Bargaining Behavior in a Buyer-Seller Dyad

1972 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 103 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Lee Mathews ◽  
David T. Wilson ◽  
John F. Monoky
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Behavior

Negotiating a Fair Value under Accounting Uncertainty: A Laboratory Experiment

2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl J. Wang
Keyword(s):  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
Agreement Rate ◽  
Free Communication ◽  
Accounting Practice ◽  
Percent Agreement ◽  
Asset Values ◽  
The One ◽  
Bargaining Behavior

ABSTRACT: Using two free-communication bargaining games, this study examines bargaining behavior in a setting analogous to one in which a manager and a verifier negotiate a fair value for an asset over a range of possible values. In the renewable-contract game, the manager and the verifier are allowed to form a long-term relationship and are offered mutually beneficial payoffs. In the one-period contract game, the negotiation pair has to part after each negotiation and the verifier’s payoff does not rely upon the cooperation from the manager. The results show a 90 percent agreement rate for the renewable-contract game and a 65 percent agreement rate for the one-period contract game. The terms of agreement in the renewable-contract (one-period contract) game favor the manager (verifier), resulting in agreed-upon values overstating (understating) actual asset values. Additional analyses suggest that the fair value context affects bargaining behavior in some unique ways. The results of this study have broad implications for accounting practice.

Bargaining Behavior and Complex Games

2017 ◽  
pp. 117-153
Author(s):  
James T. Tedeschi ◽  
Barry R. Schlenker ◽  
Thomas V. Bonoma
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Behavior

ON THE EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY OF "TOUGH" BARGAINING BEHAVIOR

2003 ◽  
Vol 05 (01) ◽  
pp. 63-71
Author(s):  
ANDERS POULSEN
Keyword(s):  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Evolutionary Stability ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Evolutionary Selection ◽  
Nash Demand Game ◽  
Almost All ◽  
Bargaining Behavior ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

This paper investigates whether "tough" bargaining behavior, which gives rise to inefficiency, can be evolutionarily stable. We show that in a two-stage Nash Demand Game such behavior survives. Indeed, almost all the surplus may be wasted. We also study the Ultimatum Game. Here evolutionary selection wipes out all tough behavior, as long as the Proposer does not directly observe the Responder's commitment to rejecting low offers.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document