Incorporating Environmental Concerns into Power Sector Decision making: A Case Study of Sri Lanka. By Peter Meier and Mohan Munasinghe. World Bank Environment Paper Number 6. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1994. viii, 167 pp. $10.95 (paper).

1997 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 236-237
Author(s):  
Eric Strahorn
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Sri Lanka ◽  
World Bank ◽  
Environmental Concerns ◽  
Power Sector ◽  
The World Bank ◽  
The World ◽  
Sector Decision

scholarly journals Biased Policy Professionals

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 310-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sheheryar Banuri ◽  
Stefan Dercon ◽  
Varun Gauri
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
International Development ◽  
World Bank ◽  
Development Policy ◽  
Public Servants ◽  
Private Capacity ◽  
The World Bank ◽  
Subject Pool ◽  
The World ◽  
The Uk

Abstract Although the decisions of policy professionals are often more consequential than those of individuals in their private capacity, there is a dearth of studies on the biases of policy professionals: those who prepare and implement policy on behalf of elected politicians. Experiments conducted on a novel subject pool of development policy professionals (public servants of the World Bank and the Department for International Development in the UK) show that policy professionals are indeed subject to decision-making traps, including the effects of framing outcomes as losses or gains, and, most strikingly, confirmation bias driven by ideological predisposition, despite having an explicit mission to promote evidence-informed and impartial decision making. These findings should worry policy professionals and their principals in governments and large organizations, as well as citizens themselves. A further experiment, in which policy professionals engage in discussion, shows that deliberation may be able to mitigate the effects of some of these biases.

Social knowledge and international policymaking at the World Bank

2009 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 297-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Toye
Keyword(s):  
World Bank ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
Poverty Reduction ◽  
Social Knowledge ◽  
The World Bank ◽  
The World ◽  
Public Bureaucracy ◽  
Binding Constraints

The production of social knowledge in all international organizations is problematic because all are public bureaucracies. The World Bank provides a case study of the problems of managing in-house research in an international public bureaucracy. Not only are there managerial constraints on what the Bank is willing to publish, but the binding constraints on publication evolve. The evolution in managerial objectives at the Bank in recent years and the factors that have influenced shifts in its rhetoric and policy are examined. Are these adjustments merely rhetorical? Recent research on poverty reduction, governance and conditionality is discussed to gauge how far the Bank has moved.

Explaining the Gaps between Mandate and Performance: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform

2005 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 10-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamar Gutner
Keyword(s):  
World Bank ◽  
Policy Process ◽  
Environmental Performance ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
The World Bank ◽  
The World ◽  
Principal Agent Model ◽  
And Performance

This article seeks to explain why the World Bank's environmental performance is so uneven despite numerous reform efforts. I argue that a principal-agent model offers a potentially powerful tool for analyzing gaps between the mandates and performance of international organizations (IOs) such as the World Bank. The model is particularly useful when it is calibrated to recognize problems of antinomic delegation and the dual role an IO may have as both agent and principal. Antinomic delegation occurs when states ask IOs to take on complex tasks that are difficult to institutionalize. Recognizing that many IOs may be principal and agent at different stages of the policy process reveals more opportunities for agency slack that are not well addressed by the IO literature. This article presents these modifications to the principal-agent model and applies the model to the case of the World Bank. The case study demonstrates that the nature of the tasks being delegated and the incentives shaping both sides of the principal-agent relationship are key sources of disconnect between the institution's stated goals and its performance.

scholarly journals Too Many Fancy Bottles! In Nepal's New Power Sector Institutions Electricity Development Decade 2072

2016 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 6-10
Author(s):  
Santa Bahadur Pun
Keyword(s):  
World Bank ◽  
Present State ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
Power Sector ◽  
Prodigal Son ◽  
The World Bank ◽  
Electricity Crisis ◽  
Development Decade ◽  
The World

