Long-term Competition in a Dynamic Game: The Cold Fish War

1987 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 596 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Cave
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (20) ◽  
pp. 5708 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yunxian Hou ◽  
Pengfei Chen

After the policy of separating ownership rights, contract rights, and management rights to rural land, some Chinese farmers entrusted their land to agricultural social service providers. However, at present in land trusteeships, short-term behaviors exist, which are not good for the sustainable utilization of land. This article uses a dynamic game model to analyze the economic reasons for short-term behavior and to explore possible mechanisms. The study’s results showed that fluctuations in trusteeship prices encouraged farmers to sign low-price, long-term contracts or high-price, short-term contracts that allowed agricultural social service providers choose short-term behaviors. A variable-price system may avoid short-term contracts as a result of fluctuations in trusteeship prices, allowing both sides to build a long-term stable partnership, encouraging long-term investment in land. To ensure the sustainable utilization of land, it is suggested that both sides adopt a variable price system.


2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Xu ◽  
Govindan Kannan ◽  
Xiaoli Yang ◽  
Jian Li ◽  
Xiukun Zhao

The contract between the carrier and forwarder is a long-term issue, and the repeated contract business makes the forwarder develop a reference point based on the contract prices, and this reference effect, to a large extent, affects the forwarder’s contract purchasing decisions. Based on that, this paper introduces the reference effect in the sea-cargo supply chain and studies a multiple-period contract problem between the carrier and the forwarder. It is found that when the capacity price in the spot market is less than the forwarder’s willingness-to-pay, the forwarder’s contract purchasing decision is not affected by the reference effect, only by the capacity price in the spot market, and the multiple-period contract problem can be simplified into a single-period game. In addition, the carrier’s optimal contract wholesale price approaches the capacity price in the spot market. Although, the forwarder’s contract purchasing decision depends upon the reference effect, it is difficult to derive the closed-form solution. Moreover, because of the risk in the spot market, the carrier tends to sell his/her capacity in the contract market. Finally, we employ the numerical simulation to study the carrier’s contract pricing decisions and the forwarder’s capacity purchasing decisions in two cases.


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (14) ◽  
pp. 1950190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Shunqi Hou ◽  
Binshuo Bao

This paper studies a dual-channel apparel supply chain faced with strategic consumers and uncertain demands, where the dominant retailer decides its service level and offline price first, and the manufacturer decides the online price later on. This paper develops a framework to examine the impacts of quick response on the system’s short-term profitability and long-term stability. To make comparisons, two scenarios are considered, in which the supply chain system adopts and does not adopt quick response, respectively. The optimal decisions and profits of the firms are first analyzed in two scenarios, and dynamic game models are then developed to study the complex characteristics. Comparisons in supply chain outputs and system stability are further made between these two scenarios. The results show that the imbalance of risks in two channels affects the performance of quick response that tends to benefit the retailer more, while it benefits the manufacturer only when the return rate is extremely high and consumers care much about the purchase channels. However, quick response certainly contributes to the system stability, which not only provides a larger stable region for firms to adjust their decisions, but also makes the system less sensitive to the consumers’ valuation for the product. Along with this, it is easier for the chaotic system with quick response to restore the stability.


2013 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 64-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yanhong Guo

With the development of e-commerce, online purchasing has made competitions among retailers fiercer than ever. Access on the internet influences traditional purchasing access inevitably. In this paper, the author uses Hotelling model to simulate the dynamic pricing process between online retailers and off-line retailers by the two steps game model. It gives a straightforward demonstration of the dynamic game process and results between the two retailers--online and off-line. Via the solutions of the model, it is revealed that the preference between online purchase and off-line purchase, as well as switching costs, have a direct impact on pricing strategy of retailers. This paper makes a clear and close analysis of the impact, holding that with the existence of long-term profit, competitors will choose to lower the price to win over consumers.


