Effect of Contract Price as Limitation on Measure of Quantum Meruit Recovery Where Plaintiff Rescinds after Part Performance

1935 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 313
Author(s):  
David C. Dunlap
Keyword(s):  
Contract Price

The Building Blocks of Formulas to Measure Expectation Damages; the Indifference Principle

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melvin A. Eisenberg
Keyword(s):  
Market Price ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Replacement Cost ◽  
Contract Price ◽  
Resale Price ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Lost Profit

Chapter 13 concerns the building blocks of formulas to measure expectation damages: replacement cost, market price, resale price, diminished value, and lost profits. Replacement-cost damages are based on the difference between the contract price and the actual or imputed cost of a replacement transaction. Resale-price damages are based on the difference between the contract price payable by a breaching buyer and the price the seller received on resale to a third party. Diminished-value damages are based on the difference between the value of the performance that a breaching seller rendered and the value of the performance that she promised to render. Lost-profit damages are based on the difference between the price a breaching buyer agreed to pay and the seller’s variable costs.

Introduction to Problems of Performance

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melvin A. Eisenberg
Keyword(s):  
Contract Price ◽  
Contract Formation ◽  
Specific Performance ◽  
The Right ◽  
A Performance

This chapter provides an introduction to problems of performance, which for the most part concern post-contract formation issues, such as a promisee’s rights where the promisor has rendered a performance that is imperfect but substantial. Generally speaking, problems of performance concern sanctions for breach other than damages or specific performance, such as suspension of performance or termination of the contract by the aggrieved party. These sanctions are often much more severe than damages. For example, if a promisee has the right to terminate a contract the promisor may lose the profits she would have earned if the contract had continued in force, as well as the value, or at least the contract price, of the performance she rendered before the contract was terminated.

scholarly journals CONTRACTING-OUT OF HOUSEHOLD WASTE COLLECTION SERVICES IN JAPAN

2017 ◽  
Vol 65 (02) ◽  
pp. 443-455
Author(s):  
NORIMICHI MATSUEDA ◽  
JUN’ICHI MIKI
Keyword(s):  
Analytical Model ◽  
Inverse Relationship ◽  
Municipal Waste ◽  
Household Waste ◽  
Private Firms ◽  
Simple Analytical Model ◽  
Waste Collection ◽  
Contracting Out ◽  
Contract Price ◽  
Set Up

We first report three empirical findings from our survey on the contracting-out of municipal waste collection services in Japan: (1) the rate of contracting-out and the contract price are inversely related, (2) this inverse relationship tapers out as the contracting rate becomes sufficiently high, and the contract price even tends to go up as the contracting rate approaches 100% and (3) there is a significant disparity in the contracting rates between the eastern and western parts of Japan. In order to account for these observations, we then set up a simple analytical model and examine its implications. Also, we discuss the issues that a potential hold-up situation could give rise to when the services are completely contracted out to private firms.

scholarly journals Multi-agent Contracting and Reconfiguration in Competitive Environments using Acquaintance Models

10.14311/838 ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Bíba ◽  
J. Vokřínek
Keyword(s):  
Crucial Role ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Price Setting ◽  
Collaborative Environments ◽  
Contract Price ◽  
Competitive Environments ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Competitive Contracting

Cooperation of agents in competitive environments is more complicated than in collaborative environments. Both replanning and reconfiguration play a crucial role in cooperation, and introduce a means for implementating a system flexibility. The concepts of commitments, decommitments with penalties and subcontracting may facilitate effective reconfiguration and replanning. Agents in competitive environments are fully autonomous and selfinterested. Therefore the setting of penalties and profit computation cannot be provided centrally. Both the costs and the gain differ from agent to agent with respect to contracts already agreed and resources load. This paper proposes an acquaintance model for contracting in competitive environments and introduces possibilities of reconfigurating in competitive environments as a means of decommitment optimization with respect to resources load and profit maximization. The presented algorithm for contract price setting does not use any centralized knowledge and provides results corresponding to a realistic environment. A simple customerprovider scenario proves this algorithm in competitive contracting. 

The Effect of Anticipatory Repudiation: Principle and Policy

1962 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 213-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. M. Nienaber
Keyword(s):  
Proper Time ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
The Other ◽  
Entire Period ◽  
Sales Manager ◽  
Local Authorities ◽  
Contract Price ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Pertinent Question ◽  
Do So

IThe facts of the recent House of Lords decision, White and Carter (Councils), Ltd. v. McGregor, were so simple and have been canvassed so thoroughly as to be now practically a matter of common knowledge. The appellants' business consisted in the placing of advertisements, for a fee, on litter bins which were then distributed to various local authorities. They agreed to run the respondents' advertisement for a period of three years. The respondents repudiated on the ground that their sales manager who had concluded the contract had no authority to do so. The appellants refused to accept the repudiation and duly displayed the advertisements for the entire period, bringing at the proper time a suit for the full amount owing under the contract. The pertinent question was: were the appellants entitled to dismiss the repudiation and give effect to the contract on their side in order to secure performance on the other side; or rather were they obliged to adopt the repudiation as the end of the contract and the beginning of a suit for damages subject to mitigation? The latter view prevailed in all but the House of Lords where a majority of three to two preferred the former.In coming to this conclusion the House of Lords in effect overruled an earlier decision, viz., Langford and Co., Ltd. v. Dutch, the facts of which were virtually on all fours with those of the present case. In Langford's case the appellant was unsuccessful in recovering the contract price for exhibiting an advertisement film which he persisted in showing despite the respondent's repudiation of the contract.

An Economic Analysis of the Effects of Harvest Timing on Yield, Quality, and Processing Contract Price for three Potato Varieties

2018 ◽  
Vol 95 (5) ◽  
pp. 549-563 ◽  
Author(s):  
Addie Waxman ◽  
Jeffrey Stark ◽  
Joseph Guenthner ◽  
Nora Olsen ◽  
Michael Thornton ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Economic Analysis ◽  
Potato Varieties ◽  
Contract Price ◽  
Harvest Timing ◽  
Yield Quality
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