Whose Ethos for Public Goods in the Global Economy?

2000 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georges Enderle

Abstract:The discussion of the global economy and worldwide expansion of the capitalist and market economic system barely deals with the topic of public goods, although they are of paramount importance precisely in this international setting. Fortunately, the theory of public economics systematically developed the central concept of the public good with its far-reaching implications so that this knowledge can be applied also to global issues. In order to treat these often vaguely discussed issues, a typology of international relations is proposed. These and other considerations prepare the way to ask the question about the implied ethos. Because a common and sustainable ethos for public goods in the global economy is of great relevance and high urgency, both religious and non-religious ethical traditions are called for making their necessary contributions to this foundation.

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Indah Pangestu Amaritasari

AbstractThis article discusses global issues and its relation with national security. Global contemporary issues—drugs, migration, living environment, population, global economy challenges, liberal democracy crisis, fusion and division, small arms production—are issues that emerged as new security threats that transformed since the end of the Cold War. Security threats are no longer in form of “military attacks” that one country does to another, but are acts of crime that are performed by non-state actors and are aimed at state actors, individuals or citizens that ultimately threaten human security. Human security is a new term in response of threats from global contemporary issues. This article concludes that national security in the context of global contemporary issues in an international relations perspective is a complex issue. This is explained in the transnational theory in international relations. United Nations have reassessed the concept of national security which then noted about human security.Keywords: International relations, human security, national security AbstrakArtikel ini membahas tentang isu-isu global dan kaitannya dengan ancaman terhadap keamanan nasional. Isu-isu global kontemporer—obat-obatan (drugs), migrasi, lingkungan hidup, populasi, tantangan ekonomi global, krisis demokrasi liberal, fusi dan pembelahan, produksi senjata ringan—merupakan isu yang lahir sebagai bentuk baru ancaman keamanan yang mengalami transformasi sejak berakhirnya Perang Dingin. Ancaman dalam bentuk baru bukan lagi berupa “serangan militer” yang dilakukan oleh suatu negara terhadap negara lain, tetapi tindakan kejahatan yang dilakukan oleh aktor non-negara (non-state actor) dan ditujukan kepada negara (state actor), individu atau warga negara yang mengancam keamanan umat manusia (human security). Isu keamanan manusia (human security) merupakan istilah baru dalam merespon ancaman dari perkembangan isu global kontemporer. Dalam artikel ini disimpulkan bahwa keamanan nasional dalam konteks isu global kontemporer pada prespektif hubungan internasional adalah hal yang kompleks. Hal ini kemudian dijelaskan dalam teori transnasional dalam hubungan internasional. PBB kemudian memberikan tawaran untuk mengkonseptualisasi kembali pengertian keamanan nasional yang pada akhirnya memberikan masukan mengenai keamanan kemanusia (human security).Kata kunci: Hubungan Internasional, ancaman, human security, keamanan nasional


2021 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 243-256
Author(s):  
Alain Marciano

James Buchanan wrote “An Economic Theory of Clubs” and invented clubs to support a form of welfare economics in which there is no social welfare function (SWF) and individual utility functions cannot be “read” by external observers. Clubs were a means to allow the implementation of individualized prices for public goods and services and to allow each individual to pay exactly the amount he wants to pay. He developed this project to answer and counter Paul Samuelson's analysis of public goods, in which social welfare functions play a crucial role. Buchanan and Samuelson disagreed over the allocation of the costs of the public good to each individual. To Buchanan, it was by relying on individual's preferences. To Samuelson, by using a SWF. Buchanan's clubs are thus foreign and incompatible with the traditional Samuelson-style public economics in which they are used.


2007 ◽  
pp. 90-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Rubinstein

The article is devoted to the modern public economics. The author analyzes the German "Finanzwissenschaft" tradition. Major issues connected to the problem of interests of the society as a whole were raised within this tradition: the problem of public goods pricing and the free-rider problem. The author considers this tradition taking into account the neoclassical economic concept of public sector. The article introduces the "public goods paradox" - incompatibility of methodological individualism and the positive demand for public goods. The author criticizes neoclassical theories (P. Samuelson, R. Musgrave, H. Margolis) and proposes a new approach. He develops the complementarity principle alternative to methodological individualism. According to this idea interests of the society as a whole are irreducible to interests of individuals.


