Foreign Takeover Activity in the U.S. and Wealth Effects for Target Firm Shareholders

1992 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 58 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Sinan Cebenoyan ◽  
George J. Papaioannou ◽  
Nickolaos G. Travlos
2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-30
Author(s):  
Gurmeet Singh Bhabra ◽  
Chris Wood

We examine the shareholder wealth impact of proxy contests and find that over the three years preceding the contest, target stock prices significantly underperform their industry peers. In addition, consistent with the monitoring role of proxy contests, the announcement and full contest periods result in a positive stock price reaction suggesting that the market views the initiation of a proxy contest as good news. Interesting differences emerge between firms in which dissidents win seats and those where they do not win seats. While target firm stock prices appreciate for all firms at the announcement, such wealth gains are permanent only for the subsample of targets which not only are afflicted with elevated levels of agency problems but also make significant reduction in discretionary expenditures. When dissidents do not win seats, no attempt to reduce agency costs is apparent, and as a result, these firms experience a sustained wealth loss over the years surrounding the contest. The steps taken to reduce agency costs primarily in firms in which dissidents win seats suggests that proxy contests fulfil their intended role of disciplining the board and improve firm performance.


1996 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 393-408 ◽  
Author(s):  
John C. Beck ◽  
Alan B. Larsen ◽  
J.Michael Pinegar
Keyword(s):  

2012 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 633
Author(s):  
Onur Arugaslan ◽  
Jim DeMello ◽  
Devrim Yaman

<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span><p style="margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; text-align: justify; mso-pagination: none;" class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">In this study we examine the stock price effects of corporate takeovers by dual class firms and unified firms. Our sample consists of 852 firms that were bidders in takeovers between 1993 and 2009. Our univariate and OLS regression results show that both dual class firms and unified firms obtain insignificant returns for various takeover announcement periods. The average and median returns for these two groups are similar to each other. We also identify several factors that the literature suggests should affect the bidder announcement returns in takeovers. Our results indicate that smaller firms in our sample and firms that pay for the acquisition in cash obtain higher abnormal returns when they announce the takeover. In addition, we find that the factors we identify have different influences on the announcement returns of dual class and unified firms. Specifically, unified firms that engage in tender offers and larger firms obtain more positive announcement returns compared to dual class firms whereas unified firms obtain more negative results when the target firm is a public firm. </span></span></p><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span>


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1341
Author(s):  
Yener Coskun ◽  
Christos Bouras ◽  
Rangan Gupta ◽  
Mark E. Wohar

We investigate for the presence of multi-horizon wealth effects across U.S. states over the period of 1975:Q2 to 2012:Q2 by utilizing multi-horizon non-causality testing and multi-horizon causality measurement. At the state/aggregate level, we document that housing wealth has more statistically significant and persistent impact on private consumption than financial wealth. We also find that state-level housing/financial wealth effects are present at long time horizons and exhibit heterogeneity across the U.S. From a policy perspective, we suggest that state-level policies may specifically utilize the housing market to support consumption and growth.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yener Coskun ◽  
Christos Bouras ◽  
Rangan Gupta ◽  
Mark E. Wohar

2001 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 163-174
Author(s):  
Grant H. Skrepnek ◽  
Kenneth A. Lawson

The purpose of this study was to quantify the excess return in shareholder security prices following initial announcements of successful horizontal pharmaceutical mergers which occurred between 1985 and 1996. An event study methodology was used to study a sample of26 fim1s involved in 14 mergers wherein transaction costs exceeded $500 million. Overall, results of the study were consistent with prior research, indicating that target-firm shareholders received a majority oft he short-term merger-related wealth effects in comparison to those received by bidder- firm shareholders.


1988 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. C. Van Den Honert ◽  
G. D.I. Barr ◽  
J. F. Affleck-Graves ◽  
G. Smale

The authors examine, in a cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) framework, the effect of four easily identifiable features of merger activity on acquirer/target shareholder wealth. The features considered are the relatedness of the acquiring and target firms involved in the merger, the relative sizes of the acquirer and target, the prior control position, and the medium of exchange. The results indicate that the relatedness of the acquirer and target firm and the prior control position are strong factors in determining the distribution of any wealth effects between the shareholders of the target and acquiring firms. The size and the medium of exchange are shown to be weaker factors in determining the distribution of wealth. In all cases it is seen that the shareholders of acquiring firms do not tend to benefit in the short term from the merger while those of the target firms show significant gains.


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