The Treatment of Security Holders Under the Absolute Priority Rule in Chapter X Reorganizations

1966 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 745
Author(s):  
Charles B. Franklin
Keyword(s):  
Priority Rule ◽  
Absolute Priority ◽  
The Absolute

The US Chapter 11 Plan Procedure

2019 ◽  
pp. 114-160
Author(s):  
Nicolaes Tollenaar
Keyword(s):  
Best Interests ◽  
Priority Rule ◽  
Absolute Priority ◽  
The Us ◽  
Key Features ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Feasibility Test ◽  
The Right

The chapter begins with an outline of the US Chapter 11 plan procedure. It briefly discusses the proposals of the American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI) for reform of Chapter 11. It then discusses the key features of the US Chapter 11 plan procedure, including the right to propose a plan, the permitted content of the plan, the voting in classes, and the criteria for confirmation and cramdown. Finally, it looks at criticisms of the US system, which include the costs and extent of judicial involvement, the duration of the automatic say, the exclusivity period, the best interests and feasibility test, the wording of the absolute priority rule, and the intrusiveness of the cramdown powers under US law.

scholarly journals A Seniority Arrangement for Sovereign Debt

2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (12) ◽  
pp. 3740-3765 ◽  
Author(s):  
Satyajit Chatterjee ◽  
Burcu Eyigungor
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Realistic Model ◽  
Priority Rule ◽  
Debt Contracts ◽  
Absolute Priority ◽  
Course Of Action ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Debt Dilution ◽  
Normative Implications

A sovereign’s inability to commit to a course of action regarding future borrowing and default behavior makes long-term debt costly (the problem of debt dilution). One mechanism to mitigate this problem is the inclusion of a seniority clause in debt contracts. In the event of default, creditors are to be paid off in the order in which they lent (the “absolute priority” or “first-in-time” rule). In this paper, we propose a modification of the absolute priority rule suited to sovereign debts contracts and analyze its positive and normative implications within a quantitatively realistic model of sovereign debt and default. (JEL E32, E44, F34, G15, H63, O16, O19)

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