Robotics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 53
Author(s):  
Luiz F. P. Oliveira ◽  
António P. Moreira ◽  
Manuel F. Silva

The development of robotic systems to operate in forest environments is of great relevance for the public and private sectors. In this sense, this article reviews several scientific papers, research projects and commercial products related to robotic applications for environmental preservation, monitoring, wildfire firefighting, inventory operations, planting, pruning and harvesting. After conducting critical analysis, the main characteristics observed were: (a) the locomotion system is directly affected by the type of environmental monitoring to be performed; (b) different reasons for pruning result in different locomotion and cutting systems; (c) each type of forest, in each season and each type of soil can directly interfere with the navigation technique used; and (d) the integration of the concept of swarm of robots with robots of different types of locomotion systems (land, air or sea) can compensate for the time of executing tasks in unstructured environments. Two major areas are proposed for future research works: Internet of Things (IoT)-based smart forest and navigation systems. It is expected that, with the various characteristics exposed in this paper, the current robotic forest systems will be improved, so that forest exploitation becomes more efficient and sustainable.


Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Ramzi Suleiman ◽  
Yuval Samid

Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of punishment in enhancing cooperation was explained as deterrence of free riders by cooperative strong reciprocators, who were willing to pay the cost of punishing them, whereas in environments in which punishment diminished cooperation, antisocial punishment was explained as revenge by low cooperators against high cooperators suspected of punishing them in previous rounds. The present paper reconsiders the generality of both explanations. Using data from a public goods experiment with punishment, conducted by the authors on Israeli subjects (Study 1), and from a study published in Science using sixteen participant pools from cities around the world (Study 2), we found that: 1. The effect of punishment on the emergence of cooperation was mainly due to contributors increasing their cooperation, rather than from free riders being deterred. 2. Participants adhered to different contribution and punishment strategies. Some cooperated and did not punish (‘cooperators’); others cooperated and punished free riders (‘strong reciprocators’); a third subgroup punished upward and downward relative to their own contribution (‘norm-keepers’); and a small sub-group punished only cooperators (‘antisocial punishers’). 3. Clear societal differences emerged in the mix of the four participant types, with high-contributing pools characterized by higher ratios of ‘strong reciprocators’, and ‘cooperators’, and low-contributing pools characterized by a higher ratio of ‘norm keepers’. 4. The fraction of ‘strong reciprocators’ out of the total punishers emerged as a strong predictor of the groups’ level of cooperation and success in providing the public goods.


2021 ◽  
pp. 002234332098421
Author(s):  
Sam Whitt

This study considers how ethnic trust and minority status can impact the ability of ethnic groups to pursue cooperative public goods, focusing on groups with a history of conflict and lingering hostility. A public good experiment between ethnic Albanians and Serbs in postwar Kosovo reveals that subjects contribute far more to a mutually beneficial public good when they are part of an experimentally induced coethnic majority. However, when in the minority, subjects not only underinvest, but many actively divest entirely, privatizing the public good. Majority/minority status also has wide-ranging implications for how individuals relate to real-world public goods and the institutions of government that provide them. Compared to majority Albanians, survey data indicate how minority Serbs in Kosovo express greater safety and security concerns, feel more politically, socially, and economically excluded, are more dissatisfied with civil liberties and human rights protections, and are less likely to participate politically or pay taxes to support public goods. Conflict-related victimization and distrust of out-groups are strong predictors of these minority group attitudes and behaviors. This suggests a mechanism for how conflict amplifies out-group distrust, increasing parochial bias in public good commitments, especially among minorities who are wary of exploitation at the hands of an out-group majority. To restore trust, this study finds that institutional trust and intergroup contact are important to bridging ethnic divides that inhibit public good cooperation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Attila Szolnoki ◽  
Xiaojie Chen

AbstractThe conflict between individual and collective interests is in the heart of every social dilemmas established by evolutionary game theory. We cannot avoid these conflicts but sometimes we may choose which interaction framework to use as a battlefield. For instance some people like to be part of a larger group while other persons prefer to interact in a more personalized, individual way. Both attitudes can be formulated via appropriately chosen traditional games. In particular, the prisoner’s dilemma game is based on pair interaction while the public goods game represents multi-point interactions of group members. To reveal the possible advantage of a certain attitude we extend these models by allowing players not simply to change their strategies but also let them to vary their attitudes for a higher individual income. We show that both attitudes could be the winner at a specific parameter value. Interestingly, however, the subtle interplay between different states may result in a counterintuitive evolutionary outcome where the increase of the multiplication factor of public goods game drives the population to a fully defector state. We point out that the accompanying pattern formation can only be understood via the multipoint or multi-player interactions of different microscopic states where the vicinity of a particular state may influence the relation of two other competitors.


1998 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 90-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
William D. Gerdes

One strategy for generating Pareto results in a public good model is to create an environment where traders internalize the public good externality. The model presented here accomplishes this by separating the provision and ownership of public goods. Such goods are privately provided but collectively owned. Under this arrangement, Lindahl prices are generated through the voluntary exchange activities of consumers. Persistent attempts to free ride are not consistent with maximizing behavior which leads to internalization.


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