Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections

2001 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Ansolabehere ◽  
James M. Snyder ◽  
Charles Stewart
Keyword(s):  
Candidate Positioning

scholarly journals Approval Voting

1995 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert J Weber
Keyword(s):  
Median Voter ◽  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Approval Voting ◽  
History Of ◽  
Candidate Positioning

Under approval voting, a voter may cast single votes for each of any number of candidates. In this paper, the history of approval voting and some of its properties are reviewed. When voters vote sincerely, approval voting compares favorably with both the plurality rule and Borda's rule in yielding outcomes reflective of the electorate's will. When voters vote strategically, perverse outcomes possible under other rules cannot arise at equilibrium under approval voting. Well-known ‘median voter’ results in two-candidate positioning games generalize to multicandidate settings under approval voting but not under the plurality rule.

scholarly journals A Theory of Voting Equilibria

1993 ◽  
Vol 87 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger B. Myerson ◽  
Robert J. Weber
Keyword(s):  
Plurality Rule ◽  
Approval Voting ◽  
Election Result ◽  
Voter Preferences ◽  
Voting System ◽  
Candidate Positioning

A voting equilibrium arises when the voters in an electorate, acting in accordance with both their preferences for the candidates and their perceptions of the relative chances of various pairs of candidates being in contention for victory, generate an election result that justifies their perceptions. Voting equilibria always exist, and the set of equilibria can vary substantially with the choice of voting system. We compare equilibria under the plurality rule, approval voting, and the Borda system. We consider a candidate-positioning game and find that the plurality rule imposes little restriction on the position of the winning candidate in three-candidate races, while approval voting leads to a winner positioned at the median of the voter distribution. We contrast campaign activities intended to influence voter preferences with activities meant to influence only perceptions of candidate viability.

The Electoral Logic of Party Reputations

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul M. Sniderman ◽  
Edward H. Stiglitz
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
Specific Policy ◽  
Candidate Positioning

This chapter presents a theory of candidate positioning. The key to this account is the policy reputations of the two political parties. Candidates must take positions consistent with the policy reputations of their parties to collect a reputational premium. The chapter's job is twofold. The first task is to demonstrate that programmatic party identifiers favor candidates of their party on the grounds that they represent the overall outlook of their party, independent of the specific policy positions that the candidates take. The second task is to specify the range of positions that a candidate may take and still be judged to represent the overall outlook of the party by supporters of his party who know and share its outlook.

Candidate positioning in Britain

2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 848-857 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew K. Buttice ◽  
Caitlin Milazzo
Keyword(s):  
Candidate Positioning

Voters’ Response to Candidate Ambiguity in U.S. House Elections

2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (5) ◽  
pp. 890-908 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Cahill ◽  
Walter J. Stone
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Spatial Logic ◽  
Candidate Positioning ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Voting Decisions

There is a sizable literature on the causes and effects of candidate positioning in elections. An implication of this research is that candidates present clear issue positions to the electorate and citizens then make voting decisions based on this information. However, if candidates are ambiguous in the positions they take, this may impair voters’ decision-making and prompt voters to punish them for inconsistency. Although there is a growing literature on the effects of candidate and party ambiguity, consensus on the implications of ambiguity for candidates and voters is yet to be achieved. Using data from the 2010 House elections, we find that candidate ambiguity undermines voters’ ability to vote consistent with the spatial logic just as Downs speculated. We also find, in contrast to Downs, that voters punish rather than reward candidate ambiguity. We suggest that a possible mechanism is in voters’ valence ratings of candidates.

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