Great Britain and the Coming of the Pacific War, 1939–1941

1974 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 43-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Lowe
Keyword(s):  
Great Britain ◽  
Ivory Tower ◽  
Pacific War ◽  
The Pacific ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
Thai Government ◽  
Far Eastern

In a mood of understandable frustration, the British minister in Bangkok sent a telegram to the head of the Far Eastern department of the Foreign Office in June 1941, referring to the tedious economic discussions he was conducting with the Thai government, saying:I am disturbed by the contradictory tone of the telegrams sent to me from His Majesty's Foreign Office … Some of them breathe that broad and statesmanlike spirit which I have learnt to respect and admire over a period of nearly forty years. Others strike a shrill and petulant note which is new to me … I have an uneasy feeling that you people in Downing Street live in an ivory tower as regards Thailand …

The Pacific War Controversy in Britain: Sir Robert Craigie Versus The Foreign Office

1983 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 489-517 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Olu Agbi
Keyword(s):  
Far East ◽  
The United States ◽  
British History ◽  
Pacific War ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Winston Churchill ◽  
The Far East ◽  
The Pacific ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
Far Eastern

Unlike the State Department Officials of the United States who were subjected by the Senate to postwar Congressional investigation in the Pearl-Harbor hearing, British Far Eastern policy-makers were saved such parliamentary ordeals. The loss of the whole British position in the Far-East at the hands of the Japanese between December 1941 and May 1942 was humiliating enough. It was, as Winston Churchill later claimed, ‘the worst disaster and the largest capitulation of British history’.

The Pacific War Controversy in Britain: Sir Robert Craigie Versus The Foreign Office

1983 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 489-517
Author(s):  
S. Olu Agbi
Keyword(s):  
Far East ◽  
The United States ◽  
British History ◽  
Pacific War ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Winston Churchill ◽  
The Far East ◽  
The Pacific ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
Far Eastern

Unlike the State Department Officials of the United States who were subjected by the Senate to postwar Congressional investigation in the Pearl-Harbor hearing, British Far Eastern policy-makers were saved such parliamentary ordeals. The loss of the whole British position in the Far-East at the hands of the Japanese between December 1941 and May 1942 was humiliating enough. It was, as Winston Churchill later claimed, ‘the worst disaster and the largest capitulation of British history’.

Great Britain and the Origins of the Pacific War.

1978 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 482
Author(s):  
Stephen Endicott ◽  
Peter Lowe
Keyword(s):  
Great Britain ◽  
Pacific War ◽  
The Pacific

French Far Eastern Policy in the 1930s

1989 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
John F. Laffey
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Fundamental Problem ◽  
Pacific War ◽  
World War ◽  
Japanese Occupation ◽  
The Pacific ◽  
Full Picture ◽  
Far Eastern ◽  
Shed Light

The completion in 1986 of the Documents diplomatiques français, 1932–1939 permits a review of French Far Eastern policy during that troubled time characterized by J.-B. Duroselle as ‘la décadence.’ This massive documentary collection, however, still dose not provide a full picture of the forces which shaped French East Asian policy in the years before the outbreak of the Pacific War. Understandably focused upon European developments, it begins and ends, from the Far Eastern perspective, in medias res; that is, after the outbreak of the Manchurian crisis and before the Japanese occupation of Indochina. Moreover, like other compilations of what statesmen and diplomats said to each other, this one slights economic factors and, though to a lesser extent, the role of public opinion. Even taken in their own terms, the documents perhaps reveal more about what others said and did to the French than about what they themselves accomplished. That points to a more fundamental problem, for one can question whether anything so gelatinous as the French responses or lack thereof to developments largely beyond their control can even be described as ‘policy.’ Still, although much more work in archives and private papers will be necessary before the entire story can be pieced together, these documents do shed light on what passed for French policy in East Asia during the years before the outbreak of World War II.

