Disaggregating and Explaining Corporate Political Activity: Domestic and Foreign Corporations in National Politics

2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (4) ◽  
pp. 891-903 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wendy L. Hansen ◽  
Neil J. Mitchell
Keyword(s):  
Charitable Giving ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Political Action ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
Political Action Committees ◽  
National Politics ◽  
Corporate Political Activity ◽  
Political Activities ◽  
Empirical Level ◽  
Foreign Corporations

Corporate political activity is usually operationalized and analyzed as financial contributions to candidates or political parties through political action committees (PACs). Very little attention has been paid to other dimensions, such as lobbying, in a systematic way. On a theoretical level we address the issue of how to conceive of PAC contributions, lobbying, and other corporate activities, such as charitable giving, in terms of the strategic behavior of corporations and the implications of “foreignness” for the different types of corporate political activity. On an empirical level we examine the political activities of Fortune 500 firms, along with an oversampling of U.S. affiliates of large foreign investors for the 1987–88 election cycle.

Corporate Political Strategies

1990 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 281-288 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graham K. Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Political Action ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
Political Action Committees ◽  
Political Contributions ◽  
Corporate Political Activity ◽  
Political Behaviour ◽  
Corporate Political Strategies ◽  
Ready Availability ◽  
Politically Active

With one partial exception, political scientists have carried out little empirical research on corporate political activity. That one exception is political action committees, PACs. Perhaps because of the ready availability of apparently reliable data on corporate political contributions, most empirical studies of business political activity have concentrated on PACs. The study of PACs is not, however, synonymous with the study of corporate political behaviour. Indeed, not all corporations have PACs; Sabato estimated that almost half the largest manufacturing corporations did not. At least one politically active corporation, Du Pont, refused for many years to establish a PAC.

The Corporate Context of Lobbying Activity

2006 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Holly Brasher ◽  
David Lowery
Keyword(s):  
Political Action ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Political Action Committees ◽  
Prior Work ◽  
Corporate Political Activity ◽  
Business Context ◽  
Economic Context ◽  
Corporate Context ◽  
Size Matter

Despite extensive research on political activity on the part of corporations, clear and consistent findings remain elusive. We identify three reasons for this failure. First, most of the empirical literature on corporate political activity simply studies the wrong phenomena by examining political action committees rather than lobbying more generally. Second, the literature studies an excessively narrow sample of organizations that might engage in lobbying, focusing almost always on extremely large corporations, which inevitably attenuates variance on many of the variables hypothesized to influence engagement in political activity. And third, prior work is rarely attentive to the diversity of corporate activities, narrowly conceptualizing vital aspects of the business context that might influence decisions to engage in political activity. Based on this critique, we develop and test new models of corporate political activity, finding that the diversity of the economic context within which firms work and firm size matter a great deal, if in ways somewhat different from those reported in prior work.

scholarly journals The political activities of American corporate leaders

2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 493-527 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony J. Nownes ◽  
Nurgul R. Aitalieva
Keyword(s):  
Mail Survey ◽  
Strong Relationship ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
The Political ◽  
National Politics ◽  
Corporate Political Activity ◽  
Political Activities ◽  
Corporate Leaders ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Politically Active

What is the nature and extent of corporate leader involvement in American national politics? The results of a mail survey of nearly 100 such individuals show that leaders are quite active, devoting an average of nearly 1 hour per day to national political activity. We also show that corporate leaders engage in a wide range of advocacy activities. Monetary activities loom particularly large in the political lives of American corporate leaders, as large numbers are approached by members of Congress for contributions, and many who are approached answer the call. In addition, we find that corporate leaders, unlike advocacy professionals, do a great deal of their advocacy work in private; for the most part they eschew public activities such as testifying before congressional committees. Speaking to the question of which leaders are most politically active, our data evince a strong relationship between firm political activity and firm leader political activity. In sum, politically active firms have politically active leaders. We thus contribute to the ongoing academic discussion of corporate political activity by showing that the CEO's office is an additional locus of political power within business firms, and that CEO political activity is instrumental rather than consumptive in nature.

