt op basis van nieuw en onontgonnen bronnenmateriaal tot de vaststelling dat Van de Perres spontane beslissing tot ontslag in de eerste plaats een strategische keuze was: in het parlement, waar hij zich overigens niet erg in zijn schik voelde, kon hij minder invloed uitoefenen op de Vlaamse beweging dan via de talrijke engagementen waarvoor hij voortaan de handen vrij had. Eén ervan was die van bestuurder én publicist bij het dagblad De Standaard.________Chronicle of the announcement of a resignation. Two remaekable letters by Alfons Van de Perre concerning his resignation as a Member of Parliament in 1919In this source publication Luc Vandeweyer analyses the parliamentary career of the physician-politician Alfons Van de Perre and he describes how Van de Perre became a Member of Parliament in 1912 actually against the grain, yet how he apparently did a good job carrying out his duties. During the first elections after the First World War (1919) Van de Perre found that his mandate was renewed, but he handed in his resignation immediately afterwards. According to the familiar historiographical interpretation the abdication of the progressive politician was an act of self-denial, which was prompted on the one hand by health reasons and on the other hand inspired by the will to restore unity within the Catholic political party. On the basis of new and so far unexplored source material the author concludes that the spontaneous decision by Van de Perres to hand in his resignation was above all a strategic choice: in the Parliament, which he did not much enjoy anyway, he could exert less influence on the Flemish movement than via his numerous commitments, which he was now free to take on. One of these was the post of director as well as political commentator of the newspaper De Standaard.


2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valerie Rosoux ◽  
Laurence van Ypersele

This article examines the gradual deconstruction of the Belgian national identity. Is it possible to speak of a de facto differentiation or even ‘federalization’ of the so-called ‘national past’ in Belgium? How do Belgians choose to remember and forget this past? To contribute to an understanding of these issues, the article considers two very different episodes of Belgian history, namely the First World War and the colonization of the Congo. On the one hand, the memory of the First World War appears to provide the template for memory conflicts in Belgium, and thus informs the memories of other tragedies such as the Second World War. On the other hand, the memory of the colonial past remains much more consensual – providing a more nuanced picture of competing views on the past. Beyond the differences between the ways in which these episodes are officially portrayed, the same fundamental trend may be observed: the gradual fragmentation of a supposedly smooth and reliable national version of history.


1968 ◽  
Vol 88 ◽  
pp. 13-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. G. L. Hammond

Many studies of the campaign and the battle of Marathon have suffered from conflicts between scholars in the field of hypothesis. The article by J. Kromayer illustrates this admirably. He concerned himself mainly with the rival hypotheses of Curtius and Delbrück, the former maintaining that the Persians embarked most of their force and all the cavalry just before the battle, and the latter that the Persians did not do so at all but delivered a full-scale but unsuccessful attack up the Vraná valley, which resulted in a counter-attack by the Greeks. Neither hypothesis rests upon the ancient evidence. Yet Curtius has been followed by Munro, Grundy and others, and recently by Gomme, Pritchett and Burn; and Delbrück has been followed by Meyer, De Sanctis and others. Other hypotheses are made about the duration of the engagement. They vary from Munro's matter of ‘minutes’ to Delbrück's three phases of hard-fought action, although they are both in conflict with the evidence of Herodotus. Again, hypotheses have been advanced in an attempt to dispense with the topographical evidence, for instance of the Mound at Marathon, e.g. the hypothesis that it existed before the battle. In a paper delivered in 1920 and published in this Journal in 1964, Whatley expressed his doubts about the value of such hypotheses; but he himself became involved in drawing analogies between the massive, complicated and many-fronted First World War and the one-day battle of Marathon—analogies which are quite misleading. In this paper I propose to be as economical as possible in making hypotheses and to keep to the ancient evidence first. This leads to a different order of exposition; for most scholars have begun with the campaign, formed their theory of the aims of the Persians and of the Greeks, and tried to make the battle conform with the theory, but I shall begin with the battle itself, for which we have much evidence, and treat the campaign afterwards.


1943 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-25
Author(s):  
Edwin E. Witte

There is by this time quite a literature on the war economy. With the one exception of the recent symposium by Professor Steiner and his associates, most of whom are connected with the University of Indiana, all of the longer treatises on the subject discuss the war economy in abstract terms or on the basis of the experience of the First World War. These treatises served a useful purpose and were the only books on the economies of war which could be written at the time; but they now seem unreal, because this war differs so greatly from the prior struggle. The University of Indiana book, dealing as it does with concrete problems of present war, is up-to-the-minute and excellently done in all respects. It does not attempt, however, to do what I am venturing: a brief, overall picture of what the war has been doing to the United States.


1980 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 381-398 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. I. Hamilton

The word hero cannot be defined simply. According to time and speaker, it can imply anything from the bravery of a moment to the courage and statesmanship of a lifetime. We do not enjoy the distinction in English which La Bruyère drew in French: to him un héros was a young, dauntless and venturesome man, one like Alexander; but against him had to be set the truly great man, the grand homme, the one with judgement, foresight, experience and considerable ability - a man like Caesar. As we shall see, hero can be used to describe both kinds of men. But if it has no very specific meaning, it is an important word for any study of the Victorian era - an era that for our purposes is taken to cover the years from the 1830s to the outbreak of the First World War. For the Victorians loved a hero, and the word often came to their lips. Carlyle, whose Heroes and hero-worship was first published in 1841, thought that a nation's whole history could be told in terms of its heroes, and he and Kingsley and Froude, to name three of the important literary figures of the age, regarded heroes as being vital to any society. They thought it particularly important that the new burgeoning industrial society should have heroes of its own, and that these should act as beacons and as examples. As Froude said in Representative men (1850), ‘the only education worth anything is the education of character, and we cannot educate a character unless we have some notion of what we would form’.


