Underground Economies in Transition: Unrecorded Activity, Tax Evasion, Corruption and Organized Crime. Ed. Edgar L. Feige and Katarina Ott. Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate, 1999. vii, 315 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Indexes. Figures. Tables. $74.95, hard bound.

Slavic Review ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 610-611
Author(s):  
Gregory Grossman
Keyword(s):  
Organized Crime ◽  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Economies In Transition ◽  
Underground Economies

Illegal migration as an encroachment on the sovereignty and security of the state

2021 ◽  
pp. 341-352
Author(s):  
Sergey D. Grinko
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Organized Crime ◽  
Drug Trafficking ◽  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Illegal Migration ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
World Community ◽  
Large Length ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Entire World

We consider the issues of correlation between the international law of citizens of different states to travel and national legislation restricting illegal migration, which are the subject of interstate agreements. The issue of combating organized illegal migration for Russia is urgent, since the dynam-ics of this crime indicates an increase in the registration of such crimes and the identified persons who committed them. This is due to the large length of Russian borders and integration with foreign states, which entails an increase in the penetration of foreign citizens into the territory of our country. Illegal migration leads to an increase in ethnic organized crime and related smug-gling, drug trafficking, tax evasion and extortion. The fight against this criminal phenomenon is relevant for the entire world community. States seek to protect their citizens, but at the same time are obliged to comply with in-ternational legal norms on the issue under consideration. This activity of states should be carried out in accordance with the principles of respect for human rights and freedoms. We analyze international and Russian legisla-tion, damage caused by illegal migration, and propose measures to prevent crime related to illegal migration.

The Underground Economies: Tax Evasion and Information Distortion.

1989 ◽  
Vol 99 (398) ◽  
pp. 1206
Author(s):  
K. Matthews ◽  
Edgar L. Feige
Keyword(s):  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Information Distortion ◽  
Underground Economies

scholarly journals Features of the use of offshore zones in order to legalize criminally obtained funds

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-40
Author(s):  
Artem Ivanov
Keyword(s):  
Money Laundering ◽  
Organized Crime ◽  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Economic Activity ◽  
Economic Institutions ◽  
Breeding Ground

Criminally obtained funds criminalize economic activity, facilitate the penetration of criminal elements into all economic institutions, and also serve as a breeding ground for organized crime. Money laundering through offshore companies is closely related to the outflow of capital abroad and tax evasion.

Report on the debate regarding EU cash payment limitations

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikos Passas
Keyword(s):  
Organized Crime ◽  
Informal Economy ◽  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Crime Control ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Serious Crime ◽  
Cash Payment ◽  
Legitimate Interests ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Eu

Purpose Response to suggestion that EU-wide cash payment limits would assist in the control of terrorism finance and money laundering. Design/methodology/approach Desk review and interviews Findings The inception impact assessment (IIA) is ill-conceived, not grounded on firm empirical evidence and harmful to both crime control and the legitimate interests and rights of the EU citizens. The action under discussion is presented as a measure against terrorism finance, serious crime and tax evasion. The problem is that these criminal acts correspond to very different methods, volumes, perpetrators, causes and control challenges. Cash payment limitations (CPLs) are nowhere near a panacea that can address all of them and cannot make any of them go away magically. Even when each of these crime challenges are considered on their own, the empirical linkage of CPLs to effective controls is not there. The evidence from EU countries with CPLs in place shows higher levels of informal economy, corruption, tax evasion and terrorism risks than those without. There is substantial evidence of non-cash, very serious and organized crime, while the amounts needed and used by terrorists in Europe are usually very small in cash transactions, way below the thresholds under consideration. In fact, determined offenders will shift to other methods and become more sophisticated, posing new problems to controllers. Displacement and incentives for better-organized crime may well be the main products of such measures. Originality/value It counters the argument that the cash payment limits can help reduce serious crime, while pointing to several adverse consequences on legitimate interests and human rights.

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