Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation

1974 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 359 ◽  
Author(s):  
George J. Stigler
2016 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 472-478 ◽  
Author(s):  
KATHARINE BROWNE

Abstract:This article takes up a game-theoretic perspective on California’s recently passed bill (SB 277) that closes all nonmedical exemptions for school-mandated vaccination. Such a perspective characterizes parental decisions to vaccinate their children as a collective action problem and reveals the presence of an incentive to free ride—to enjoy the benefits of others’ efforts to vaccinate their children without vaccinating one’s own. This article defends California’s legislation as a reasonable means of overcoming the free rider problem and of ensuring that the burdens of vaccination are shared equally.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergey Gavrilets ◽  
Mahendra Duwal Shrestha

Human behavior and collective actions are strongly affected by social institutions. A question of great theoretical and practical importance is how successful social institutions get established and spread across groups and societies. Here, using institutionalized punishment in small-scale societies as an example, we contrast two prominent mechanisms - selective imitation and self-interested design - with respect to their ability to converge to cooperative social institutions. While selective imitation has received a great deal of attention in studies of social and cultural evolution, the theoretical toolbox for studying self-interested design is limited. Recently Perry et al. (2018) expanded this toolbox by introducing a novel approach, which they called foresight, generalizing standard myopic best response for the case of individuals with a bounded ability to anticipate actions of their group-mates and care about future payoffs. Here we apply this approach to two general types of collective action – “us vs. nature” and “us vs. them” games. Our results show that foresight increases leaders’ willingness to punish free-riders. This, in turn, leads to increased production and the emergence of an effective institution for collective action. We also observed that largely similar outcomes can be achieved by selective imitation, as argued earlier. Foresight and selective imitation can interact synergistically leading to a faster convergence to an equilibrium. Our approach is applicable to many other types of socialinstitutions and collective action.


2014 ◽  
Vol 38 (01) ◽  
pp. 76-101
Author(s):  
PETER M. SANCHEZ

AbstractThis paper examines the actions of one Salvadorean priest – Padre David Rodríguez – in one parish – Tecoluca – to underscore the importance of religious leadership in the rise of El Salvador's contentious political movement that began in the early 1970s, when the guerrilla organisations were only just beginning to develop. Catholic leaders became engaged in promoting contentious politics, however, only after the Church had experienced an ideological conversion, commonly referred to as liberation theology. A focus on one priest, in one parish, allows for generalisation, since scores of priests, nuns and lay workers in El Salvador followed the same injustice frame and tactics that generated extensive political mobilisation throughout the country. While structural conditions, collective action and resource mobilisation are undoubtedly necessary, the case of religious leaders in El Salvador suggests that ideas and leadership are of vital importance for the rise of contentious politics at a particular historical moment.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 245-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ezekiel W. Kimball ◽  
Adam Moore ◽  
Annemarie Vaccaro ◽  
Peter F. Troiano ◽  
Barbara M. Newman

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