2019 ◽  
Vol 05 (01) ◽  
pp. 1850019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis Sears ◽  
David Lim ◽  
C.-Y. Cynthia Lin Lawell

The design of policies and institutions to promote the sustainable management of groundwater resources for use in agriculture is both a long-term and short-term challenge in California and globally. When designing groundwater management policies, it is important to account for spatial externalities that may lead groundwater users to behave non-cooperatively. Spatial externalities arise because groundwater users face a common pool resource problem: because farmers are sharing the aquifer with other farmers, other farmers’ pumping affects their extraction cost and the amount of water they have available to pump. In this paper, we present a dynamic game framework for analyzing spatial groundwater management. In particular, we characterize the Markov perfect equilibrium resulting from non-cooperative behavior, and compare it with the socially optimal coordinated solution. In order to analyze the benefits from internalizing spatial externalities in California, we calibrate our dynamic game framework to California, and conduct a numerical analysis to calculate the deadweight loss arising from non-cooperative behavior. Results show that the inefficiencies arising from spatial externalities are driven by higher returns on crops, electricity input prices, whether the crop is an annual crop versus a perennial, the level of the groundwater stock, the climate of the region, and the adjustment costs of fallowing production. We find that the benefits from coordinated management in California are particularly high when crop prices are high.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (12) ◽  
pp. e0260529
Author(s):  
Jorge Herrera de la Cruz ◽  
José-Manuel Rey

A stable and rewarding love relationship is considered a key ingredient for happiness in Western culture. Building a successful long-term relationship can be viewed as a control engineering problem, where the control variable is the effort to be made to keep the relationship alive and well. We introduce a new mathematical model for the effort control problem of a couple in love who wants to stay together forever. The problem can be naturally formulated as a dynamic game in continuous time with nonlinearities. Adopting a dynamic programming approach, a tractable computational formulation of the problem is proposed together with an accompanying algorithm to find numerical solutions of the couple’s effort problem. The computational analysis of the model is used to explore feeling trajectories, effort control paths, happiness, and stabilization mechanisms for different types of successful couples. In particular, the simulation analysis provides insight into the pattern of change of both marital quality and effort making in intact marriages and how they are affected by certain level of heterogamy in the couple.


2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 278-290
Author(s):  
Dariusz Karaś ◽  

The aim of the study is to indicate the usefulness of game theory in the context of the effectiveness of geopolitical problem analysis in terms of improving decision-making in relation to Arctic areas. The article presents a series of significant global Arctic problems related to open fisheries, opening Arctic areas for the extraction of natural resources or creating new and more favorable sea routes for transporting goods. Key players in the Arctic area have been identified along with their conflicting claims. It was mentioned that cooperation leads to a reduction in social costs and the stimulation of economic development in the main areas of interest for individual countries. To verify the assumptions, an experiment based on a tragedy of the commons was carried out, in which the participants took the role of fisher-hunters and mining companies. The experiment took the form of a dynamic game, where in each round the participants decided on the volume of catches and resources extracted. The results showed that limiting the freedom of action extended the time of the game, and thus the functioning of the entities and the duration of resources. Leaving plenty of capacity led to agreement between the players and the self-introduction of limits. The experiment showed that the players were aware that only agreement led to gaining benefits in the long term. Thus the creation of an institution supervising disputed areas can lead to conflict mitigation, where entities with different goals and interests must reach agreement, especially when the key challenge is to avoid degradation of the resources and the environment.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
John P. A. Ioannidis

AbstractNeurobiology-based interventions for mental diseases and searches for useful biomarkers of treatment response have largely failed. Clinical trials should assess interventions related to environmental and social stressors, with long-term follow-up; social rather than biological endpoints; personalized outcomes; and suitable cluster, adaptive, and n-of-1 designs. Labor, education, financial, and other social/political decisions should be evaluated for their impacts on mental disease.


2016 ◽  
Vol 39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary C. Potter

AbstractRapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) of words or pictured scenes provides evidence for a large-capacity conceptual short-term memory (CSTM) that momentarily provides rich associated material from long-term memory, permitting rapid chunking (Potter 1993; 2009; 2012). In perception of scenes as well as language comprehension, we make use of knowledge that briefly exceeds the supposed limits of working memory.


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