Causes, Consequences, and Shareholder Wealth Effects of Management Turnover: A Review of the Empirical Evidence

1990 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eugene P. H. Furtado ◽  
Vijay Karan
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Shareholder Wealth ◽  
Wealth Effects ◽  
Management Turnover

Successful Cross-border Acquisitions of Latin American Financial Institutions: Identifying Success Factors

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 347-367 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Bülent Aybar ◽  
Wendy M. Jeffus ◽  
John C. Edmunds
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Success Factors ◽  
Market Access ◽  
Shareholder Wealth ◽  
Wealth Effects ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Foreign Companies ◽  
Study Methodology ◽  
Insight Into

This article examines the shareholder wealth effects for foreign companies that announce acquisitions of financial institutions in Latin America. We examine data for 636 transactions for the period 1985–2009. We employ event study methodology coupled with a cross-sectional regression to determine if shareholders of the acquiring firm receive positive returns. The results indicate that acquirers receive positive returns when the acquisition involves a target bank in a market with low market access, high market risk, and greater control post acquisition. These findings offer improvements on previously examined variables and provide insight into a market not sufficiently examined in prior research.

scholarly journals Discount and premium awards in the context of pre-existing ESOP conditions

2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 54-67
Author(s):  
Bruce A. Rosser ◽  
Jean M. Canil
Keyword(s):  
Stock Option ◽  
Shareholder Wealth ◽  
Wealth Effects ◽  
Executive Stock Option ◽  
Major Implication ◽  
Incentive Problems ◽  
The Cost

This study examines interactions between pre-award ESOP restrictive conditions and award discounts/premiums that characterized executive stock option awards in Australia from the mid-1980s to 2000. Shareholder wealth effects at award suggest that (i) shareholders generally do not gain from offering discounts because associated value increments do not exceed the cost of the discount, (ii) premium awards coupled with exercise restrictions appear to be used to ameliorate the risk of CEO opportunism associated with irregular awards, and (iii) shareholders suffer a wealth decrement when premium awards are used to ameliorate the disinvestment incentive of inferior CEO dilution protection. The second of these findings implies risk of CEO opportunism. A major implication is that award discounts/premiums are used to modify the conditions of pre-existing ESOPs that presumably are dated and no longer optimal for addressing current incentive problems. Analyses of the optimality of award discounts/premiums should take this into account.

Bank mergers and acquisitions in Greece: the financial crisis and its effect on shareholder wealth

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ioannis Tampakoudis ◽  
Michail Nerantzidis ◽  
Demetres Subeniotis ◽  
Apostolos Soutsas ◽  
Nikolaos Kiosses
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Mergers And Acquisitions ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Shareholder Wealth ◽  
Conclusive Evidence ◽  
Wealth Effects ◽  
Bank Mergers ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the wealth implications of bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the unique Greek setting given the triple crisis phenomenon – banking, sovereign debt and economic crises – that prevailed after the global financial crisis. Design/methodology/approach The study examines bank M&As and bank transactions over the period from 1997 to 2018, as well as government-assisted M&As during the crisis. The wealth effects of bank M&As are assessed using both univariate and multivariate frameworks. Findings Findings show a neutral crisis effect on the valuation of M&As upon their announcement. However, the authors provide conclusive evidence that M&A completions are value-destroying events for acquiring banks during the crisis, far worse than in the pre-crisis period. Greek banks also fail to create value from government-assisted mergers. The results suggest that the financial stability and the prevention of further deepening of the Greek crisis with possible contagion effects were achieved at the expense of shareholders and taxpayers. Originality/value To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that examines the impact of the Greek triple crisis on the wealth effects of bank M&As and bank transactions. Also, the study provides first evidence with regard to the economic impact of government-assisted M&As in the European context.

scholarly journals Heir to the Throne: Choice of the Replacement CEO After Unexpected CEO Turnovers

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 172
Author(s):  
Mia L. Rivolta
Keyword(s):  
Shareholder Wealth ◽  
Senior Management ◽  
Leadership Transition ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Ceo Succession ◽  
Management Turnover ◽  
Stock Performance ◽  
Hiring Process ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Selection Of

This paper analyzes firms’ choice of replacement CEOs after unexpected CEO turnovers, and the impact of the replacement decision on shareholder wealth. More specifically, I investigate whether the selection of replacement CEOs from the board facilitates a smoother leadership transition. I find that while selecting replacement CEO from existing board members allows the company to quickly fill the CEO position, thereby reducing uncertainty and transitional costs (measured by new CEO turnover, senior management turnover and delay), it may not be beneficial to shareholders. I provide evidence that replacing departing CEO with a board member is negatively associated with stock performance for up to two years. This paper is a step forward towards the understanding of the roles boards play in the CEO succession and new CEO hiring process.

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