The thirteenth to fifteenth centuries were witness to lively and broad-ranging debates about the nature of persons. In logical and grammatical discussions, “person” indicated individuality. In the legal-political realm, “person” separated subjects from objects. In theological contexts, “person” appears most often in Trinitarian and Christological debates: God was three persons in one Being, and Christ was one person with two natures (human and divine). This chapter looks at how these uses of “person” overlap in the works of contemplatives in the Latin West such as Hadewijch, Marguerite Porete, Meister Eckhart, and Catherine of Siena. I argue that the key concepts of individuality, dignity, and rationality combine with the contemplative use of first and second person perspectives, personification, and introspection to yield a concept of “person” that both prefigures Locke’s classic seventeenth-century definition and deeply influences the development of personalism.