The Poetry of Ethics: Horace, Epistles

1979 ◽  
Vol 69 ◽  
pp. 16-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. W. Macleod
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Thinking ◽  
Ancient Ethics ◽  
Ethical Systems

In 23 B.C. the first three books of Horace's Odes appeared. In the years which followed, up to the completion of Epistles 1, his work took a new direction, and the ethical themes which had had a marked place in his lyric verse became his entire concern: in his own words (Ep. 1.1.10–11),nunc itaque et versus et cetera ludicra pono;quid verum atque decens euro et rogo, et omnis in hoc sum.What Horace describes in this context, at the very beginning of the book, is a kind of conversion to philosophy; and so the reader is at once drawn to ask what philosophy means to the poet. Before considering this question by scrutiny of the poems, two more general ones should be raised: first, what are the dominant features of ancient ethics as a whole and how far does it differ from modern ethical systems or moral thinking? Second, what part did moral philosophy play in the life of Romans in Horace's time? The answers I shall give to these very large questions are pragmatic and limited: they are meant simply as preparation for considering Horace's Epistles.

scholarly journals A Crítica da razão prática e o estoicismo

DoisPontos ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Valério Rohden
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Precise Determination ◽  
Ancient Ethics ◽  
The Subject

No presente trabalho será demonstrada a estreita, embora discreta, relação da filosofia moral de Kant com a ética antiga, especialmente com o estoicismo de Cícero. O tema será explicitado mediante uma aproximação entre as obras da Crítica da razão prática e Sobre os fins (De finibus), respectivamente de cada um desses autores. Será destacada a crítica de Kant à identificação entre virtude e felicidade e sua reformulação sintética no conceito de “sumo bem”. Na conclusão se torna claro que a realização moral da razão, reivindicada por Cícero, encontra na reformulação de Kant sua determinação mais precisa. The crises of practical reason and stoicism Abstract The present paper shows the close albeit subtle relation of Kant’s moral philosophy to ancient ethics, especially Cicero’s Stoicism. The subject is made explicit by means of a rapprochement between the Critique of practical reason and De finibus, so as to be highlight Kant’s criticism of the classical identifying of virtue and happiness and his synthetical recasting of the concept of the supreme good. The essay concludes by making clear that the moral actualization of reason, reclaimed by Cicero, finds in Kant’s reformulation its most precise determination.

scholarly journals Contemporary moral philosophy in the context of the social transformation

2002 ◽  
pp. 193-202
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Dobrijevic
Keyword(s):  
Social Theory ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Social Transformation ◽  
Practical Relevance ◽  
Moral Thinking ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Social ◽  
Selective Bibliography

The article contains an explanation of the topic to be dealt with by the author within the work on the project 'Applying Modern Philosophical-Political Paradigms on Processes of Social Transformation in Serbia/FRJ'' of the Institute of Philosophy and Social Theory. In the first part of the paper the basic conception of the work as well as theoretical and practical relevance of the proposed topic are presented. In the second part, author emphasis the weight of the 'two-level theory' of moral thinking, which was elaborated by Richard Mervyn Hare, utilitarian philosopher. In the third part, the plan and the content of the forthcoming work are outlined. Basic and selective bibliography which author will be rely on in the elaboration of the proposed topic is given at the end of this article.

Integrity

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ann Davis
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Public Life ◽  
Personal Relationships ◽  
Central Position ◽  
Focused Attention ◽  
Moral Thinking ◽  
The Core ◽  
Leading Role

The possession (or lack) of integrity is something that all morally serious people care about and think important. In both personal relationships and public life, to describe someone as exhibiting a lack of integrity is to offer a damning diagnosis. It carries the implication that this individual is not to be relied upon, that in some fundamental way they are not someone who we can, or should, view as being wholly or unequivocally there. The foundations of self and character are not sound; the ordering of values is not coherent. Important as the notion of integrity is, it is nevertheless difficult to characterize with precision. Attempts to analyse it seldom do justice to its complexity, or adequately reflect the diverse concerns that generate and sustain either philosophers’ or non-philosophers’ interest in it. Contemporary interest in the notion of integrity has a number of different, often overlapping, sources. It has been accorded a leading role in the debate between consequentialists and non-consequentialists; revived interest in virtue-ethics has naturally focused attention on it; and its connection with unity or coherence of personality make it central for moral psychology. As well as occupying a central position in three major topics within academic moral philosophy, integrity has also come to wider prominence in at least two ways: as a virtue increasingly missed in public life; and as a transcultural virtue that reflects a world that has become increasingly morally pluralistic. The notion of integrity, though complex, elusive, and analytically intractable, is one that goes to the core of our moral thinking, both in theoretical and practical terms.

Moral justification

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
T.M. Scanlon
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Justification ◽  
Moral Argument ◽  
Moral Thinking ◽  
Moral Claims ◽  
Moral Philosophers ◽  
The Way

Questions of justification arise in moral philosophy in at least three ways. The first concerns the way in which particular moral claims, such as claims about right and wrong, can be shown to be correct. Virtually every moral theory offers its own account of moral justification in this sense, and these accounts naturally differ from each other. A second question is about the justification of morality as a whole – about how to answer the question, ‘Why be moral?’ Philosophers have disagreed about this, and about whether an answer is even possible. Finally, some philosophers have claimed that justification of our actions to others is a central aim of moral thinking. They maintain that this aim provides answers to the other two questions of justification by explaining the reasons we have to be moral and the particular form that justification takes within moral argument.

