THE DETERMINANTS OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN FAMILY-CONTROLLED PUBLIC CORPORATIONS.

2003 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 226-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. R. Gomez-Mejia ◽  
M. Larraza-Kintana ◽  
M. Makri
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Public Corporations

Changes in SEC Disclosure Rules for Executive Stock Options: Implications for Valuation

1995 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 321-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ajeyo Banerjee
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Stock Options ◽  
Executive Stock Options ◽  
Important Indicator ◽  
Public Corporations ◽  
Disclosure Requirements ◽  
Top Managers ◽  
Disclosure Rules ◽  
Near Term ◽  
Over Time

Outstanding (unexercised and unexpired) executive stock options held by top managers of public corporations are an important indicator of accumulated compensation motivating their near-term behavior. In the process of radically overhauling disclosure requirements relating to executive compensation in the proxy rules in 1983, the SEC discontinued the requirement of disclosure of any particulars relating to outstanding executive stock options held by top managers. This has resulted in imprecisions in the measurement of key particulars of outstanding executive stock options of top managers since 1984. Although we have suggested some procedures for consistent valuation of these options over time, the SEC has since reintroduced the requirements regarding disclosure of unexercised and unexpired executive stock options in annual proxy statements, so that investors remain aware of the full extent of top managers' wealth.

scholarly journals Top executive compensation in Portuguese family firms

2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 104-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivo Nuno Pereira ◽  
José Paulo Esperança
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Public Firms ◽  
Public Corporations ◽  
Background Theory ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Compensation Mechanisms ◽  
Generation Family ◽  
Performance Based Compensation

Performance based compensation is considered a decisive tool in the co-alignment of interest between owners and managers. The solution to agency problems in public corporations hinges critically on the use of variable compensation mechanisms. Empirical analysis of this phenomenon is exiguous and the background theory has been suffering developments, like the introduction of family firm agency problems. This study confirms the larger use of variable compensation by public firms but shows that the potential for using variable compensation in second or third generation family firms is particularly high due to higher potential form conflict emergence between the different stakeholders. The framework used in this paper has the potential to encompass a wide range of phenomena where conflict can emerge and incentives can be used to co-align interests between the different transacting parties

The Determinants of Executive Compensation in Family-Controlled Public Corporations

2003 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 226-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis R. Gomez-Mejia ◽  
Martin Larraza-Kintana ◽  
Marianna Makri
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Public Corporations

CEO Compensation and Acquired and Acquiring Companies in Large Corporate Acquisitions

GIS Business ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 01-13
Author(s):  
Simon Yang
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Relative Sensitivity ◽  
Matched Sample ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Corporate Acquisitions ◽  
Acquiring Firms ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
To Receive

This paper examines the relative sensitivity of CEO compensation of both acquiring and acquired firms in the top 30 U.S. largest corporate acquisitions in each year for the period of 2003 to 2012. We find that total compensation and bonus granted to executive compensation for acquired companies, not acquiring companies, are significantly related to the amount of acquisition deal even after the size and firm performance are controlled for. Both acquiring and acquired CEOs are found to make the significantly higher compensation than the matched sample firms in the same industry and calendar year. We also find that executives with higher managerial power, as measured by a lower salary-based compensation mix, prior to a corporate acquisition are more likely to receive a higher executive pay in the year of acquisition. The association between executive compensation and managerial power seems to be stronger for acquired firms than for acquiring firms in corporate acquisition. Overall, our findings suggest that corporate acquisition has higher impacts on executive compensation for acquired firm CEOs than for acquiring firm CEOs.

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