scholarly journals Opportunistic and Deliberate Disinflation under Imperfect Credibility

2000 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 707 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antulio N. Bomfim ◽  
Glenn D. Rudebusch
Keyword(s):  
Imperfect Credibility

Perfect and Imperfect Credibility: A Brazilian Target Zone Analysis

2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosa Rosa Fontes ◽  
Marcelo A. Arbex ◽  
Mirian Almeida
Keyword(s):  
Target Zone ◽  
Imperfect Credibility

scholarly journals On two notions of imperfect credibility in optimal monetary policies

2019 ◽  
Vol 174 ◽  
pp. 22-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ippei Fujiwara ◽  
Timothy Kam ◽  
Takeki Sunakawa
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policies ◽  
Imperfect Credibility

scholarly journals Monetary policy and inflationary shocks under imperfect credibility

2012 ◽  
Vol 116 (3) ◽  
pp. 571-574 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthieu Darracq Pariès ◽  
Stéphane Moyen
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Imperfect Credibility

scholarly journals Imperfect Credibility versus No Credibility of Optimal Monetary Policy

2021 ◽  
Vol 72 (1) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
Jean-Bernard Chatelain ◽  
Kirsten Ralf
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Optimal Monetary Policy ◽  
Imperfect Credibility

scholarly journals The effect of central bank credibility on forward guidance in an estimated New Keynesian model

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-39
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Cole ◽  
Enrique Martínez-García
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Rational Expectations ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
New Keynesian Model ◽  
Survey Of Professional Forecasters ◽  
Forward Guidance ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
The Us ◽  
Imperfect Credibility ◽  
Central Bank Credibility

Abstract This paper examines the effectiveness of forward guidance shocks in the US. We estimate a New Keynesian model with imperfect central bank credibility and heterogeneous expectations using Bayesian methods and survey data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). The results provide important takeaways: (1) The estimated credibility of the Fed’s forward guidance announcements is relatively high, but anticipation effects are attenuated. Accordingly, output and inflation do not respond as favorably as in the fully credible counterfactual. (2) The so-called “forward guidance puzzle” arises partly from the unrealistically large responses of macroeconomic variables to forward guidance under perfect credibility and homogeneous fully informed rational expectations, assumptions which are found to be jointly inconsistent with the observed US data. (3) Imperfect credibility provides a plausible explanation for the empirical evidence of forecasting error predictability based on forecasting disagreement found in the SPF data. Thus, we show that accounting for imperfect credibility and forecasting disagreements is important to understand the formation of expectations and the transmission mechanism of forward guidance.

scholarly journals Imperfect credibility and inflation persistence

2003 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 915-944 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher J. Erceg ◽  
Andrew T. Levin
Keyword(s):  
Inflation Persistence ◽  
Imperfect Credibility
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