Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies

2001 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lanny W. Martin ◽  
Randolph T. Stevenson
Keyword(s):  
Government Formation ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies

“Why Can’t We Be Friends?” The Coalition Potential of Presidents in Semi-presidential Republics—Insights from Romania

2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Veronica Anghel
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Parliamentary Democracy ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Prime Ministers ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
Presidential Regimes ◽  
Depth Interviews

Coalition governments are a regularly studied feature of parliamentary democracies. Debates still linger in the field as to what extent the outcomes of these studies are also applicable in determining who has the upper hand over coalition formation in semi-presidential regimes. This article explores the dynamics of government formation under semi-presidential regimes using evidence from Romania (1990–2016) and discusses the formal and informal potential of the president to shape coalitions. It covers a lacuna in qualitative studies by using evidence gathered from in-depth interviews with prime ministers, cabinet members, and key party decision makers and shows that under certain circumstances presidents can play an influential role in government formation, but these are rather the exception than the rule. Using a case that presents the incentives for an increase in the presidentialization of politics, I show that the mechanisms of a multiparty regime mostly limit the president’s exclusive bargaining advantage to nominating the prime minister and then, much as in a parliamentary democracy, render him or her dependent on the coalition potential of his or her own party.

Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies

1984 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
KAARE STROM
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Rational Solutions ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Political Crises ◽  
Minority Government ◽  
Competing Hypotheses

Minority cabinets account for about 35% of all governments in 15 parliamentary democracies since 1945. Conventional explanations associate minority government formation with political crises, instability, polarization, factionalization, and failures of interparty bargaining. Such explanations are tested and found lacking in empirical support. Instead, minority governments are explained as rational solutions under specified conditions. Minority cabinets form when even oppositional parties can influence parliamentary legislation, and when government participation is likely to be a liability in future elections. This rationalist explanation receives substantial empirical support in tests against competing hypotheses. The results suggest important modifications to theories of government and coalition formation.

A Copula Approach to the Problem of Selection Bias in Models of Government Survival

2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daina Chiba ◽  
Lanny W. Martin ◽  
Randolph T. Stevenson
Keyword(s):  
Selection Bias ◽  
Empirical Models ◽  
Selection Problem ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Coalition Politics ◽  
Copula Approach ◽  
Substantive Importance

Theories of coalition politics in parliamentary democracies have suggested that government formation and survival are jointly determined outcomes. An important empirical implication of these theories is that the sample of observed governments analyzed in studies of government survival may be nonrandomly selected from the population of potential governments. This can lead to serious inferential problems. Unfortunately, current empirical models of government survival are unable to account for the possible biases arising from nonrandom selection. In this study, we use a copula-based framework to assess, and correct for, the dependence between the processes of government formation and survival. Our results suggest that existing studies of government survival, by ignoring the selection problem, overstate the substantive importance of several covariates commonly included in empirical models.

scholarly journals THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT IN GOVERNMENT FORMATION: COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF UZBEKISTAN AND EUROPEAN STATES

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 5010-5020
Author(s):  
Turdiev Khayitjon Usmonkul ugli
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Research ◽  
Legal Analysis ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Central Asian ◽  
European Experience ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Central Asian Countries ◽  
The Government

This research was carried out on the formation of different types of governments in European countries and analyzed the government formation traditions in parliamentary democracies. The article provides the comparative research in constitutional law. By researching this theme we tended to analyze the possibility of application of European model of government formation to models in Central Asian countries based on the constitutional frameworks and key political, contextual factors that influence the formation of different types of governments. Also these studies provide the processes of government formation in Uzbekistan and the extent to which the government formation processes correspond the European experience. This article attempts to look at the extent to which these models are generally applicable when applied to in our country.

The Acceptance of Party Unity in Parliamentary Democracies

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Willumsen
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Parliamentary Democracies ◽  
Survey Questions ◽  
Ideal Policy ◽  
Central Argument ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Policy Incentives

The central argument of this book is that voting unity in European legislatures is not primarily the result of the ‘disciplining’ power of the leadership of parliamentary parties, but rather the result of a combination of ideological homogeneity through self-selection into political parties and the calculations of individual legislators about their own long-term benefits. Despite the central role of policy preferences in the subsequent behaviour of legislators, preferences at the level of the individual legislator have been almost entirely neglected in the study of parliaments and legislative behaviour. The book measures these using an until now under-utilized resource: parliamentary surveys. Building on these, the book develops measures of policy incentives of legislators to dissent from their parliamentary parties, and show that preference similarity amongst legislators explains a very substantial proportion of party unity, yet alone cannot explain all of it. Analysing the attitudes of legislators to the demands of party unity, and what drives these attitudes, the book argues that what explains the observed unity (beyond what preference similarity would explain) is the conscious acceptance by MPs that the long-term benefits of belonging to a united party (such as increased influence on legislation, lower transaction costs, and better chances of gaining office) outweigh the short-terms benefits of always voting for their ideal policy outcome. The book buttresses this argument through the analysis of both open-ended survey questions as well as survey questions on the costs and benefits of belonging to a political party in a legislature.

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