Beyond the limits: involvement in illegal political activities

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Viktor Dahl ◽  
Håkan Stattin
Keyword(s):  
Goal Orientation ◽  
Political Violence ◽  
Predictive Power ◽  
Political Action ◽  
Political Engagement ◽  
Political Activism ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
Late Adolescents ◽  
Political Activities ◽  
Simultaneous Model

The purpose of this study is to examine the adolescents who cross the boundaries of legality, also including illegal political means in their political action repertoire. The data comprised of questionnaire responses from middle and late adolescents in a Swedish city of around 130,000 citizens. Analyses of covariance, EXACON, and logistic regression were used to examine the extent to which adolescents including illegal political activities in their political activity repertoire compare with their legally oriented counterparts. Adolescents using illegal political activity reported higher levels of political interest and goal-orientation than adolescents involved solely in legal political activity. The major contrasts with legal political activism were that illegal political activism seemed to co-occur with (a) reluctance to accept authority, irrespective of the context (societal, school, or parental) and (b) approval of violent political means. In a simultaneous model, further analysis revealed that reluctance to accept authority reduced the predictive power of illegal political activities with regard to approval of political violence. This suggests that the tendencies to approve of political violence, among adolescents involved in illegal political activities, might be partially explained by challenges toward authority. To conclude, adolescents in illegal political activism seem to have similar resources for political engagement as their legally oriented counterparts. However, adolescents involved in illegal political activity seem more likely to let ends justify the means. Most likely, this position is related to authority challenges.

Franchise systems and lobbying: implications for Olsonian collective action theory

2018 ◽  
Vol 56 (11) ◽  
pp. 2357-2372
Author(s):  
Richard S. Brown
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Action Theory ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
System Size ◽  
Industry Structure ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
Corporate Political Activity ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Political Activities

Purpose Previous research combining corporate political activity and collective action theory has focused solely on industry structure and its role in predicting group lobbying or PAC participation. The purpose of this paper is to use a different context—franchise systems—to apply Olsonian collective action theory to political activities. Design/methodology/approach Using a random-effects technique in STATA on an unbalanced panel data set, this paper empirically models the effects of franchise system size and degree of franchising on the level of lobbying intensity. Findings Since franchise systems are made up of differing unit ownership structure, the author first model if those systems that are fully franchised lobby less than those with franchisor unit ownership (supported). Next, since collective action theory predicts that more participants in a space will lead to less collective action, the author predict that franchise systems with larger unit counts will lobby less than those with smaller counts (not supported). Finally, the author test the interaction of these two effects as systems that are fully franchised and of higher unit totals should have an even greater negative relationship with political activity (supported). Originality/value This paper uses both a novel data set and a novel context to study collective action. Previous research has utilized an industry structure context to model the level of lobbying and collective action, while the current research uses an analogous logic, but in the context of franchise systems.

scholarly journals Industry vs. Government: Leveraging Media Coverage in Corporate Political Activity

2020 ◽  
pp. 017084062096416
Author(s):  
John Murray ◽  
Daniel Nyberg
Keyword(s):  
Mass Media ◽  
Media Coverage ◽  
Mining Industry ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
Corporate Political Activity ◽  
Political Activities ◽  
Media Frames ◽  
The Media ◽  
The Public Sphere

This article investigates how an industry leveraged media coverage to publicly oppose governmental policy. Based on a frame analysis of the political contest between the mining industry and the Australian government over a proposed tax on resource corporations, we show how the industry aligned its position with mass media to (a) make the policy contest salient, (b) frame their position in the contest as legitimate and (c) construct negative representations of the policy as dominant. The analysis reveals how the industry’s corporate political activities leveraged media coverage to align disparate frames into a consistent message against the policy in the public sphere. This contributes to the literature on corporate political activity by explaining the process of alignment with mass media frames to legitimize corporate positions on salient issues. Second, we contribute to the framing literature by demonstrating the process of frame alignment between non-collaborative actors. Finally, we contribute to the broader discussion on corporations’ role in society by showing how corporate campaigns can leverage the media to facilitate the favourable settlement of contentious issues. These contributions highlight the pitfalls of corporate political influence without necessary democratic standards.

scholarly journals How do firms compete in the non-market? The process of political capability building

2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 263-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard S. Brown
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Political Action ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
Corporate Structure ◽  
Corporate Political Activity ◽  
Resource Based View ◽  
Capability Building ◽  
Political Access ◽  
Theory Research ◽  
Political Actions

