Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character.

1999 ◽  
Vol 108 (3) ◽  
pp. 433
Author(s):  
Talbot Brewer ◽  
Robert Audi
Keyword(s):  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Ethical Character

Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character

2003 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 145-146
Author(s):  
Rem B. Edwards ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Ethical Character

Cautiously optimistic rationalism may not be cautious enough

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin F. Landy
Keyword(s):  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Judgments

Abstract May expresses optimism about the source, content, and consequences of moral judgments. However, even if we are optimistic about their source (i.e., reasoning), some pessimism is warranted about their content, and therefore their consequences. Good reasoners can attain moral knowledge, but evidence suggests that most people are not good reasoners, which implies that most people do not attain moral knowledge.

Moral accounts and membership categorization in primary care medical interviews

2012 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 211-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick J. Dillon
Keyword(s):  
Primary Care ◽  
Health Care ◽  
Social Identity ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Health Behaviours ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Membership Categorization ◽  
Medical Interviews

Although the link between health and morality has been well established, few studies have examined how issues of morality emerge and are addressed in primary care medical encounters. This paper addresses the need to examine morality as it is (re)constructed in everyday health care interactions. A Membership Categorisation Analysis of 96 medical interviews reveals how patients orient to particular membership categories and distance themselves from others as a means of accounting (Buttny 1993; Scott and Lyman 1968) for morally questionable health behaviours. More specifically, this paper examines how patients use membership categorisations in order to achieve specific social identity(ies) (Schubert et al. 2009) through two primary strategies: defensive detailing and prioritizing alternative membership categories. Thus, this analysis tracks the emergence of cultural and moral knowledge about social life as it takes place in primary care medical encounters.

Die Wirklichkeit des Sittlichen

2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Kersting
Keyword(s):  
Social Environment ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Discourse Ethics ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Kantian Ethics ◽  
Hermeneutic Approach ◽  
The Given ◽  
Moral Convictions

Within the Kantian ethics consciousness of the moral principle is a fact of reason which cannot be grounded in any antecedent data, empirical or rational. Hegel however argues that the fact of reason is necessarily embedded in the fact of „Sittlichkeit“, that a pure reason is an empty and chimerical construction, that moral knowledge is unavoidably rootet in the contingent moral convictions of the given cultural and social environment. This essay defends Hegel’s critique of Kant’s moral philosophy and – by generalizing Hegel’s hermeneutic approach – sketches the outlines of an explicatory concept of ethics which contradicts the scientistic understanding of moral philosophy characteristic for Kant, the utilitarianism and the supporters of discourse ethics likewise.

THE SNAKE AND THE ROUNDABOUT: ETHICAL PARTICULARISM AND THE PATTERNS OF NORMATIVE INDUCTIONA SERPENTE E A ROTUNDA: PARTICULARISMO ÉTICO E OS PADRÕES DA INDUÇÃO NORMATIVA

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (16) ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederic R. Kellogg (George Washington University)
Keyword(s):  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Ethical Choice ◽  
Propositional Form

Using two examples of ethical choice, Philippa Foot’s snake and the traffic roundabout, this paper offers an account of normative induction that characterizes particularism and generalism as stages of normative inquiry, rather than rival accounts of moral knowledge and motivation. Ethical particularism holds that the evaluative cannot be “cashed out” in propositional form, and that it is descriptively “shapeless.” Drawing on examples from law, this paper claims that, while individual normative inquiry may be viewed as encountering a shapeless particularist context of seem-ingly unlimited nonmoral properties, normativity is driven by repe-tition of similar situations toward shared practices and descriptive predication. Rather than retention of epistemic status by defeated reasons, this illustrates retirement of relevant properties and ac-companying reasons, transformation of the reasons environment, and a pluralist normative ontology.

Moral Perception and Its Rivals

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah McGrath
Keyword(s):  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Perception ◽  
Attractive Alternative ◽  
Alternative Account ◽  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
Relevant Class

Proponents of moral perception hold that some of our moral knowledge is perceptual knowledge. Discussions of whether moral perception is possible often seem to assume that there is some attractive alternative account of how we arrive at moral knowledge in those cases that are regarded as among the best candidates for cases of full-fledged moral perception. This chapter challenges that assumption by critically examining some alternative accounts of how we arrive at knowledge in the relevant class of cases, arguing that the more closely one examines these alternative accounts, the more implausible they seem as accounts of how we actually manage to arrive at moral knowledge. A modest version of moral perception is sketched, one that does not suffer from any similarly implausible commitments. There are some concluding reflections on why it matters whether some of our moral knowledge is perceptual.

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