An Alternative View of the Labelling versus Psychiatric Perspectives on Societal Reaction to Mental Illness

Social Forces ◽  
1977 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marvin D. Krohn ◽  
Ronald L. Akers
Keyword(s):  
Mental Illness ◽  
Alternative View ◽  
Societal Reaction

Szasz and the Law: An Alternative View

1976 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 551-558 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee S. Weinberg ◽  
Richard E. Vatz
Keyword(s):  
Mental Illness ◽  
Human Behavior ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Alternative View ◽  
Previous Issue ◽  
Medical Models ◽  
Institutional Psychiatry ◽  
Thomas Szasz

In a previous issue C. G. Schoenfeld attempted to disprove Thomas Szasz’ theory that mental illness is a “myth” and to dispute Szasz’ contention that current views of “mental illness” promote violent subjugation of human freedom in institutional and legal settings. This article argues that typical of many who criticize Dr. Szasz, Mr. Schoenfeld misunderstands and misrepresents Szasz’ rich theoretical arguments concerning “mental illness” and the prevalent use in law and institutional psychiatry of medical models for analyzing human behavior. Additionally, the authors urge responsible researchers to further pursue the implications of an accurate understanding of Szasz’ arguments for legal theory and practice.

scholarly journals Capacity as the Gateway: an alternative view

2014 ◽  
pp. 45
Author(s):  
Robert Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Mental Illness ◽  
Mental Disorder ◽  
Patient Autonomy ◽  
Best Interests ◽  
Alternative View ◽  
Expert Committee ◽  
Strong Argument ◽  
Direct Discrimination ◽  
Indirect Discrimination ◽  
The Right

<p>The Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency (the Percy Commission) in its 1957 report put the case for providing “forms of control, within stated limits, over people suffering from mental disorder which do not apply to other people”. Paragraph 314 (i) of the report offers the following justification for compulsory treatment in the interests of the patient’s health: “When an illness or disability itself affects the patient’s judgment and appreciation of his own condition, there is a specially strong argument for saying that his own interests demand that the decision whether or not to accept medical examination, care or treatment should not be left entirely to his own distorted or defective judgment. Admission to hospital against the patient’s wishes at the time may be the only way of providing him with the treatment or training which may restore his health or enable him to take his place as a self-supporting member of the community or to develop his limited capabilities to the greatest possible extent. The better the prospects are of treatment or training being successful, the more important this consideration becomes.” The report goes on to say: “No form of mental disorder should be considered to be, by itself, a sufficient ground for depriving a person of his liberty. It is necessary to balance the possible benefits of treatment or training, the protection of the patient and the protection of other persons, on the one hand, against the patient’s loss of liberty on the other.”</p><p>This rationale, which is reflected in the provisions of the 1983 Act, is rejected in the Report of the Expert Committee on the Review of the Mental Health Act 1983 because it discriminates against the mentally disordered by depriving them of the right to patient autonomy, that is the right of people to make effective treatment choices. Crucially, the right depends upon the patient having capacity to make such choices: “Patient autonomy brings with it an inevitable emphasis on capacity.” (para.2.4) The purpose of this paper is to argue that the Expert Committee’s approach is flawed. First, because it would merely, to use the terminology of discrimination law, replace direct discrimination with indirect discrimination. Second, because in conceptualising the detainable mentally ill patient as lacking capacity to make choices about treatment it erodes the validity of other choices which such a person may make. Third, that it tends to weaken the criteria for compulsion to what is, in effect, a best interests test. Fourth, that the justiciability of questions of capacity is problematic where the incapacity both results from mental illness and is considered in the context of treatment for mental illness.</p>

Fool’s Gold: Psychologists Using Disingenuous Reasoning to Mislead Legislatures into Granting Psychologists Prescriptive Authority

2003 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 489-524
Author(s):  
Brent Pollitt
Keyword(s):  
Primary Care ◽  
Mental Illness ◽  
Nurse Practitioners ◽  
Primary Care Physicians ◽  
American Psychological Association ◽  
The United States ◽  
Psychotropic Medications ◽  
American Psychological ◽  
Training Requirements ◽  
Prescriptive Authority

Mental illness is a serious problem in the United States. Based on “current epidemiological estimates, at least one in five people has a diagnosable mental disorder during the course of a year.” Fortunately, many of these disorders respond positively to psychotropic medications. While psychiatrists write some of the prescriptions for psychotropic medications, primary care physicians write more of them. State legislatures, seeking to expand patient access to pharmacological treatment, granted physician assistants and nurse practitioners prescriptive authority for psychotropic medications. Over the past decade other groups have gained some form of prescriptive authority. Currently, psychologists comprise the primary group seeking prescriptive authority for psychotropic medications.The American Society for the Advancement of Pharmacotherapy (“ASAP”), a division of the American Psychological Association (“APA”), spearheads the drive for psychologists to gain prescriptive authority. The American Psychological Association offers five main reasons why legislatures should grant psychologists this privilege: 1) psychologists’ education and clinical training better qualify them to diagnose and treat mental illness in comparison with primary care physicians; 2) the Department of Defense Psychopharmacology Demonstration Project (“PDP”) demonstrated non-physician psychologists can prescribe psychotropic medications safely; 3) the recommended post-doctoral training requirements adequately prepare psychologists to prescribe safely psychotropic medications; 4) this privilege will increase availability of mental healthcare services, especially in rural areas; and 5) this privilege will result in an overall reduction in medical expenses, because patients will visit only one healthcare provider instead of two–one for psychotherapy and one for medication.

A Tribute to the Late William J. Curran

1996 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 274-275
Author(s):  
O. Lawrence ◽  
J.D. Gostin
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Health Care ◽  
Mental Illness ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Mental Health Care ◽  
Harvard University ◽  
Legal Medicine ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
International Institute ◽  
University Professor

In the summer of 1979, a group of experts on law, medicine, and ethics assembled in Siracusa, Sicily, under the auspices of the International Commission of Jurists and the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Science, to draft guidelines on the rights of persons with mental illness. Sitting across the table from me was a quiet, proud man of distinctive intelligence, William J. Curran, Frances Glessner Lee Professor of Legal Medicine at Harvard University. Professor Curran was one of the principal drafters of those guidelines. Many years later in 1991, after several subsequent re-drafts by United Nations (U.N.) Rapporteur Erica-Irene Daes, the text was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly as the Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care. This was the kind of remarkable achievement in the field of law and medicine that Professor Curran repeated throughout his distinguished career.

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