Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games

1991 ◽  
Vol 106 (3) ◽  
pp. 885-910 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. B. Van Huyck ◽  
R. C. Battalio ◽  
R. O. Beil
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Coordination Failure ◽  
Strategic Uncertainty

scholarly journals Strategic Robustness in Bi-level System-of-systems Design

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jordan L Stern ◽  
Paul T. Grogan ◽  
Ambrosio Valencia-Romero
Keyword(s):  
Preferential Attachment ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Selection Criterion ◽  
Systems Design ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Small World ◽  
Coordination Failure ◽  
Strategic Uncertainty ◽  
Managerial Control ◽  
Robust Designs

Robust designs protect system utility in the presence of uncertainty in technical and operational outcomes. Systems-of-systems, which lack centralized managerial control, are vulnerable to strategic uncertainty from coordination failures between partially or completely independent system actors. This work assesses the suitability of a game-theoretic equilibrium selection criterion to measure system robustness to strategic uncertainty and investigates the effect of strategically robust designs on collaborative behavior. The work models interactions between agents in a thematic representation of a mobile computing technology transition using an evolutionary game theory framework. Strategic robustness and collaborative solutions are assessed over a range of conditions by varying agent payoffs. Models are constructed on small world, preferential attachment, and random graph topologies and executed in batch simulations. Results demonstrate that systems designed to reduce the impacts of coordination failure stemming from strategic uncertainty also increase the stability of the collaborative strategy by increasing the probability of collaboration by partners; a form of robustness by environment shaping that has not been previously investigated in design literature. The work also demonstrates that strategy selection follows the risk dominance equilibrium selection criterion and that changes in robustness to coordination failure can be measured with this criterion.

scholarly journals Coordination and Private Information Revelation

Games ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 64
Author(s):  
Debdatta Saha ◽  
Prabal Roy Chowdhury
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Existence Result ◽  
Coordination Game ◽  
Information Revelation ◽  
Coordination Failure ◽  
Strategic Uncertainty ◽  
Full Disclosure ◽  
Two Agents ◽  
Battle Of The Sexes

This paper examines a persuasion game between two agents with one-sided asymmetric information, where the informed agent can reveal her private information prior to playing a Battle-of-the-Sexes coordination game. There is a close connection between the extent of information revelation and the possibility of coordination failure; while, in the absence of any coordination failure, there exist equilibria with full disclosure, in the presence of strategic uncertainty in coordination there exists an equilibrium with no information revelation. We provide a purification argument for the non-existence result, as well demonstrate that it is robust to several extensions, including both-sided asymmetric information and imprecise information revelation.

Tacit Cooperation, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure: Evidence from Repeated Dominance Solvable Games

2002 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 156-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
John B. Van Huyck ◽  
John M. Wildenthal ◽  
Raymond C. Battalio
Keyword(s):  
Coordination Failure ◽  
Strategic Uncertainty
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