Moral Explanation and Moral Objectivity

1998 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Railton ◽  
Gilbert Harman ◽  
Judith Jarvis Thomson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Objectivity ◽  
Moral Explanation

Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 15

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Moral Explanation ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Selection Of

This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The chapters included in the series provide a basis for understanding recent developments in the field. Chapters in this volume explore topics including the nature of reasons, the tenability of moral realism, moral explanation and grounding, and a variety of epistemological challenges.

Moral Objectivity and Moral Freedom

Ethics ◽  
1965 ◽  
Vol 75 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-127
Author(s):  
Huntington Terrell
Keyword(s):  
Moral Objectivity ◽  
Moral Freedom

Moral Objectivity and the Cold War

Ethics ◽  
1960 ◽  
Vol 70 (4) ◽  
pp. 291-305
Author(s):  
Germain G. Grisez
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Moral Objectivity ◽  
The Cold War

Incomplete Routes to Moral Objectivity: Four Variants of Naturalism

2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-217
Author(s):  
David Sidorsky
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
John Dewey ◽  
David Hume ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Human Knowledge ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Moral Objectivity ◽  
Present Essay ◽  
History Of ◽  
Integrated Or

The search for moral objectivity has been constant throughout the history of philosophy, although interpretations of the nature and scope of objectivity have varied. One aim of the pursuit of moral objectivity has been the demonstration of what may be termed its epistemological thesis, that is, the claim that the truth of assertions of the goodness or rightness of moral acts is as legitimate, reliable, or valid as the truth of assertions involving other forms of human knowledge, such as common sense, practical expertise, science, or mathematics. Another aim of the quest for moral objectivity may be termed its pragmatic formulation; this refers to the development of a method or procedure that will mediate among conflicting moral views in order to realize a convergence or justified agreement about warranted or true moral conclusions. In the ethical theories of Aristotle, David Hume, and John Dewey, theories that represent three of the four variants of ethical naturalism (defined below) that are surveyed in this essay, the epistemological thesis and the pragmatic formulation are integrated or combined. The distinction between these two elements is significant for the present essay, however, since I want to show that linguistic naturalism, the fourth variant I shall examine, has provided a demonstration of the epistemological thesis about moral knowledge, even if the pragmatic formulation has not been successfully realized.

scholarly journals Reflective equilibrium and moral objectivity

Inquiry ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 60 (5) ◽  
pp. 443-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sem de Maagt
Keyword(s):  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Objectivity

Moral Objectivity

1984 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 135-170 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Lear
Keyword(s):  
General Question ◽  
Moral Objectivity ◽  
Profound Impact ◽  
The Way

Morality exercises a deep and questionable influence on the way we live our lives. The influence is deep both because moral injunctions are embedded in our psyches long before we can reflect on their status and because even after we become reflective agents, the question of how we should live our lives among others is intimately bound up with the more general question of how we should live our lives: our stance toward morality and our conception of our lives as having significance are of a piece. The influence is questionable because morality pretends to a level of objectivity that it may not possess. Moral injunctions are meant to be binding on us in some way that is independent of the desires or preferences we may happen to have. When one asserts that a certain action is morally worthy or shameful one is, prime facie, doing more than merely expressing approval or disapproval or trying to get others to act as instruments of one's own will. If moral assertions were shown, at bottom, to be merely such exhortations, then they would be shown to wear a disguise. Morality would be revealed as pretending to an objectivity it does not have, and such a revelation could not but have a profound impact on our lives. It is doubtful that such a revelation could be kept locked up inside our studies.

Sharing Ecosystems

On Borders ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 249-272
Author(s):  
Paulina Ochoa Espejo
Keyword(s):  
Complex Systems ◽  
Natural Resources ◽  
Natural Water ◽  
Water Governance ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Human Right ◽  
Water Basin ◽  
Moral Explanation ◽  
Mexico Border ◽  
The U.S

This chapter offers a moral explanation for why bordering states should share the governance of transborder rivers on the basis of place-specific duties; the argument can also be extended to other natural resources. The chapter offers a view of water governance that mediates between a universalist view based on a human right to water and an exclusivist view grounded on the principle of self-determination. The chapter offers the example of the river Grande (Bravo) on the U.S.-Mexico border, and argues that the obligation to share the governance of transborder rivers comes from duties to the complex systems that sustain life (including human life) in the natural water basin. These obligations overlap and crisscross the current border.

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