Buying Supermajorities in Finite Legislatures
2000 ◽
Vol 94
(3)
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pp. 677-681
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Keyword(s):
I analyze the finite-voter version of the Groseclose and Snyder vote-buying model. I identify how the optimal coalition size varies with the underlying preference parameters; derive necessary and sufficient conditions for minimal majority and universal coalitions to form; and show that the necessary condition for minimal majorities found in Groseclose and Snyder is incorrect.
1977 ◽
Vol 16
(3)
◽
pp. 361-369
1982 ◽
Vol 23
(2)
◽
pp. 137-149
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2015 ◽
Vol 11
(06)
◽
pp. 1735-1738
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1999 ◽
Vol 19
(6)
◽
pp. 1527-1564
2005 ◽
Vol 2005
(21)
◽
pp. 3497-3509
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