Game Theory and Experimental Games: The Study of Strategic Interaction

1984 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 173
Author(s):  
David K. Smith ◽  
A. M. Colman
1996 ◽  
Vol 93 (23) ◽  
pp. 13421-13428 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. A. McCabe ◽  
S. J. Rassenti ◽  
V. L. Smith

Author(s):  
Ulrich Petersohn

Since 2013, combat services have been increasingly exchanged on the market. This development is puzzling since the practice emerged despite an anti-mercenary norm banning such services, and without any revision of the norm. The article argues that the combat market is not a deliberate design, but the result of strategic interaction. For some, compliance with the anti-mercenary norm is the best strategy, while for others, violating the norm is best. However, once the norm violation occurs, it is in the interest of all actors to maintain a façade of compliance. Non-compliant actors benefit from the combat services, and compliant actors do not have to engage in costly sanctioning of the norm violation, and avoid the reputational costs associated with non-enforcement. The article employs game theory to investigate the strategic interactions of actors across 11 combat contracts from 2013 to 2019.


2000 ◽  
pp. 152-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin A. McCabe ◽  
Stephen J. Rassenti ◽  
Vernon L. Smith

1984 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 297-298
Author(s):  
F.W. Roush

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