A secretary problem with backward solicitation and uncertain employment
A secretary problem which allows the applicant to refuse an offer of employment with a fixed probability and admits backward solicitations of previous interviewees with known probability of successful solicitation is considered. The optimal strategy that maximizes the probability of employing the best applicant is derived. Two types of probability of successful solicitation, constant and geometric, are discussed in detail.
1996 ◽
Vol 33
(03)
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pp. 630-639
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2012 ◽
Vol 49
(3)
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pp. 821-837
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1975 ◽
Vol 12
(03)
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pp. 620-624
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1985 ◽
Vol 22
(03)
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pp. 644-652
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