"Dirty Words" and the Offense Principle

2000 ◽  
Vol 19 (5) ◽  
pp. 545 ◽  
Author(s):  
David W. Shoemaker
Keyword(s):  
Offense Principle

scholarly journals John Stuart Mill's Harm Principle and Free Speech: Expanding the Notion of Harm

Utilitas ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Melina Constantine Bell
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Free Speech ◽  
Harm Principle ◽  
Ethical Framework ◽  
Epistemic Injustice ◽  
Offense Principle ◽  
Systemic Oppression ◽  
Social Coercion ◽  
The Harm Principle

Abstract This article advocates employing John Stuart Mill's harm principle to set the boundary for unregulated free speech, and his Greatest Happiness Principle to regulate speech outside that boundary because it threatens unconsented-to harm. Supplementing the harm principle with an offense principle is unnecessary and undesirable if our conception of harm integrates recent empirical evidence unavailable to Mill. For example, current research uncovers the tangible harms individuals suffer directly from bigoted speech, as well as the indirect harms generated by the systemic oppression and epistemic injustice that bigoted speech constructs and reinforces. Using Mill's ethical framework with an updated notion of harm, we can conclude that social coercion is not justified to restrict any harmless speech, no matter how offensive. Yet certain forms of speech, such as bigoted insults, are both harmful and fail to express a genuine opinion, and so do not deserve free speech protection.

HARM AND THE VOLENTI PRINCIPLE

2011 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 309-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerald Dworkin
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
Legal Moralism ◽  
Great Work ◽  
Joel Feinberg ◽  
Offense Principle ◽  
Moral Limits

AbstractThis is an essay on the limits of the Criminal Law. In particular, it is about what principles, if any, determine whether it is legitimate for the state to criminalize certain conduct. Joel Feinberg in his great work on the moral limits of the criminal law argues that we need only two principles. One is a principle regulating harm to other people and the other is an offense principle regulating certain kinds of offensive conduct. I explore various aspects of his argument. In particular I concentrate on his use of the Volenti Principle: He who consents cannot be wrongfully harmed by conduct to which he has fully consented. Feinberg uses the principle to argue that certain kinds of consensual conduct cannot be forbidden unless we adopt some kind of legal moralism, i.e., conduct can be forbidden on the grounds that it is immoral even though the conduct harms no other person. I explore the possibility of avoiding legal moralism by limiting the use of the Volenti Principle.

scholarly journals RETHINKING THE OFFENSE PRINCIPLE

Legal Theory ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 8 (03) ◽  
Author(s):  
A. P. Simester ◽  
Andrew von Hirsch
Keyword(s):  
Offense Principle

Rethinking the Offense Principle

2017 ◽  
pp. 365-392
Author(s):  
A. P. Si mester ◽  
Andrew von Hirsch
Keyword(s):  
Offense Principle

scholarly journals Toward a Theory of Offense: Should You Feel Offended?

Philosophy ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Chang Liu
Keyword(s):  
Moral Emotion ◽  
Adequate Theory ◽  
Norm Theory ◽  
Offense Principle

Abstract The feeling of being offended, as a moral emotion, plays a key role in issues such as slurs, the offense principle, ethics of humor, etc. However, no adequate theory of offense has been developed in the literature, and it remains unclear what questions such a theory should answer. This paper attempts to fill the gap by performing two tasks. The first task is to clarify and summarize the questions of offense into two kinds, the descriptive questions (e.g., what features differentiate offense from similar moral states like anger?) and the normative questions (e.g., what are the conditions for taking offense to be apt?). The second task is to answer these questions by developing what I call ‘the violated norm theory of offense’. According to this theory, feeling offended entails that the norm one endorses is judged to be violated by the offender. Appealing to the violated norm enables this theory to answer the descriptive questions (e.g., taking offense differs from anger because of features like not requiring victims and the difficulty of animal offense) and the normative questions of offense (e.g., taking offense is apt only if the violated norm is universalizable).

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