On Experimental Philosophy, Morality and Meaning

Philosophy ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 91 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-254
Author(s):  
Hektor K. T. Yan
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Research ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Moral Thinking ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Moral Thought ◽  
The Common ◽  
Experimental Subjects

AbstractThe emerging field known as experimental philosophy has expanded into moral philosophy: by presenting experimental subjects with vignettes describing scenarios with moral implications, data about people's moral intuitions are gathered and analyzed. This paper examines the adequacy of applying the common methodology of experimental philosophy to the study of moral thought. By employing Raimond Gaita's notion of moral seriousness and his distinction between form and content, it argues that the kind of empirical research on moral intuitions conducted by experimental philosophers fails to take into consideration some fundamental characteristics of moral thinking.

Disunity of Virtue

2020 ◽  
pp. 67-83
Author(s):  
Gopal Sreenivasan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Ancient Ethics ◽  
Unity Thesis ◽  
Dominant Tendency

This chapter contains the argument against the unity of the virtues, which presupposes that the virtues are not unified and vindicates anti-imperialism about virtue. It describes the unity of the virtues that was more or less universally affirmed in ancient ethics and notes that the dominant tendency in contemporary moral philosophy is to reject it. It also sketches a position on the interrelation of the virtues that avoids the falsity of the unity thesis, while still salvaging some of its more attractive aspects. The chapter focuses on the thesis that one cannot have one virtue without having all of the others. It elaborates that if there is any one virtue that a person lacks, then it follows that this person does not have any of the other virtues.

Philosophy and Practice: Some Issues About War and Peace

1984 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
R. M. Hare
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
War And Peace ◽  
Moral Thinking ◽  
First Order ◽  
Applied Philosophy ◽  
Philosophy Professor ◽  
The Right ◽  
Theoretical Side

I am going in this lecture on ‘Philosophy and Practice’ first to say something about philosophy and then something about practice, in order to show you how they bear on one another. But I must start by paying a tribute to the President of the Society for Applied Philosophy, Professor Sir A. J. Ayer, who has kindly agreed to take the chair at this lecture. I can honestly say that he is more responsible than anybody else for putting me on the right track in moral philosophy. He did this by convincing me, when young, that the ways people were doing it at that time had no future. In the famous chapter on ethics in his marvellously readable and exciting book,Language, Truth and Logic, Ayer was thought to be trying to show that moral philosophy itself, and perhaps even ordinary first-order moral thinking, was a waste of time. From later work of his, and from his occasional pronouncements about moral and political questions, it is evident that the second of these slanders was false. But even on the theoretical side the lessons I learnt from his book were positive as well as negative. That is not to say that the negative lessons were unimportant. Some people have still not absorbed them, and continue to waste our time. But here are two positive points which you will find in Ayer's book, and which for me were crucia

South African Defence Force veterans’ modes of remembering and the ethics of post-apartheid nostalgia

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 662-676
Author(s):  
Gary Baines ◽  
Gemma Barkhuizen
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
South African ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Sense Of Belonging ◽  
Ethical Problem ◽  
Moral Thinking ◽  
Moral Relevance ◽  
Apartheid Regime

South African Defence Force veterans frequently evince nostalgia for their service in the apartheid army. This has invited censure as commentators regard it as self-evident that nostalgia for the oppressive apartheid regime is ethically dubious. However, such assumptions fail to employ the resources of moral philosophy to buttress and nuance their pronouncements. In this article, we argue that nostalgia can be understood as a bittersweet longing for irretrievable personal pasts, a yearning for times when South African Defence Force veterans felt a sense of belonging to a brotherhood in arms and to the imaginary white nation. However, this is not necessarily synonymous with a desire to reinstitute apartheid. We then offer a brief survey of significant difficulties posed by three prominent camps within moral philosophy (deontology, consequentialism and virtue ethics) for evaluating this post-apartheid nostalgia as a moral or ethical problem. We find that the emphasis on voluntary or deliberate action entrenched in mainstream moral thinking constitute substantial obstacles to arriving at sound judgements regarding the nature of nostalgia. We argue that nostalgia, properly understood, cannot fulfil commonplace theoretical and intuitive requirements for moral relevance. We therefore challenge the notion that definitive ethical judgements can usefully be made about post-apartheid nostalgia.

Simplicity and Authority: Reflections on Theory and Practice in Kant's Moral Philosophy

2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Timmermann
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Moral Philosopher ◽  
The Voice ◽  
Ethical Systems

AbstractWhat is the proper task of Kantian ethical theory? This paper seeks to answer this question with reference to Kant's reply to Christian Garve in Section I of his 1793 essay on Theory and Practice. Kant reasserts the distinctness and natural authority of our consciousness of the moral law. Every mature human being is a moral professional—even philosophers like Garve, if only they forget about their ill-conceived ethical systems and listen to the voice of pure practical reason. Normative theory, Kant argues, cannot be refuted with reference to alleged experience. It is the proper task of the moral philosopher to emphasize this fact. The paper also discusses Kant's attempts to clarify his moral psychology, philosophy of value and conception of the highest good in the course of replying to Garve's challenge.

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