Charles E. Mitchell: Scapegoat of the Crash?

1986 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas F. Huertas ◽  
Joan L. Silverman

Extremely successful both as an investment and as a commercial banker, Charles E. Mitchell was identified by contemporaries as the epitome of the unscrupulous “money changers” whose speculative dealings they felt played a major role in the Crash of 1929 and the ensuing economic collapse. This portrayal has been echoed and elaborated by historians and commentators down to the present day. In this article Dr. Huertas and Dr. Silverman demonstrate that Mitchell's activities, while sometimes ill-advised, were motivated by the economic“good sense” of the day and were not attributable to either rampant immorality or ungoverned greed. At the same time, they direct the attention of economic historians to the monetary policies of the Federal Reserve system in the 1920s and 1930s—in which Mitchell also played a role—and suggest that a more potent source of the Great Depression lies therein.

Author(s):  
John Kenneth Galbraith ◽  
James K. Galbraith

This chapter examines the impact of the stock market crash of October 1929 on the monetary system of the United States. Very little attention has been given to the factors which converted the uncomfortable and distressing crises of the previous century into the profound and enduring tragedy known as the Great Depression. Neither the stock market crash of October 1929 nor the antecedent speculation has often been deemed to be a decisive cause. The chapter first considers how the stock market crash affected investment expenditures by business and consumer expenditures before discussing the bank failures that followed the crash. It also explores how bank failures and the fear of bank failures induced deflation and how the Federal Reserve System began open-market operations after harboring fears of inflation. Finally, it looks at the reform of the Federal Reserve System by legislation in 1933, 1934, and 1935.


2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Binder ◽  
Mark Spindel

Nearly unique amongst the world's monetary bodies, the Federal Reserve defies description as a central bank. A century after its creation, the Fed retains a hybrid structure of a president-appointed, Senate-confirmed Washington board and twelve largely privately directed regional reserve banks—each of which remains moored in the cities originally selected in 1914. In this article we investigate the origins of the Federal Reserve System, focusing on the selection of the twelve reserve bank cities. In contrast to accounts that suggest politics played no role in the selection of the cities, we suggest that a range of political interests shaped Democrats' choices in designing the reserve system. The result was a decentralized institution that initially proved unable to coordinate monetary policy—a key contributor to the onset of the Great Depression less than two decades later.


2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 618-650
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER W. SHAW

Post-World War I Federal Reserve System policy focused on reducing price levels. Faith in liquidationist ideas led Federal Reserve officials to maintain tight-money policies during the depression of 1920–1921. Farmers suffering through this economic crisis objected to contemporary monetary policy. Organized labor and leading Progressive reformer Robert M. La Follette Sr. seconded their criticism. Postwar challenges to the nation’s financial leadership and its priorities bore tangible results by producing a number of notable reforms, including modifications of Federal Reserve policy and the Agricultural Credits Act of 1923. In the absence of similar political pressure during the Great Depression, the Federal Reserve System adhered to liquidationist ideas and did not pursue monetary expansion.


1932 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 379-391 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl R. Bopp

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