Critical Reflections on the International Humanitarian Law Aspects of the ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion

2005 ◽  
Vol 99 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ardi Imseis

I shall confine my brief thoughts on the recent advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territory (OPT) to the Court’s treatment of international humanitarian law (IHL) in general, and to the law of belligerent occupation in particular. To that end, I will focus on the following four areas: the Court’s consideration of the applicable law as regards IHL; the Court’s interpretation of Article 6 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War; the Court’s consideration of the concept of military necessity in the context of foreign military occupation; and the Court’s consideration of the responsibility of third states, particularly the high contracting parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention, for violations of relevant principles of IHL by an occupying power.

2005 ◽  
Vol 99 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Folk

On July 9, 2004, the International Court of Justice issued its advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s construction of a security wall on occupied Palestinian territory, declaring that the wall was in violation of international law. The advisory opinion also indicated that Israel should forthwith cease construction of the wall, dismantle what had been so far constructed, and make reparations to the Palestinians for all damages caused by the project. On July 20, 2004, at the Tenth Emergency Session of the General Assembly, Resolution ES-10/15 was adopted by a vote of 150 in favor, 6 opposed, and 10 abstentions, demanding that Israel comply with the legal obligations as specified by the advisory opinion.


1997 ◽  
Vol 37 (316) ◽  
pp. 76-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy L.H. McCormack

The Advisory Opinion delivered by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons was a somewhat disappointing if not entirely unexpected decision. After the final paragraph, which constitutes the dispositif, all fourteen judges appended either personal declarations, separate opinions or dissenting opinions to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with specific findings and particular aspects of the reasoning behind the Opinion.


1997 ◽  
Vol 37 (316) ◽  
pp. 56-64
Author(s):  
Hisakazu Fujita

The Advisory Opinion handed down by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on 8 July 1996 concerning the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons contains many elements that are of fundamental interest from the standpoint of international humanitarian law. Indeed, humanitarian law, which has developed to a remarkable extent since the Second World War, has always lacked an express ruling on nuclear weapons.


2005 ◽  
Vol 38 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 165-188
Author(s):  
Karin Calvo-Goller

This note deals with some of the procedural and substantive issues raised by the Legal Opinion rendered by International Court of Justice on the legality of the separation barrier. In the note it is argued that the motivations behind the General Assembly's request where political and not legal. It is contended that he partiality of the choice of the dossiers' material as submitted, issues relevant to propriety and the judicial character of the Court, should have led it to decline to give the requested opinion. The note is critical on the participation of Judge Elaraby, which the note argues affects the fairness and impartiality of the proceedings and affect the value of the Advisory Opinion. Israel did not consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. The problems inherent in the lack of relevant factual basis and in the fact-finding function of the Court, its total disregard of Israel's needs to protect its citizens against Palestinian terrorism, and the categorical and unmotivated rejection of Israel's security claims, led to an unbalanced and unjust result. Basic humanitarian law principles relating to the protection of civilians and international human rights are disregarded by the Court when it comes to the right to life of Israeli civilians and to their right to be protected against terror attacks. The note contends that the Court's denial of Israel's right to self-defense lacks legal and factual basis. The procedural and substantive deficiencies of the Advisory Opinion affect its value and persuasiveness.


2014 ◽  
Vol 66 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 338-352
Author(s):  
Senad Ganic

The Arab-Israeli conflict even today represents one of the most complex problems facing the international community. The biggest controversy of the problem lies in the conflicting interpretations of the reasons offered by both sides. The way to overcome this impasse, is precisely the way recourse to international institutions. For this reason, the surprising fact is, that one very important decision of The International Court of Justice, it seems, remained unjustly neglected, especially if we take into account the importance of the issues which the Court dealt and the beneficial impact that this decision may have in the process of resolving the conflict in the Middle East. We believe that Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory hides the way to a possible solution of this exhausting conflict. To consider because it comes to a legal analysis of the situation, which was given by the authorities in whose objectivity we supposed not to suspect as we supposed not to doubt on the objectivity of international law. Therefore, we consider it important to once again remind the decision, believing that in this way we can help to better understand the nature of this conflict, but also the reasons which indicate its possible peaceful solution.