1971 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. A. Thompson

A difficulty which faces students of American thought about foreign affairs is the relation between general principles and views of the world on the one hand and attitudes to specific issues of policy on the other. Since the pioneering work of Robert E. Osgood, historians have emphasized the important distinction between those whose primary concern is the protection of American national interests within the existing system of power politics, and those who seek above all to reform the international order in accordance with American liberal ideals. In recent years much attention has been paid to the influence of economic considerations, particularly the desire to promote American foreign trade. However, the relative weight attached to national security, liberal idealism and American economic interests overseas by individual Americans does not entirely account for their differing attitudes to particular questions. For in crucial debates, such as those over the Philippines and the League of Nations, each of these considerations was invoked by some on both sides of the argument. To some extent, the older and more superficial distinction between ‘isolationism’ and ‘anti-isolationism’, while concealing the variety of premises upon which either position could be founded, provides a better basis for predicting the readiness of Americans to favour particular foreign enterprises or commitments. Yet adherence even to these broad traditions has been far from consistent. Thus, while it would be natural to assume that the imperialists of 1898–1900 were more likely than their opponents to favour American intervention in the First World War, it is not clear that this was the case.


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2018) (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bogdan Kolar

Category: 1.01 Original scientific paper Language: Original in Slovenian (Abstract in Slovenian and English, Summary in English) Key words: Pope Benedict XV, First World War, Catholic Church, Austria-Hungary, Slovenia Abstract: After the death of Pope Pius X in 1914, Benedict XV was elected as his successor. His pontificate was marked by the First World War and the settling of international relations after its end. Because of the fierce opposition of Italy to his involvement in peace mediations, the pope spent most of his effort and attention in the humanitarian and social fields, easing the consequences of the war. He reorganized the spiritual care of military units. His peace initiatives were opposed by most of the countries in both warring camps, and in many countries also by the bishops who adopted state policies as their own. From all the initiatives, the one that generated the most traction was sent to all countries involved in the war on August 1, 1917. In this note the three years of war was called "useless slaughter". The principles he set out for an end to the fighting and the post-war arrangement of the world were echoed in the Points presented in early 1918 by American president Th. W. Wilson. The discussion also contains and overview of the echoes of and responses to the pope's peace initiatives in Slovenian Ethnic Lands.


1967 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Akzin

Ever since the American and the French revolutions, it was taken for granted that a written, formal, Constitution was essential to the functioning of a modern State. Old-established States, as they moved toward modernization or away from absolutism, hurried to provide themselves with Constitutions. New States enacted Constitutions as a matter of course, as one of the first acts of a newly-found sovereignty, often copying them from available models and without pausing to consider to what extent the provisions copied would suit the particular characteristics and goals of their respective societies. The well-known process of “reception” of laws was followed by a similar trend to “receive” Constitutions. To have a formal Constitution well-nigh became a universal fashion, a symbol of modernism. In the aftermath of the First World War, only two groups of fully independent States remained without Constitutions. One of them comprised countries still in their pre-modern stage, in respect both of their political and of their general social set-up, and without pretensions to modernity: Afghanistan, Ethiopia (then Abyssinia), Saudi Arabia, Thailand (then Siam), Yemen; since then, each of these, bent on modernization, provided itself with some kind of constitutional chart. The other group consisted of the one and only Great Britain, looked upon by everybody as a case apart.


2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (5) ◽  
pp. 1395-1445
Author(s):  
MANU SEHGAL ◽  
SAMIKSHA SEHRAWAT

AbstractBy providing the first comprehensive account of the role of the British and Indian press in war propaganda, this article makes an intervention in the global history of the First World War. The positive propaganda early in the war, intertwined with a rhetoric of loyalism, contrasted with how the conservative British press affixed blame for military defeats in Mesopotamia upon the colonial regime's failure to effectively mobilize India's resources. Using a highly emotive and enduring trope of the ‘Mesopotamia muddle’, the Northcliffe press was successful in channelling a high degree of public scrutiny onto the campaign. The effectiveness of this criticism ensured that debates about the Mesopotamian debacle became a vehicle for registering criticism of structures of colonial rule and control in India. On the one hand, this critique hastened constitutional reforms and devolution in colonial India and, on the other, it led to demands that the inadequacy of India's contribution to the war be remedied by raising war loans. Both the colonial government and its nationalist critics were briefly and paradoxically united in opposing these demands. The coercive extraction of funds for the imperial war effort as well as the British press's vituperative criticism contributed to a post-war, anti-colonial political upsurge. The procedure of creating a colonial ‘scandal’ out of a military disaster required a specific politics for assessing the regulated flows of information, which proved to be highly effective in shaping both the enquiry that followed and the politics of interwar colonial South Asia.


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