Revisiting Metropolitanism and Fiscal Disparities

This paper describes and analyzes the experiences of Norway. Sweden and Denmark with local income taxation in order to test the validity of comments made by numerous American economists about such taxes. Although local income taxes are their major source of locally raised revenue, it appears that the problems of revenue instability and tax base mobility are not serious in these countries. Fiscal disparities have been greatly reduced through consolidation of government units and heavy reliance on transfers from the national government, and these institutional arrangements may have reduced local autonomy in some important respects. The heavy reliance on income taxes by all levels of government is one reason for the extremely high marginal tax rales to which most workers are subject.

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Fiscal disparities in Uruguay’s regions: The role of a new systemof intergovernmental equalization transfers

CEPAL Review ◽

10.18356/042857cd-en ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 2019 (129) ◽

pp. 197-220

Author(s):

Leonel Muinelo-Gallo ◽

Joana Urraburu Bordon ◽

Pablo Castro Scavone

Keyword(s):

Fiscal Disparities

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Factor decomposition of sub-provincial fiscal disparities in China

China Economic Review ◽

10.1016/j.chieco.2005.03.003 ◽

2005 ◽

Vol 16 (4) ◽

pp. 403-418 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

YU Qing ◽

TSUI Kaiyuen

Keyword(s):

Fiscal Disparities ◽

Factor Decomposition

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Determinants of the Distribution of the Central-Government Budgetary Grants in Turkey

Environment and Planning C Government and Policy ◽

10.1068/c0672r ◽

2008 ◽

Vol 26 (5) ◽

pp. 954-967 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

Recep Tekeli ◽

Muhittin Kaplan

Keyword(s):

Local Governments ◽

Central Government ◽

Fiscal Decentralization ◽

The Political ◽

Coalition Government ◽

Fiscal Disparities ◽

Grant Allocation ◽

Incumbent Party ◽

Government Grant ◽

Economic Criteria

Intergovernmental grants are the main revenue source of local governments. In the fiscal decentralization literature it has been argued that fiscal disparities across the regions are accounted for in the central-government grant distribution. However, some argue that grants are given to localities to increase the reelection chances of the incumbent or to increase the votes at election. To compete with the opposition parties the incumbent party may try to allocate the grants to aligned local governments. In this paper we analyze the grant allocation in Turkey. We test empirically whether central-government's budgetary transfers to the municipalities were made on the basis of economic criteria or in accordance with the political interest of politicians, and hence the coalition government. To test the hypothesis we followed the literature but we used additional variables. Using municipal data in sixty-one provinces, we find that the desire to secure reelection motivates politicians.

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