Supreme Court of Indiana. The American Express Company v. Calvin Fletcher et al.

1866 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 21
2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Lemley

In a string of recent opinions, the Supreme Court has made it harder forconsumers to avoid arbitration clauses, even when businesses strategicallyinsert provisions in them that effectively prevent consumers from beingable to bring any claim in any forum. In American Express Co. v. ItalianColors Restaurant, an antitrust case, the Court held that class-actionwaivers embedded in mandatory arbitration clauses were enforceable evenwhen they had the effect of making it economically irrational for thevictims of antitrust violations to pursue their claims.Courts have long considered antitrust claims to be too complex and tooimportant to trust to private arbitrators. By the 1980s, the Supreme Courtpermitted federal statutory rights, including antitrust claims, to bearbitrated so long as the plaintiffs could effectively vindicate theirrights in the alternative forum. In 2013, the Supreme Court in ItalianColors fundamentally weakened the Effective Vindication Doctrine when itheld that arbitration clauses that precluded class actions and classwidearbitration were enforceable even when they effectively prohibited allindividual plaintiffs from bringing a case.Arbitration differs from litigation in ways that harm the interests ofconsumer antitrust plaintiffs. For example, arbitration limits discoveryand has no meaningful appeals process. Furthermore, defendants use theterms in arbitration clauses to prevent class actions and to undercut thepro-plaintiff features of antitrust law, including mandatory trebledamages, meaningful injunctive relief, recovery of attorneys’ fees, and alengthy statute of limitations. With the Court’s undermining of theEffective Vindication Doctrine in Italian Colors, defendants’ efforts todismantle these pro-plaintiff components of antitrust law may prove moresuccessful in the future.The problems associated with antitrust arbitration are magnified inconcentrated markets. Supporters of enforcing arbitration clauses assumethat they these contractual provisions are the result of an informed,voluntary bargain. But when a market is dominated by a single supplier or asmall group of firms, consumers often find it impossible to purchase anecessary product while retaining the right to sue, especially sincearbitration clauses are generally embedded in contracts of adhesion. Thismeans that in the markets most likely to be affected by antitrustviolations, consumers are least likely to be able to avoid mandatoryarbitration clauses. Furthermore, when mergers result in concentratedmarkets, they can increase the problems explored in Part Two.Antitrust authorities can address the problem of proliferating arbitrationclauses. When evaluating mergers, officials at the Federal Trade Commissionand the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice can threaten tochallenge the merger unless the merging parties agree to specifiedconditions, such as the divestiture of certain assets. Because thosemergers that pose the greatest risk of anticompetitive effects also magnifythe problems associated with mandatory arbitration clauses, antitrustofficials would be wise to condition merger approval on the mergingparties’ agreement to not require arbitration of antitrust claims.


Author(s):  
Paul A Johnson

ABSTRACT Platforms, or two-sided markets, have become a topic of significant discussion in competition law over the past decade, culminating in the recent US Supreme Court decision in Ohio v. American Express Co. This note discusses externalities in platforms. Indirect network effects, one type of externality common on platforms, have been prominent in these discussions. However, the prominence of indirect network effects has obscured the importance of another externality that exists on platforms, a usage externality. This note argues that a near exclusive focus on indirect network effects has led to errors in identifying when a market should be analyzed as a platform. These errors implicate the identification of platforms like those at issue in Ohio v. American Express Co. as well as a wider set of platforms, such as ad-supported media platforms.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 319-338
Author(s):  
David S Evans

Abstract This article presents some basic principles for conducting the antitrust analysis of multisided platforms that courts could adapt to the particulars of their jurisdictions and case laws. It has a particular focus on measuring consumer surplus for platform businesses and the implications of that for the design of antitrust rules. It shows how multisided platforms increase welfare by reducing transactions costs and resolving externalities among economic agents. It presents three normative principles for policy interventions and illustrates these principles by showing how they apply to recent debates over privacy. The article then develops a framework for considering antitrust rules in light of these principles given the objectives of antitrust law, error costs, and developing administrable rules. It lastly considers the competing approaches to analysing multisided platforms that were presented to the Supreme Court in the American Express litigation and the Court’s decision in light of these principles.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Lemley

