Soviet nuclear strategy from Stalin to Gorbachev: a revolution in Soviet military and political thinking, Innovation and the arms race: how the United States and the Soviet Union develop new military technologies, Minds at war: nuclear reality and the inner conflicts of defense policymakers and Science and mythology in the making of defence policy

1989 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 525-526
Author(s):  
Stephen Shenfield
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Arms Race ◽  
Political Thinking ◽  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Defence Policy

15. The Return to Confrontation, 1979–80

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Young ◽  
John Kent
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Short Range ◽  
The United States ◽  
Arms Race ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Slow Progress ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
East West

This chapter examines why the United States and the Soviet Union returned to confrontation during the period 1979–1980. Despite the slow progress of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II), there were at least some efforts to control strategic weapons. Short-range and intermediate-range nuclear weapons, in contrast, continued to grow in number and sophistication, particularly in Europe, where NATO and Warsaw Pact forces still prepared for war against each other, despite détente. The failure to control theatre nuclear weapons led to a new twist in the European arms race at the end of the 1970s which helped to undermine recent improvements in East–West relations. The chapter first considers NATO’s ‘dual track’ decision regarding theatre nuclear weapons before discussing the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. It concludes with an assessment of the revival of the Cold War, focusing on the so-called Carter Doctrine.

Rational Superiority, Crises, and Arms Control, 1961–1963

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Cameron
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
National Security ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Public Rhetoric ◽  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Test Ban

Chapter 1 describes how John F. Kennedy rose to power by articulating his own new nuclear strategy, which would use the latest advances in social and organizational sciences, combined with US superiority in nuclear weapons, to defend the United States’ national security interests. The foremost exponent of this strategy of “rational superiority” was Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. The chapter then explains how this scheme was dealt a series of blows by Kennedy’s experiences during the Berlin and Cuban missile crises, which disabused him of the idea that nuclear superiority could be used to coerce the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the Kennedy administration used the rhetoric of rational superiority to advance the Limited Test Ban Treaty and was planning to employ it as part of the president’s reelection campaign in 1964. Kennedy had not reconciled this gap between his public rhetoric and personal doubts at the time of his death.

First Steps toward SALT, 1966–1969

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Cameron
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Vietnam War ◽  
The United States ◽  
Soviet Economy ◽  
Arms Race ◽  
Living Standards ◽  
White House ◽  
Political Consequences ◽  
The Soviet Union

The chapter analyzes the Johnson administration’s failure to begin substantive strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. Johnson and McNamara were overly optimistic regarding the USSR’s willingness to concede nuclear superiority to the United States, believing that the strain of an arms race on the Soviet economy would be too great. The chapter argues that this economic determinism based on a US-centric model of modernization that privileged living standards over other goals was similar to that which underpinned the administration’s bombing strategy in the Vietnam War. Rather than being a completely separate initiative, Johnson’s strategy of détente with the USSR based on arms control stemmed from the same outlook as that which underpinned Vietnam. When Soviet willingness to enter talks failed to materialize, the Johnson White House was unable to agree to talks that would be based on strategic parity, fearing the domestic political consequences of doing so.

Moscow Calls Off the Arms Race

2019 ◽  
pp. 102-128
Author(s):  
Beth A. Fischer
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Arms Race ◽  
Negligible Effect ◽  
The West ◽  
Military Buildup ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Us

Told from the Kremlin’s perspective, this chapter debunks the myth that Reagan’s military buildup—and SDI in particular—compelled the Soviets to agree to arms reductions and then to collapse. In reality, the US buildup had a negligible effect on the USSR. By the 1980s Soviet reformers believed nuclear arsenals were of little value: they were costly, could not be used, and incited fear in the West, which prompted the United States to increase its arsenal. The USSR would be more secure, they reasoned, if arsenals were greatly reduced, if not eliminated. Moreover, although some Soviet scientists were initially worried about SDI, this concern dissipated as scientists determined Reagan’s plan was not feasible. In short, for a variety of strategic, financial, and ethical reasons Moscow sought to end the arms race. It therefore did not build its own SDI-style system, nor did it match increases in US defense expenditures, as triumphalistsassume. The Reagan administration’s policies did not compel the Soviet Union to disarm and then collapse.

6. Star Wars and beyond

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph M. Siracusa
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
The United States ◽  
Arms Race ◽  
Star Wars ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Nuclear Environment ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
The Stability

By the 1960s, both the United States and the Soviet Union found themselves caught up in an offensive and defensive arms race that threatened the stability of an embryonic nuclear deterrence system. ‘Star Wars and beyond’ looks at how domestic politics and the desire to stabilize the nuclear environment played a major role in American and Soviet anti-ballistic missile decisions after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Would rival nations fear that the United States might flaunt its strategic arsenal as a means of encouraging states to behave? Would US missile defences cause an opponent to feel compelled to strike first? Would this impede strategic arms-limitations efforts? Or would US missile defences renew the strategic arms race?

The Decision to Deploy the ABM: Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics in the Johnson Administration

1972 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Morton H. Halperin
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
San Francisco ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
The United States ◽  
Arms Race ◽  
Johnson Administration ◽  
Missile Defense ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Ballistic Missile Defense

Why did the Johnson Administration decide in the late 1960's to deploy a ballistic missile defense system in the United States? In attempting to answer this question we need to seek an understanding of several distinct decisions and actions. The most puzzling event occurred in San Francisco on September 18, 1967, when Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara delivered an address to the editors and publishers of United Press International. McNamara devoted the first fourteen pages of his talk to a general discussion of the strategic arms race, emphasizing the limited utility of nuclear weapons and the fact that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had gained any increased security from the arms race. With this as background, he turned to a specific discussion of the ABM issue

scholarly journals Le Japon, sa politique de défense et l'avenir de son alliance avec les États-Unis

2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-119
Author(s):  
Alex Macleod
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
East Asia ◽  
Active Role ◽  
The United States ◽  
Asia Pacific ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Defence Policy ◽  
The Government ◽  
Northern Territories

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War have forced Japan to question its defence policy. In the past this policy has been firmly based on a purely defensive posture which relied totally on Japan's alliance with the United States. Because the Cold War dragged on in East Asia for much longer than in Europe, Japan could carry on the same defence policy as before. Japanese defence planners found it convenient to emphasize the « Soviet threat » as a way to maintain annual increases in the military budget, and refusing to normalize their relations with the Soviets, until the question of the Northern Territories had been settled. They can no longer ignore the various signs of détente in East Asia. Yet they have had limited effects on Japan's defence policy. The Americans have called on Japan to play a role more commensurate with its economic power but want to avoid any hint of an autonomous Japanese defence policy. They pressured Japan into playing a more active part in the Gulf crisis and the ensuing war, but the government failed to muster sufficient support, at home and amongst the other countries of East Asia, for any role for its military outside Japan, even in a non combat capacity. So Japan has sought other regional and global security policies to compensate for this handicap and has met with mixed success. The recent failure to pass legislation allowing its Self-defence Forces to participate in UN peacekeeping operations has seriously jeopardized Japan 's search for a more active role in regional affairs. But will the Japanese continue for much longer to play a second role in the United States' System of bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region which that country can afford less and less ? This is the real dilemma of Japanese defence policy : it can neither remain as it is nor can it easily change direction.

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