High Court of Justice, Chancery Division. Brown v. Alabaster

1888 ◽  
Vol 36 (5) ◽  
pp. 288
Author(s):  
Edmund H. Bennett
Keyword(s):  
High Court ◽  
Court Of Justice

scholarly journals Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Israel

2006 ◽  
Vol 100 (4) ◽  
pp. 895-901
Author(s):  
Daniel Bodansky ◽  
Geoffrey R. Watson
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Advisory Opinion ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
High Court ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
Israeli Government ◽  
Israeli Supreme Court

Mara'Abe v. Prime Minister of Israel. Case No. HCJ 7957/04. At <http://elyonl.court.gov.il/eng/home/index.html> (English translation).Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, September 15, 2005.In Mara ‘abe v. Prime Minister of Israel, the Israeli Supreme Court held that the routing of a portion of Israel's “security fence” in the northern West Bank violated international humanitarian law. The Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, ordered the Israeli government to consider alternative paths for the barrier. The Mara'abe decision expanded on the Court's earlier ruling in Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel, in which the Court ordered the rerouting of another segment of the obstacle. Mara ’abe also revealed some of the Israeli Court's views on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory— the 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) holding that construction of the barrier anywhere in occupied territory violates international law.

Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel. Case No. HCJ 769/02

2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (2) ◽  
pp. 459-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Bodansky ◽  
Orna Ben-Naftali ◽  
Keren Michaeli
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
International Law ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Direct Part ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
High Court ◽  
Additional Protocol ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Supreme Court

Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel. Case No. HCJ 769/02. At <http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf>.Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, December 13, 2006.In Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel1 Targeted Killings) the Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, examined the legality of Israel's “preventative targeted killings” of members of militant Palestinian organizations. The Court's unanimous conclusion reads:The result of the examination is not that such strikes are always permissible or that they are always forbidden. The approach of customary international law applying to armed conflicts of an international nature is that civilians are protected from attacks by the army. However, that protection does not exist regarding those civilians “for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities” (§51(3) of [Additional Protocol I]). Harming such civilians, even if the result is death, is permitted, on the condition that there is no less harmful means, and on the condition that innocent civilians are not harmed. Harm to the latter must be proportional. (Para. 60)

Finally, Our Own Brown! (?)

2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-289 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yifat Bitton
Keyword(s):  
African American ◽  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
The Other ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
High Court ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
Distinctive Group ◽  
Contextual Reality

The decision in Noar Kahalacha, an anti-segregation in education case that was recently delivered by the Israeli High Court of Justice, has been ‘naturally’ celebrated as the ‘Israeli Brown’. But is it? This article points to the differences between the monumental US Supreme Court decision of Brown and the Israeli Brown-equivalent – Noar Kahalacha. It contends that the two cases bear differences that stem from the divergent patterns of discrimination they represent, and that they reflect these differences squarely. The discrimination patterns reflected by the cases differ by virtue of traits that are traditionally overlooked in antidiscrimination theoretical analysis. Comparing the two cases, therefore, allows us an opportunity to revisit the notion of discrimination and its antidote, antidiscrimination. Drawing on the dichotomous concepts of de jure/de facto discrimination and difference/sameness discrimination, the article shows how these dual theoretical notions are determinative in shaping the distinctiveness of each of these cases. While the African American victims in Brown were easily recognised as a distinctive group suffering from de jure discrimination, the Mizrahi victims in Noar Kahalacha – who suffer from de facto discrimination within a Jewish hegemonic society – lacked such clear recognition. Accordingly, the discrimination narrative that Noar Kahalacha provides is very incomplete and carries only limited potential for effective application in future struggles to eliminate discriminatory practices against Mizrahis in Israel. Brown, on the other hand, carries a converse trait. Though criticised, Brown, nevertheless, strongly signifies the recognition by White America of its overarching discriminatory practices, and implies a genuine dedication to break from it. This understanding further illuminates the limitations embedded in the possibility of ‘importing’ highly contextual antidiscrimination jurisprudence from abroad into our system's highly contextual reality of discrimination.

THE DEATH OF CHARLES I

2002 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 727-754 ◽  
Author(s):  
SEAN KELSEY
Keyword(s):  
House Of Commons ◽  
High Court ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
Charles I ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Peaceful Settlement ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
City Of London ◽  
The City

By the winter of 1648–9, demands for retributive justice on Charles I and his supporters had built to a crescendo. But regicide was generally regarded as an extremely bad idea, and the king's trial was contrived as a final bid for peaceful settlement, not a prelude to king-killing. In return for a place at the heart of a new constitutional order, Charles I was required to abdicate his negative voice by pleading to charges brought on the sole authority of the House of Commons. This was a high-risk strategy inspired and justified by the weakening of opposition to the trial in the House of Lords, the city of London and at Edinburgh, and by some of the encouraging signals emanating from deep within the royalist camp itself. However, in their anxiety to avoid having their ultimate sanction forced upon them, the commissioners of the high court of justice gave the king rather more opportunities to plead to the charges against him than was consistent with the maintenance of their own authority. Rather than persuading him to give in, they encouraged him to stand firm, with fatal consequences. Far from being a providential act of vengeance, or indeed the inexorable fate of a man predestined to martyrdom, the execution of Charles I was a highly adventitious occurrence – predictable, perhaps, yet contingent on a wide range of unpredictable circumstances.

Judicial Review of Knesset Decisions by the High Court of Justice

1994 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meir Shamgar
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Limited Range ◽  
Democratic Regime ◽  
High Court ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Subject

Some fifteen years ago, an address on the subject of judicial review of the actions of the Knesset would have been extremely short and quite familiar to English jurists. Our practice was basically the same as in England: the Parliament is sovereign, its laws inviolate, and its inner proceedings immune from review.Beginning with two decisions in the early 1980s, Flato-Sharon and Sarid, the Court has gradually recognized the justiciability of a limited range of Knesset decisions. While the precise level of review varies according to the type of decision at issue, the Court's review has been motivated in all cases by the need to preserve the rule of law and the integrity of our democratic regime.

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