Author(s):  
Leyh Brianne McGonigle

The Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia touches upon the role of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in exercising review over the factual and legal determinations of other principal UN organs, including the UN General Assembly (GA) and Security Council (SC). The relevance of the case, with regard to international organizations and legal acts, hinges on the findings related to the role of the ICJ as a judicial institution vis-à-vis its more political counterparts within the UN organization, the dissolution and succession of international organizations, and the power and limits of international organizations to ensure compliance with their rules and standards.


Author(s):  
Mark Weisburd

This chapter examines restrictions on the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) capacity to act due to problems of admissibility or justiciability with respect to the use of force. It considers how the ICJ deals with cases requiring the exercise of non-legal judgement in relation to the UN Security Council’s authority. It also looks at disputes involving the use of force that can be decided only through the exercise of non-legal judgement. Five cases are highlighted: Corfu Channel (UK v. Albania), Nicaragua v. US, the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, Oil Platforms (Iran v. US), and Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The chapter concludes by focusing on cases involving matters that are arguably within the province of the UN Security Council.


1996 ◽  
Vol 36 (313) ◽  
pp. 500-502
Author(s):  
The Review

On 8 July 1996, the International Court of Justice gave its advisory opinion in response to two enquiries as to the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Whilst the Court did not examine in detail the request put forward by the World Health Organization, it did give very close attention to the question presented by the General Assembly:“Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?”


2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-207
Author(s):  
Mahasen Aljaghoub

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, (UN) and its Statute is an integral part of the UN's Charter. The court's integral role within the UN has largely been misunderstood especially in the way the court has viewed its advisory jurisdiction. The ICJ always asserts that the delivery of an advisory opinion represents its participation in the UN's work and thus, in the absence of compelling reasons, a request for an opinion ought not to be refused. Some commentators note that the principle that the ICJ must participate in the work of the Organisation might sometimes conflict with its judicial character, which might result in not embracing the philosophy of “judicial restraint” in the court's advisory jurisdiction. They also contend that the absence of consent in advisory cases has led the court to overlook its judicial restraint. This article argues that those commentators have overlooked the main role of the ICJ's advisory function in clarifying the law and providing guidance for future action by the UN organs, and has consequently called for applying the principle of consent as a condition for giving an advisory opinion on questions relating to disputes pending between States. In the present article, the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory opinion is analysed to see whether the absence of Israeli consent has undermined the ICJ's judicial character. The author is of the view that the court, as the principal judicial organ of the UN, should, by a cautious judicial policy, provide enlightenment to the UN and participate to achieving its goals while at the same time adhering to its judicial character.


1997 ◽  
Vol 37 (316) ◽  
pp. 35-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louise Doswald-Beck

The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice represents the first time that the Court's judges have been called upon to analyse in some detail rules of international humanitarian law. Other instances, for example, the Nicaragua case, involved nowhere near such an extensive analysis. The Advisory Opinion is therefore of particular interest in that it contains important findings on the customary nature of a number of humanitarian law rules and interesting pronouncements on the interpretation of these rules and their relationship with other rules. Most judges based their final decision on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons on teleological interpretations of the law, choosing either the right of self-defence as being the most fundamental value, or the survival of civilization and the planet as a whole as paramount. Unfortunately, space does not permit a comment on these highly important analyses of the underpinnings of humanitarian law and its purpose in the international order. Therefore, rather than focusing primarily on the Court's conclusion as to the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, this short comment will concentrate on the various pronouncements made on humanitarian law rules. Reference to the Court's finding on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons will only be made from the point of view of how it has contributed to the interpretation of those rules. For this purpose, reference will be made not only to the Advisory Opinion as such (hereafter referred to as the “Opinion”), but also to the various Separate and Dissenting Opinions.


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