The Political Economy of Merchant Empires: State Power and World Trade 1350-1750.

1993 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 565
Author(s):  
Roy S. Hanashiro ◽  
James D. Tracy
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
World Trade ◽  
State Power ◽  
The Political ◽  
Merchant Empires

The political economy of North-South commodity bargaining: the case of the International Sugar Agreement

1984 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 709-731 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincent A. Mahler
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
European Community ◽  
World Trade ◽  
The Political ◽  
Short Term ◽  
International Commodity ◽  
Long Run ◽  
North And South

The historically unstable world trade in sugar has long stimulated multilateral efforts to stabilize sugar prices. In the negotiations leading to the International Sugar Agreement (ISA) of 1977, both producers and consumers were willing to make short-term concessions in the interest of reaching an accord that would benefit all in the long run–a pattern that has hardly been typical of North-South bargaining in general. But the ISA has failed to achieve its goal of more stable sugar prices in the years since its enactment. This failure is primarily due not to shortcomings in the agreement itself but rather to a major expansion of production in the only important sugar exporter that failed to ratify the ISA, the European Community. The ISA is important not only in its own right but also because it offers a good example of the promise–and the problems–of international commodity agreements in bringing about more stable and equitable relations between North and South.

scholarly journals The Political Economy of the Chinese Market Economy Status given by Argentina and Brazil

Revista CS ◽  
2014 ◽  
pp. 47-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco Urdinez
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
World Trade ◽  
The Political ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Chinese Market ◽  
The World ◽  
Status Recognition

When China signed a Protocol of Accession to the World Trade Organization in December 2001, other country members were allowed to consider China as a Non-Market Economy until the end of 2016. Taking into account this restraint, the aim of this paper is to answer the following question: can the Market Economy Status Recognition (MES) be measured by a de-facto compliance? The variable used to measure the compliance is the number of antidumping investigations initiated by each country. Hence, the countries which recognize China as a market economy would have a fewer antidumping investigations than the countries that are still treating Beijing as a Non Market Economy, which is the key reason of why the Chinese Government has been campaigning vigorously since 2001 to gain a MES status by a larger number of its economic partners.

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