An Implicit Contract Theory of Intergovernmental Grants

1990 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Brennan ◽  
Jonathan Pincus
Keyword(s):  
Contract Theory ◽  
Intergovernmental Grants ◽  
Implicit Contract

scholarly journals Flexibility in collective wage bargaining in New Zealand: facts and folklore

1970 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond Harbridge
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Contract Theory ◽  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
Implicit Contract ◽  
Wage Flexibility ◽  
Economic Forces ◽  
Collective Wage Bargaining ◽  
Over Time

Prevailing folklore in New Zealand has it that wage bargaining outcomes are unduly inflexible. Implicit contract theory suggests that while wages may be sticky and somewhat rigid within a single wage round, stzckiness will diminish over time as wages become responsive to outside economic forces. This paper examines the hypothesis that the stickiness of wage settlements diminishes over time and develops 4 criteria for testing that hypothesis. Data for all settlements regiqtered with the Arbitration Commission since 1984 are used. Analysis of the data indicates that despite folklore to the contrary, a very important degree of wage flexibility exists.

The Implicit Contract Theory of Unemployment meets the Wage Bill Argument

1980 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 321 ◽  
Author(s):  
George A. Akerlof ◽  
Hajime Miyazaki
Keyword(s):  
Contract Theory ◽  
Wage Bill ◽  
Implicit Contract
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