Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems

Econometrica ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 66 (3) ◽  
pp. 689 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atila Abdulkadiroglu ◽  
Tayfun Sonmez
Keyword(s):  
House Allocation ◽  
The Core ◽  
Allocation Problems ◽  
Serial Dictatorship

scholarly journals Envy-freeness in house allocation problems

2019 ◽  
Vol 101 ◽  
pp. 104-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiarui Gan ◽  
Warut Suksompong ◽  
Alexandros A. Voudouris
Keyword(s):  
House Allocation ◽  
Allocation Problems

scholarly journals House Allocation with Overlapping Generations

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 258-289 ◽  
Author(s):  
Morimitsu Kurino
Keyword(s):  
Overlapping Generations ◽  
College Freshmen ◽  
Incentive Compatibility ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Pareto Efficiency ◽  
Campus Housing ◽  
House Allocation ◽  
Monetary Transfers ◽  
In The Beginning ◽  
Serial Dictatorship

Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, each year college freshmen move in and seniors move out of on-campus housing. Each student stays on campus for only a few years. A student is a “newcomer” in the beginning and then becomes an “existing tenant.” Motivated by this observation, we introduce a model of house allocation with overlapping generations. In terms of a dynamic rule without monetary transfers, we examine two static rules of serial dictatorship and top trading cycles. We support these seniority-based rules in terms of their dynamic Pareto efficiency and incentive compatibility. (JEL D13, D61, D82)

scholarly journals Allocation Mechanisms without Reduction

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 455-470
Author(s):  
David Dillenberger ◽  
Uzi Segal
Keyword(s):  
Probability Distribution ◽  
Allocation Problem ◽  
The Other ◽  
Allocation Mechanism ◽  
Recursive Preferences ◽  
House Allocation ◽  
Simple Variant ◽  
Standard Models ◽  
Serial Dictatorship ◽  
Top Cycle

We study a simple variant of the house allocation problem (one-sided matching). We demonstrate that agents with recursive preferences may systematically prefer one allocation mechanism to the other, even among mechanisms that are considered to be the same in standard models, in the sense that they induce the same probability distribution over successful matchings. Using this, we propose a new priority groups mechanism and provide conditions under which it is preferred to two popular mechanisms, random top cycle and random serial dictatorship. (JEL C78, D44, D82)

Random Serial Dictatorship: The One and Only

2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 353-368 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sophie Bade
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Strategy ◽  
Pareto Optimal ◽  
Random Matching ◽  
The Core ◽  
Matching Mechanism ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
The One ◽  
Serial Dictatorship

Fix a Pareto-optimal, strategy-proof, and nonbossy deterministic matching mechanism and define a random matching mechanism by assigning agents to the roles in the mechanism via a uniform lottery. Given a profile of preferences, the lottery over outcomes that arises under the random matching mechanism is identical to the lottery that arises under random serial dictatorship, where the order of dictators is uniformly distributed. This result extends the celebrated equivalence between the core from random endowments and random serial dictatorship to the grand set of all Pareto-optimal, strategy-proof, and nonbossy matching mechanisms.

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