Abstract
Alternate care sites across the US were widely underutilized during the COVID-19 outbreak, while the volume and severity of COVID-19 cases overwhelmed health systems across the United States. The challenges presented by the pandemic have shown the need to design surge capacity principles with consideration for demand that strains multiple response capabilities. We reviewed current policy and previous literature from past ACS as well as highlight challenges from the COVID-19 pandemic, to make recommendations that can inform future surge capacity planning. Our recommendations include: 1) Preparedness actions need to be continuous and flexible; 2) Staffing needs must be met as they arise with solutions that are specific to the pandemic; 3) Health equity must be a focus of ACS establishment and planning; and 4) ACS should be designed to function without compromising safe and effective care. A critical opportunity exists to identify improvements for future use of ACS in pandemics.
A major teacher shortage exists in the United States. As teachers leave the classroom in droves, administrators are forced to hire unlicensed educators in order to fill vacant positions. Teachers have decided to change professions due to a lack of competitive salaries, fear of personal
safety, and a lack of support from education stakeholders. Through the use of research in academic journals and articles as well as personal anecdotes, I attempt to prove that teachers are not being treated fairly, and if the right changes are made then the teacher retention rate can be improved.
In recent years the study of divided government has been a growth industry. Numerous scholars
have sought to explain patterns of divided government in the United States, while
others have attempted to explore the consequences of the phenomenon. No doubt this
scholarly interest in the subject is due in large part to the attention paid by the political media
to divided control of the presidency and Congress during the 1980s, as well as the resulting
’gridlock‘ that dominated policy making in Washington during that time period.
Despite an array of formulas for peace put forth during his administration, President Bush and his policy-making team have been almost totally uninterested in involving the United States in any serious effort to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The quick demise of all peace initiatives——each of which succumbed to the administration's focus on terrorism rather than on Israel's occupation as the root of the conflict——is testimony to the Bush team's near total identification with Israel's interests. This article examines the Bush administration's bias toward Israel and the factors influencing that approach: Bush's own willful ignorance of the situation on the ground and lack of concern for Palestinian grievances, his apparent personal rapport with Ariel Sharon, and the strong domestic political pressures on him, including from the pro-Israel lobby, Congress, neoconservatives, and the fundamentalist Christian lobby. All these factors combine to make any U.S. pressures on Israel highly unlikely.
Late in the 1980s, several major U.S. private foundations concluded that the concern for Africa in the country was weak. This weakness was reflected in the faint focus on U.S. foreign policy toward Africa in all three branches of government, in the halting voice for Africa or for U.S. interests there in the non-governmental organizations (think-tanks, religious organizations, lobbies), and in the small concern for U.S. policy or for affecting it in the African studies scholarly community. Indeed, the voice for Africa in the United States was neither strong nor effective.
Alternate care sites during the COVID-19 pandemic: Policy Implications for pandemic surge planning