Seven years after Prime Minister Dr. BR Bhattarai’s 38 Point programs to Mitigate National Electricity Crisis, the Energy Ministry of Prime Minister KP Sharma (Oli) recently unveiled another program to Eradicate National Electricity Crisis along with a concept paper and work plan on Electricity Development Decade 2072. This article will focus only with the Energy Ministry’s institutional arrangements. The Energy Ministry appears to have come to the grand conclusion that the present state of Bungled power crisis is all due to the Bundled NEA. Hence, the Ministry’s prescription has been to unbundle NEA down to its bare skeleton! There is not a word on the Department of Electricity Development or the Nepal Investment Board – both high caste thread-bearing organizations! It is hoped that a thorough Implementation Completion Report (ICR) will be conducted on three decades of bungled/bundled power sector in Nepal by the World Bank, now that the prodigal son has returned after the 1995 Arun III debacle. Without the findings of that ICR/PCR, the multilaterals should refrain from the itch to unload their one billion US$ excess baggage on Nepal’s power sector.HYDRO Nepal JournalJournal of Water, Energy and EnvironmentIssue: 19Page: 6-10

scholarly journals Pakistan

2020 ◽  
pp. 105-125
Author(s):  
Natalya Naqvi
Keyword(s):  
World Bank ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Basel Ii ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Basel Iii ◽  
The World Bank ◽  
The World ◽  
Over Time

Pakistan has the highest level of implementation among our case study countries. The impetus for converging on international standards has come from different actors over time. The adoption of Basel I adoption in the 1980s was driven by the World Bank and IMF. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the adoption of Basel II was driven first by politicians promoting the expansion of financial services, and then by banking sector regulators. Most recently, as banks have internationalized, they have championed the implementation of Basel III. Pakistan is one of the few cases where all three major actors—politicians, regulators, and major banks—are now aligned behind the implementation of the standards, leading to a high and ambitious level of implementation.

scholarly journals The paradox of embedded agency from a strong structuration perspective

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmed Othman Rashwan Kholeif ◽  
Lisa Jack
Keyword(s):  
World Bank ◽  
Middle Managers ◽  
Monitoring And Evaluation ◽  
Illustrative Case ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The World Bank ◽  
The World ◽  
Strong Structuration ◽  
Illustrative Case Study

PurposeThis paper aims to use Stones’ strong structuration theory (SST) that combines Giddens’ duality and Archer’s analytical dualism to deal with the paradox of embedded agency, focussing on resistance, in the budgeting literature. It also applies this framework to an illustrative case study that examines a failed attempt to implement performance-based budgeting (PBB) in the Egyptian Sales Tax Department (ESTD).Design/methodology/approachThe authors have used SST as an analytical framework. Longitudinal case study data were collected from interviews, observations, discussions and documentary analysis and from publicly available reports and other media issued by the World Bank.FindingsThe SST framework identifies the circumstances in which middle managers as embedded agency have limited possibilities to change their dispositions to act and identify opportunities for emancipation in the wider social context in which they are embedded. The official explanation for the failure to implement PBB in Egypt was obstruction by middle managers. The findings of this study provide an alternative explanation to that published by the World Bank for the failure to institutionalise PBB in Egypt. It was found that the middle managers were the real supporters of PBB. Other parties and existing laws and regulations contributed to the failure of PBB.Research limitations/implicationsAs a practical implication of the study, the analysis presented here offers an alternative interpretation of the failure of the Egyptian project for monitoring and evaluation to that published by the World Bank. This case and similar cases may enhance the understanding of how and when monitoring and evaluation technologies should be introduced at the global level to manage conflicts of interest between agencies and beneficiaries.Originality/valueThis paper contributes to the extant management accounting literature on the use of ST in addressing the paradox of embedded agency in making or resisting structural change. It uses SST to integrate Giddens’ ST with critical realist theory, incorporating duality and dualism in a stronger model of structuration. The SST framework offers a means of analysing case studies that result from interactions and conjunctures between different groups of actors at different ontological levels. The paper also examines the issue of embedded agency in budgeting research using an illustrative case study from a developing country, Egypt.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document