This paper contributes to both corporate political activity (CPA) research and capabilities theory research by offering models that better describe the process that managers undertake to nurture a political capability. This is done through the interplay of four factors inherent in political actions, namely (i) corporate structure, (ii) firm-government linkages, (iii) political access and (iv) public policy pressure. Additionally, recognizing that political capability attainment is not a binary endeavor, I offer a political capability continuum to better categorize the magnitude by which differing firms allocate resources toward molding public policy. This paper adds to the scant literature on management-focused CPA research that integrates the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm and political action research.

scholarly journals Do Campaign Contributions from Farmers Influence Agricultural Policy? Evidence from a 2008 Farm Bill Amendment Vote to Curtail Cotton Subsidies

2019 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 417-433
Author(s):  
Scott Callahan
Keyword(s):  
Agricultural Policy ◽  
Political Action ◽  
Campaign Contributions ◽  
Reduced Form ◽  
Political Action Committees ◽  
Farm Bill ◽  
Vote Decision ◽  
Political Activities ◽  
Cotton Farmers ◽  
Simultaneous Model

AbstractThis article studies the political activities of individual cotton farmers and cotton political action committees (PACs) by exploiting a vote to amend the 2008 Farm Bill. Using a simultaneous model, I estimate reduced form equations for donations from cotton farmers and cotton PACs using tobit models, which instrument donations in the probit vote equation to control for the hypothesized endogeneity between campaign contributions and legislative votes. I find evidence that cotton farmers, like cotton PACs, contribute to legislators representing a median cotton farming constituency. I find no evidence that contributions from cotton farmers or cotton PACs significantly affected the vote decision.

scholarly journals Is Corporate Political Activity an Investment or Agency? An Application of System GMM Approach

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 5
Author(s):  
Woon Leong Lin
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Reputation ◽  
Political Action ◽  
Generalized Method Of Moments ◽  
Dynamic Panel Data ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
Political Contributions ◽  
Corporate Political Activity ◽  
System Gmm ◽  
Method Of Moments Estimator ◽  
The Relationship

Corporate political activity (CPA) has been recognized as bearing a significant impact on financial performance (FP). Nevertheless, there has been a lack of considerable research to date. The results of the research regarding the relationship between CPA and FP have been contradictory and this has necessitated further investigation of this relationship. Nonetheless, rather than examining the relationship between CPA and FP, research scholars have revealed that a contingency perspective must be employed for revealing the conditions and the context which enhance the relationship between these two constructs. This study offers a quite distinctive viewpoint with respect to the link between CPA and FP as regards the corporate reputation perspective. For this reason, the study obtained data from the Fortune list of top 100 World Most Admired Companies (WMAC) for the period of 2007 and 2016. This data was utilized to examine the relationship between CPA and FP using the dynamic panel data system GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) estimator. This study finds virtually no support for the hypothesis that lobbying and PACs (political action committees) represent an investment in political capital. Instead, CPA is symptomatic of agency problems within firms. This study also argues that corporate reputation moderates the effect of CPA on the FP and the analysis supports the argument. Our results are particularly useful in light of the reputable corporation, which is greatly to likely increase the use of corporate funds for political contributions.

The Determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1978–1986

1994 ◽  
Vol 88 (4) ◽  
pp. 911-926 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin B. Grier ◽  
Michael C. Munger ◽  
Brian E. Roberts
Keyword(s):  
Political Action ◽  
Cost Model ◽  
Large Data ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
Small Samples ◽  
Political Action Committees ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Potential Benefits ◽  
Benefit Cost

While the allocation of interest group monies to specific politicians has been extensively studied, little is known about the factors that determine of the overall level of political activity across groups. We study total contributions by corporate political action committees at the industry level. We create a large data set on industry political activity, covering 124 industries across five election cycles from 1978 to 1986 and sketch out a simple benefit-cost model to predict total corporate PAC contributions in each industry. The few previous studies of this phenomenon use relatively small samples and employ statistical techniques that are either biased or impose untested restrictions. The selectivity-corrected regression technique used here solves these problems. We find that industries with greater potential benefits from government assistance contribute systematically more but that the ability to realize these benefits is constrained by collective action problems facing firms in each industry.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document