In a string of recent opinions, the Supreme Court has made it harder forconsumers to avoid arbitration clauses, even when businesses strategicallyinsert provisions in them that effectively prevent consumers from beingable to bring any claim in any forum. In American Express Co. v. ItalianColors Restaurant, an antitrust case, the Court held that class-actionwaivers embedded in mandatory arbitration clauses were enforceable evenwhen they had the effect of making it economically irrational for thevictims of antitrust violations to pursue their claims.Courts have long considered antitrust claims to be too complex and tooimportant to trust to private arbitrators. By the 1980s, the Supreme Courtpermitted federal statutory rights, including antitrust claims, to bearbitrated so long as the plaintiffs could effectively vindicate theirrights in the alternative forum. In 2013, the Supreme Court in ItalianColors fundamentally weakened the Effective Vindication Doctrine when itheld that arbitration clauses that precluded class actions and classwidearbitration were enforceable even when they effectively prohibited allindividual plaintiffs from bringing a case.Arbitration differs from litigation in ways that harm the interests ofconsumer antitrust plaintiffs. For example, arbitration limits discoveryand has no meaningful appeals process. Furthermore, defendants use theterms in arbitration clauses to prevent class actions and to undercut thepro-plaintiff features of antitrust law, including mandatory trebledamages, meaningful injunctive relief, recovery of attorneys’ fees, and alengthy statute of limitations. With the Court’s undermining of theEffective Vindication Doctrine in Italian Colors, defendants’ efforts todismantle these pro-plaintiff components of antitrust law may prove moresuccessful in the future.The problems associated with antitrust arbitration are magnified inconcentrated markets. Supporters of enforcing arbitration clauses assumethat they these contractual provisions are the result of an informed,voluntary bargain. But when a market is dominated by a single supplier or asmall group of firms, consumers often find it impossible to purchase anecessary product while retaining the right to sue, especially sincearbitration clauses are generally embedded in contracts of adhesion. Thismeans that in the markets most likely to be affected by antitrustviolations, consumers are least likely to be able to avoid mandatoryarbitration clauses. Furthermore, when mergers result in concentratedmarkets, they can increase the problems explored in Part Two.Antitrust authorities can address the problem of proliferating arbitrationclauses. When evaluating mergers, officials at the Federal Trade Commissionand the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice can threaten tochallenge the merger unless the merging parties agree to specifiedconditions, such as the divestiture of certain assets. Because thosemergers that pose the greatest risk of anticompetitive effects also magnifythe problems associated with mandatory arbitration clauses, antitrustofficials would be wise to condition merger approval on the mergingparties’ agreement to not require arbitration of antitrust claims.


1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 204-205
Author(s):  
Megan Cleary

In recent years, the law in the area of recovered memories in child sexual abuse cases has developed rapidly. See J.K. Murray, “Repression, Memory & Suggestibility: A Call for Limitations on the Admissibility of Repressed Memory Testimony in Abuse Trials,” University of Colorado Law Review, 66 (1995): 477-522, at 479. Three cases have defined the scope of liability to third parties. The cases, decided within six months of each other, all involved lawsuits by third parties against therapists, based on treatment in which the patients recovered memories of sexual abuse. The New Hampshire Supreme Court, in Hungerford v. Jones, 722 A.2d 478 (N.H. 1998), allowed such a claim to survive, while the supreme courts in Iowa, in J.A.H. v. Wadle & Associates, 589 N.W.2d 256 (Iowa 1999), and California, in Eear v. Sills, 82 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1991), rejected lawsuits brought by nonpatients for professional liability.


1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-203
Author(s):  
Kendra Carlson

The Supreme Court of California held, in Delaney v. Baker, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 610 (1999), that the heightened remedies available under the Elder Abuse Act (Act), Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 15657,15657.2 (West 1998), apply to health care providers who engage in reckless neglect of an elder adult. The court interpreted two sections of the Act: (1) section 15657, which provides for enhanced remedies for reckless neglect; and (2) section 15657.2, which limits recovery for actions based on “professional negligence.” The court held that reckless neglect is distinct from professional negligence and therefore the restrictions on remedies against health care providers for professional negligence are inapplicable.Kay Delaney sued Meadowood, a skilled nursing facility (SNF), after a resident, her mother, died. Evidence at trial indicated that Rose Wallien, the decedent, was left lying in her own urine and feces for extended periods of time and had stage I11 and IV pressure sores on her ankles, feet, and buttocks at the time of her death.


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