‘Trouble Must Follow’: Australia's Ban on Iron Ore Exports to Japan in 1938

1995 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 871-892 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kosmas Tsokhas
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Iron Ore ◽  
Far East ◽  
Economic Sanctions ◽  
Careful Consideration ◽  
Pacific War ◽  
Iron And Steel ◽  
The Pacific ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
European Theatre

Despite the attention that has been given to the role of economic sanctions in Japan's decision to launch the Pacific war, Australia's decision to ban iron ore exports to Japan has been given little attention, even though this was one of the earliest economic sanctions imposed onimperial Japan in the 1930s. To a degree this neglect can be traced to a preoccupation with the actions and objectives of the great powers and a failure to consider the opportunities available to small nations to take significant initiatives. The following article traces the origins of the iron ore embargo back to 1934 when Essington Lewis, the Managing Director of the Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd (BHP), Australia's iron and steel monopoly, visited Japan and subsequently advocated the development of an Australian armaments industry to counter probable Japanese aggression in the Pacific. In Japan Lewis crossed paths with J. G. Latham, the Minister for External Affairs, who was leading the Australian government's Eastern Mission. Latham returned to Australia with conclusions that differed fundamentally from those of Lewis, who came up with a plan to take advantage of Japan's dependence on imports of iron ore and other iron products to finance investment in Australian armaments manufacturing. In explaining this outcome the article discusses interactions between a number of conflicts: between Latham and Lewis; between the British Treasury and the Foreign Office; and between the Japanese army and navy. In London the Treasury wanted to focus on the European theatre, while also holding down military spending in order to achieve balanced budgets. The Treasury believed that the way to best defend British commercial interests in Asia was to appease Japan. On the other hand, the Foreign Office was committed to the protection of British interests in the Far East by a more forceful diplomacy, although it was only willing to counten-ance behavior short of military action. Consistent with Latham's recommendations to his government, the emerging consensus in London was that while a settlement in China would help to safeguard British interests there, as long as the Japanese were bound up in their war in China they were less likely to attack British colonies in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. In 1936 this orientation was challenged by a shift in the balance of power in Tokyo away from the army and in favor of the navy. Although priority continued to be placed on winning the war in China and guarding against an attack from the Soviet Union, now the navy's plan for southward expansion was given more careful consideration and credibility.

Britain, America, and the Far East, 1937-1940: a Failure in Cooperation

1963 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-154
Author(s):  
Nicholas R. Clifford
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Far East ◽  
The United States ◽  
World War ◽  
The Far East ◽  
The Pacific ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
The Government ◽  
Far Eastern

Most of the scholarly works on British policy in the years preceding World War II have neglected events in the Far East in favor of those in Europe. Any study of recent British diplomacy is, of course, seriously hampered by the lack of Foreign Office documents and by the generally uninformative nature of British memoirs. Nevertheless, the sources which do exist give a picture which, while still incomplete, is interesting for its own sake in showing how the Chamberlain Government met the problems of the Pacific, and also for the light which it sheds on Anglo-American relations in this period. Perhaps nowhere else was there as much consistent misunderstanding and disappointment between London and Washington as over the questions raised by the Sino-Japanese War. The Manchurian episode had left a legacy of distrust between the two countries; just enough was known about the approaches made by the Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, to the Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, so that many on both sides of the Atlantic believed that Britain had rejected American offers for joint action against Japan in 1932, and that as a result nothing had prevented the Japanese advance. When Stimson's The Far Eastern Crisis appeared in 1936, it was read by many with more enthusiasm than accuracy, and seemed to confirm these views. In Britain it provided ammunition for the critics of the Government, while in the United States it increased the suspicions of those unwilling to trust Britain, and strengthened the trend to isolation.

A Question of Expediency: Britain, the United States and Thailand, 1941–42

1988 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-244
Author(s):  
Richard Aldrich
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Southeast Asia ◽  
The United States ◽  
Pacific War ◽  
Special Operations ◽  
The Pacific ◽  
Foreign Office ◽  
Degree Of Control ◽  
Post War

This passage was written on 27 March 1945 by Major Andrew Gilchrist, a Foreign Office official serving with the Special Operations Executive in Thailand. It neatly demonstrates the manner in which the wartime debate within and between the various Allied bureaucracies responsible for Thailand's post war status appeared to be dominated by the circumstances of Thailand's rapid capitulation to Japan in December 1941. Subsequently, diametrically opposed interpretations of these unhappy events were employed both by Britain to legitimize her wartime plans to re-establish a degree of control over Thailand, and also by the United States to justify her attempts to thwart perceived British aggrandizement in Southeast Asia. Yet despite the clear importance of the events of 1941 for Thailand's relations with the Allies, her place in the outbreak of the Pacific War is not yet fully understood.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document