Signaling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining

1992 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 153 ◽  
Author(s):  
James D. Morrow
Keyword(s):  
Crisis Bargaining

Flexibility and Firmness in Crisis Bargaining

2021 ◽  
pp. 002200272199417
Author(s):  
Vesna Danilovic ◽  
Joe Clare
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Causal Mechanism ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Bargaining Process ◽  
Theoretical Rationale ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
Peaceful Resolution ◽  
Tit For Tat

Our study compares the efficacy of mixed bargaining strategies to strict coercion or accommodation. While mixed strategies can be approached from different conceptual angles, we focus on flexible and/or firm postures as signaling properties of bargaining. In our theory and empirical analysis, we show that the combination of firmness with flexibility on both sides, without necessarily scripted rules as in tit-for-tat, leads to peaceful resolution without unilateral concessions. Its opposite, resolute firmness is unlikely to make the opponent yield, as assumed in influential literature of the traditional canon. If anything, war is most likely when both sides opt for it. We provide the theoretical rationale for these expectations, which are validated in our empirical analysis of the ICB crisis dataset for the 1918 to 2015 period. Our study also points to the bargaining process as a potential causal mechanism between democracy and peace, and therefore has relevant implications for several research strands.

A Spatial Model of Crisis Bargaining

1984 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 407 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Clifton Morgan
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Model ◽  
Crisis Bargaining

scholarly journals Reputations for Resolve and Higher-Order Beliefs in Crisis Bargaining

2021 ◽  
pp. 002200272199554
Author(s):  
Allan Dafoe ◽  
Remco Zwetsloot ◽  
Matthew Cebul
Keyword(s):  
Belief Change ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Order Effects ◽  
Survey Experiment ◽  
Experimental Setting ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
First Order ◽  
Qualitative Evidence ◽  
Higher Order Effects

Reputations for resolve are said to be one of the few things worth fighting for, yet they remain inadequately understood. Discussions of reputation focus almost exclusively on first-order belief change— A stands firm, B updates its beliefs about A’s resolve. Such first-order reputational effects are important, but they are not the whole story. Higher-order beliefs—what A believes about B’s beliefs, and so on—matter a great deal as well. When A comes to believe that B is more resolved, this may decrease A’s resolve, and this in turn may increase B’s resolve, and so on. In other words, resolve is interdependent. We offer a framework for estimating higher-order effects, and find evidence of such reasoning in a survey experiment on quasi-elites. Our findings indicate both that states and leaders can develop potent reputations for resolve, and that higher-order beliefs are often responsible for a large proportion of these effects (40 percent to 70 percent in our experimental setting). We conclude by complementing the survey with qualitative evidence and laying the groundwork for future research.

Promises or Policies? An Experimental Analysis of International Agreements and Audience Reactions

2014 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 235-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Chaudoin
Keyword(s):  
Trade Policy ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
Experimental Analysis ◽  
International Agreements ◽  
Survey Experiment ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
Audience Costs ◽  
Policy Effects ◽  
Policy Choices ◽  
Actual Policy

AbstractA key assumption of audience costs theories of crisis bargaining and international cooperation is that audience members have strong preferences for consistency between their leader's commitments and actual policy choices. However, audiences also have strong preferences over the policy choices themselves, regardless of their consistency with past commitments. I conducted a randomized survey experiment to evaluate the magnitude of consistency and policy effects in the context of international agreements over trade policy. Respondents with expressed policy preferences, whether supporting or opposing free trade, have muted reactions to learning that their leader has broken an agreement. Only respondents with no opinion on trade policy are affected by learning that their leader's policy is inconsistent with prior commitments. This suggests that constituents' underlying preferences limit the degree to which audience costs influence policymakers' calculations.

scholarly journals Crisis bargaining in the European Union: Formal rules or market pressure?

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Finke ◽  
Stefanie Bailer
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Agenda Setting ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Eurozone Crisis ◽  
Fiscal Discipline ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
Transfer Payments ◽  
Market Pressures ◽  
Market Pressure ◽  
Formal Rules

To what extent did the European Monetary Union crisis alter the logic of European Union decision making? We analyze the relevance of asymmetric market pressures as compared to that of formal voting and agenda setting rules by applying three established bargaining models to the ‘EMU Positions’ data. Accounting for the interdependence between issues and agreements, we locate actors’ positions on three reform dimensions, namely the level of fiscal discipline, transfer payments and institutionalization. We find that market pressure during the height of the Eurozone crisis was particularly relevant, and that debtor countries were weakened by their difficulty in refinancing their public debt. Our finding shows that formal rules determining agenda setting and veto rights remain relevant even in times of crisis.

Strategic Interaction and Interstate Crises: A Bayesian Quantal Response Estimator for Incomplete Information Games

2008 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 250-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Esarey ◽  
Bumba Mukherjee ◽  
Will H. Moore
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Learning Process ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Statistical Treatment ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
Incomplete Information Games ◽  
Information Characteristics ◽  
Information Games

Private information characteristics like resolve and audience costs are powerful influences over strategic international behavior, especially crisis bargaining. As a consequence, states face asymmetric information when interacting with one another and will presumably try to learn about each others' private characteristics by observing each others' behavior. A satisfying statistical treatment would account for the existence of asymmetric information and model the learning process. This study develops a formal and statistical framework for incomplete information games that we term the Bayesian Quantal Response Equilibrium Model (BQRE model). Our BQRE model offers three advantages over existing work: it directly incorporates asymmetric information into the statistical model's structure, estimates the influence of private information characteristics on behavior, and mimics the temporal learning process that we believe takes place in international politics.

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