scholarly journals The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law

1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (3) ◽  
pp. 398-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Palmeter ◽  
Petros C. Mavroidis

Modern discussions of the sources of international law usually begin with a reference to Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which provides: The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a.international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;b.international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;c.the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;d.subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.

Author(s):  
Martin Dixon ◽  
Robert McCorquodale ◽  
Sarah Williams

This chapter begins with a discussion of the importance of the sources of international law. It then discusses the Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945; treaties; customary international law; general principles of law; judicial decisions and the writings of publicists; resolutions of international organisations; soft law.Finally, it looks at whether there exists a hierarchy of international law sources.


Author(s):  
Sewela Masie ◽  
Kaitlin Morris

With modern advances in technology, mankind is now faced with new legal problems and situations previously unanticipated. Space law in particular is relevant as, while most of the documents were drafted and assented to in the mid 1990’s, there have since been great advances in space exploration and technology. This means that potential situations exist which are not expressly provided for in International Space Law. Therefore, since the answers for hypothetical questions cannot always be found explicitly in space law, we will be relying on the sources of international law listed in article 38(1) of the International Court of Justice Statutes, namely international conventions, international custom, general principles of law and judicial decisions and teachings.1 The rules of the Vienna Convention regarding the interpretation of Treaties must also be kept in mind, including that a state is obliged to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty that it has ratified. There are therefore two main questions that will be discussed in this article: whether a state can be held absolutely liable for its actions if it, in changing the course of an asteroid affect the area of damage and whether a state can be held liable on the basis of fault for damage caused by its space craft to another space craft if the damage was anticipated and the second state was warned not to be in that specific location.


2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 704-739
Author(s):  
Xuexia Liao

Abstract This article revisits the package deal nature of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) and its implications for determining customary international law. A survey of the case law illustrates that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has not given particular weight to the fact that the LOSC was negotiated and accepted as a package deal. Nevertheless, the ICJ’s declaration that Article 121, paragraph 3 of the LOSC is a customary rule tends to be based on a ‘package deal approach’, which focuses on the textual and logical links between the paragraphs that manifest an ‘indivisible régime’. By exploring the difficulties of determining the customary status of Article 76(2)–(7) concerning the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, which may arise in the pending Nicaragua v. Colombia II case, this article calls for a cautious attitude towards determination of customary rules from the LOSC.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 349-353
Author(s):  
Gleider Hernández

Jeffrey Dunoff and Mark Pollack's Judicial Trilemma is a refreshing challenge to prevailing narratives about judicial decision-making in international courts and tribunals and is part of a growing wave of scholarship deploying empirical, social science-driven methodology to theorize the place of judicial institutions in the international legal field. Seeking to peek behind the black robes and divine the reasoning behind judicial decisions without descending into speculation and actively trying to thwart considerations of confidentiality is a fraught endeavor on which I have expressed skepticism in the past. The Judicial Trilemma admirably seeks to overcome these challenges, and I commend the authors for tackling the hard question as to whether one can truly glance behind the black robe.


2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-176
Author(s):  
Sara Mansour Fallah

Abstract 70 years ago, the International Court of Justice decided its first and potentially most important case involving unlawfully obtained evidence. Despite clearly rejecting ‘discovery by intervention’, the judgment left many guessing as to the consequences for evidence obtained through such violations. As parties to international disputes have certainly not become less inclined to obtain evidence by unlawful means, the question arises: Was this old confusion ever unraveled? This article discusses whether today, there are international rules or principles governing the admissibility of unlawfully acquired evidence and applies a two-fold approach. First, it examines traditional sources of international law, including international jurisprudence, and second, it scrutinizes the frequently drawn analogy to national jurisdictions by surveying their treatment of illegally obtained evidence. Although a generally binding “inadmissibility rule” does not yet exist, practice demonstrates a tendency to consider such evidence in light of general principles of law. This article proposes handling unlawfully acquired evidence by applying a defined, yet flexible balancing test using criteria commonly applied in international and national practice.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (Extra-C) ◽  
pp. 7-11
Author(s):  
Yulia Nikolaevna Avdonina ◽  
Guzel Firdinatovna Nagumanova

The researchers put forward the thesis that in the case of systematic analysis of scientific views inherent in individual scientists, there is an opposition of the principle of equality and self-determination of peoples to the principle of the territorial integrity of states, and at the same time, in law enforcement practice there are various acts that do not meet the signs of uniformity in the interpretation of the principle of equality and self-determination of peoples. All this together leads not so much to a pluralism of opinions, but to the emergence of various kinds of legal conflicts. Additionally, the authors try to pose the problem of recognizing new state formations as subjects of international law, and also propose separate approaches to the processes that make it possible to recognize such states. So, at the end of the paper, the researchers set a vector for the continuation of the discussion, which speaks of giving such powers either the UN Security Council, or the Human Rights Council, or the International Court of Justice, subject to additional procedural requirements.    


Author(s):  
Anders Henriksen

This chapter provides an overview of the legal sources in international law. Sources of law determine the rules of legal society and, like national legal societies, the international legal society has its own set of rules. The discussion begins in Section 2.2 with article 38 of the International Court of Justice Statute. Section 2.3 discusses treaties, Section 2.4 covers customary international law, and Section 2.5 turns to general principles of international law. Attention then turns to the two additional sources listed in article 38. Section 2.6 discusses judicial decisions and Section 2.7 examines academic contributions. Section 2.8 discusses the role played by unilateral statements. The chapter then turns to the issue of a hierarchy of sources in Section 2.9 and concludes in Section 2.10 with a discussion of non-binding instruments and so-called ‘soft law’.


1961 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 825-862 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shabtai Rosenne

When the late Sir Hersch Lauterpacht became a member of the International Court of Justice in February, 1955 (a position he was to fill effectively for barely five years, until the fall of 1959), he went to The Hague with some thirty years of devoted study and practice of international law behind him. As teacher and student of international law, as a most highly qualified publicist (in the words of Article 38(1) (d) of the Statute of the Court) of recognized universal authority, he had devoted himself both to the law in general and in particular to the problems of the judicial settlement of international disputes, whether by the Permanent Court of International Justice and its present-day successor, the International Court of Justice, or by ad hoc arbitration tribunals. Indeed, his writings as a whole display a rare preoccupation with the entire philosophy and the practical problems of the judicial settlement of international disputes, together with a deep understanding of its limitations and a satisfying freedom both from putting forward extravagant claims in its behalf and from purely theoretical speculations.


Polar Record ◽  
1956 ◽  
Vol 8 (53) ◽  
pp. 125-151 ◽  

In an attempt to settle the dispute between the United Kingdom, Argentina and Chile over sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies, the United Kingdom made unilateral Applications to the International Court of Justice at The Hague on 4 May 1955. The Applications set out the British title, and asked the Court to declare that the Argentine and Chilean encroachments in British Antarctic territory were illegal and invalid under international law.Both the Argentine and Chilean Governments refused to accept the jurisdiction of the Court.* The United Kingdom Government subsequently expressed its regret at these refusals, and placed on record the fact that it had now taken every step open to it to bring about a peaceful and amicable determination of this question of sovereignty in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. On 18 March 1956 the International Court announced that since neither Argentina nor Chile was prepared to accept the Court's jurisdiction, both cases had been removed from its list.


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