Sea Power in the Pacific, 1936-1941: A Bibliography.

1942 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 490
Author(s):  
Bernard Brodie ◽  
Werner B. Ellinger ◽  
Herbert Rosinski
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Paolo Pizzolo

Abstract As manifest challenger of the United States (US)-led international order, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has inaugurated a revisionist strategy that encompasses a multifaceted spectrum of initiatives, including an ambitious naval military build-up. History has shown that revisionist and challenging powers tend to defy the established order through arm races. US Admiral Mahan and German Admiral Tirpitz theorized two different approaches to naval strategy, the former focusing on global maritime hegemony and the latter on regional counterbalance based on risk theory. This article attempts at explaining the puzzle of China's naval buildup through the lenses of geopolitics, adding a geopolitical dimension to the current debate. It suggests that the PRC's naval military development does not follow a Mahanian global maritime strategy aimed at challenging the US primacy worldwide, but rather a Tirpitzian regional approach focused on counterbalancing the US presence within the scope of China's sea power projection, that is, the Pacific region. To substantiate this hypothesis, the study compares diachronically contemporary Chinese naval arm race with Wilhelmine Germany's High Seas Fleet. The findings underscore that, in maritime terms, China's revisionism vis-à-vis the US somewhat resembles that of Imperial Germany vis-à-vis Imperial Britain, both aiming at regional counterbalance and anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) tactics rather than global maritime counterhegemony. Although Chinese sea power is still far from posing a serious threat to that of the US and its allies, an unrestrained continuation of Beijing's naval buildup could encourage arms races and direct confrontation due to regional security dilemmas.


1947 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Owen Lattimore

The American tradition emphasizes the importance of sea power, especially the great age of sea power which began with Columbus and led first to the expansion of Spain and Portugal and then to the empire building of England, Holland, and France, and the development of North America. In America itself we are also familiar with the epic march across the continent to the Pacific, and the way in which the expanding frontier shaped, or at least strongly influenced, our society and our institutions, as expounded by Turner. Even our continental history, however, was initiated by the crossing of the Atlantic; and from then on even our period of most active continental expansion was never free of the influences and effects of sea power, sea-borne commerce, the investment of European capital, and acceleration of population growth by the immigration of Europeans.


1911 ◽  
Vol 55 (399) ◽  
pp. 600-617
Author(s):  
Archibald R. Colquhoun ◽  
R. N. Custance
Keyword(s):  

1963 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-37
Author(s):  
Donald E. Worcester

One of the special characteristics of naval warfare is its aggressive nature and the speed of its resolution. Unless combat is avoided, naval warfare is invariably swift and decisive. Armies may stand face-to-face for days or months, both up to their shoulders in mud. When warships meet on the high seas, usually one side will soon be celebrating a victory, It is not often that a nation's sea power comes to rest on a single warship, but in the contest between Chile and Peru (1879-1883) this was the case, because this war occurred during the change from wooden ships to ironclads.Naval strength is customarily measured by counting guns and the weight of the metal they discharge, total tonnage of all combatant ships, thickness of armor plate, and the number of the crews. Before fighting commences this is the only convenient way to assess the strength of opposing forces. But hardware is only one factor of naval power. Once the cannons have been unlimbered an unmeasurable factor can change all calculations, a factor best expressed by the venerable naval maxim: “Men, not ships, win battles.”


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